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ABSTRACT 
Transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) have emerged as one of the 21st century’s contemporary 
approaches to management of natural resources which span the borders of two or more countries. 
Robust arguments exist that boundaries hamper the conservation objectives of migratory species. 
On the basis of the claimed potential of TFCAs to reconcile the conservation and economic 
development objectives of nations through tourism, TFCAs have been widely embraced in 
Southern Africa as a model for governing shared resources. TFCAs in Southern Africa have been 
motivated by both ecological and socio-economic factors, TFCAs are also politically motivated. 
This study uses the lens of political ecology to understand the motivation of Zambia’s participation 
in the Kavango–Zambezi TFCA (KAZA TFCA). KAZA TFCA is one of the largest TFCAs in the 
world and is said to be home to the largest number of the remaining African elephants 
(approximately 120,000).  
This five-country TFCA spans large rural landscapes that are a potential site for extensive tourism 
and currently provide livelihood opportunities for many poor rural households. This study assesses 
the investments of Zambia’s government in the KAZA TFCA. It uses the case study of Simalaha 
Community Conservancy in the Western Province of Zambia to examine the implications of the 
KAZA TFCAs on the local population in the conservancy. The research uses semi-structured 
interviews, field observations and secondary data to advance an argument that TFCAs do not 
always yield positive gains for both governments and local communities. Gains depend on several 
factors, such as level of development of a country, level of tourism development and the 
preparedness of a participating nation to invest in and benefit from a TFCA. The study establishes 
that KAZA is an unequal investment landscape, with Zambia being one of the lesser investors in 
the KAZA TFCA. In addition, the notion that the TFCA model embodies the poverty reduction 
objectives meant to benefit local populations is contestable as the KAZA on the Zambian side 
(Simalaha community) has not improved the welfare of the local people. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
There is a growing body of work and policy debates on the formation and role of transfrontier 
conservation areas (TFCAs) in transforming the conservation landscape in Southern Africa. 
Governments support TFCAs in the form of monetary contribution, release of land for TFCA 
formation and in technical resourcing. However, while it is said that the Kavango-Zambezi 
(KAZA) TFCA in Southern Africa is the largest TFCA in the world, there are no guarantees that 
it would bring development in Southern Africa as the proponents of TFCAs claim. Major efforts 
to align nature conservation policies have been drafted and protocols signed to pave the way for 
TFCAs in Southern Africa, but countries continue to have different priorities and legal positions 
on important conservation efforts and tourism development initiatives. Furthermore, the role and 
capacity of the state in promulgating and implementing nature conservation policies to ensure 
sustainable development remain questionable in Southern Africa.  
In nature conservation programmes in Southern Africa, the state is often viewed as a weak 
institution which has failed to deliver on its mandate to conserve biological diversity 
(Ramutsindela, 2008). In relation to this, scholars have made many accusations against the state, 
including the view that states issue licenses to private companies and bankroll polluters. The state 
has further been accused of favouring and working with private sectors and donors in projects 
which degrade the environment (Brubaker, 1995; Ramutsindela, 2008). Thus, states have no 
capacity to regulate powerful polluters such as transnational corporations (TNCs). On the contrary, 
it can be argued that since time immemorial, environmental issues have always been at the heart 
of the state. In its quest to protect the environment, the state comes up with policies and legislation. 
Similarly, the Zambian government, like other states, enacted several pieces of legislation and 
policies which include: Environmental Management Act number 12 of 2011, National Policy on 
Environmental of 2007, Forestry Act Number 4 of 2015, Fisheries Act number 22 of 2011, and 
Water Resource Management Act Number 21 of 2011, among others.  
All these instruments are essential in regulating the uses and access to resources in order to protect 
the environment. Thus, Peluso (1993) argues that states drive conservation efforts and have the 
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capacity, internal legitimacy and will to manage and control the resources within their boundaries. 
Ideally, this is reflected in different environmental management approaches which have been 
adopted in order to redress the problem of biodiversity loss and preserve important ecosystems, 
thereby preserving threatened wildlife. As discussed below, the conservation sector has witnessed 
changes in environmental management which have necessitated shifts in power relations among 
the stakeholders involved, including the state, donors and local communities, among others. The 
actors are involved in power struggles as they seek to control access and ownership of key natural 
resources such as wildlife, water and land, among others. Thus, these dynamics can best be 
understood through the lens of political ecology, for reasons discussed in Chapter Two of this 
dissertation. In relation to the foregoing arguments, Durand points out that:  
Any discourse on wildlife tends to be about social relationships…thus, in conservation 
power acts within social structures that both allow and restrict human agency. As 
individuals and groups take part in social relations by mobilizing their identity and other 
resources, they reshape, transform and reproduce the web of power (Durand 2019:23) 
Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis was on fortress conservation, characterized by an 
exclusionary approach (Vaccaro and Beltran, 2013). This model entailed creation and expansion 
of more protected areas; it became common but most extensive form of environmental 
conservation (Adams, 2003; 2004; Johannesen, 2006; Hutton et.al, 2011). Central to this kind of 
conservation in Africa is the moral question of separating human beings from their natural 
resources which is the basis for their survival (Adams, 2004). This is because where it has been 
implemented the local people are displaced from their land and access to natural resources is 
restricted, leading to both economic and cultural losses (Dowie, 2009). In addition to this, 
Sinthumule (2019) argues that TFCAs tend to promote conservation and commercial enterprises 
while the local people’s needs are overlooked. Thus, this approach to conservation is viewed by 
some scholars as a manifestation of neoliberal conservation (Buscher & Dietz, 2005; Fletcher, 
2010; Buscher, 2013).Given the inadequacies of fortress conservation models that include small 
geographical coverage, loss of ecosystems due to fragmentation continues to be a major challenge 
in Southern Africa(Western 2002; Adams 2004).Fortress conservation was also accused of 
favouring the interests of the elites at international, national and community levels alike (Duffy 
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2005; Wolmer 2003). This implies that the fortress conservation approach underplayed the 
importance of local community participation in conservation. 
As such, this approach has been vulnerable to damaging critiques because it ignores the fact that 
local communities and wildlife have co-existed for many years (Dowie, 2009). It assumes that 
human beings are enemies of conservation, therefore the opening up of political borders for 
wildlife to roam freely results in the creation of borders between the local people and nature. Given 
this important practical lapse in the conceptual and practical design and execution of a protected 
areas approach to conservation, the approach is seen as a threat to the survival, human rights and 
wellbeing of indigenous people. In relation to the above, Murphree (2002:2) argues that “the old 
narrative of fortress conservation' was largely displaced by the counter-narrative of development 
through community conservation and sustainable use."  Hence the shift to community-based 
environmental conservation (CBC) in the 1980s and 1990s, where the state decentralized natural 
resource management and the local communities were in charge of controlling and managing the 
natural resources.  
However, the local communities were seen to be ineffective in conserving wildlife and biodiversity 
and hence the need for a more robust approach to conservation, which separates local people from 
wildlife (Büscher, 2005). There has been a call for conservation approaches which do not only 
protect biodiversity but also alleviate poverty. Scholars have therefore called for an approach 
which draws conservation and development together (Jeanrenaud, 2002). This left the 
conservationists without any choice but to shift back to the barriers in place in the late 1990s. This 
gave back the power to control and manage natural resources to the states.  In this case, states have 
the mandate to defend, control and manage threatened natural resources. Thus, conservationists 
and states endeavour to find approaches which simultaneously achieve conservation objectives 
and economic development. In this context, economic development is understood as the 
improvement in the living standards of the local people, improved infrastructure and increased 
revenue for the country, among other things, as a result of the growth of the tourism sector. As 
such, this kind of approach is thought to be a way of promoting sustainable development and 
reconciling nature with cultural, economic and social advancement brought about by increased 
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income through tourism (Ramutsindela, 2004).  However, most of the countries’ natural resources 
are not border-bound but, rather, often transcend political boundaries.  
Therefore, the argument for the establishment of TFCA has been that conservation of natural 
resources requires transnational management because the resources are not restricted by national 
borders, and their effective management requires international co-operation (Ferreira, 2004; 
Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008). Munthali (2007) describe Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) as 
a part or components of a larger eco-region that straddles the border between two or more 
countries, encompassing one or more protected areas as well as multiple resource areas for the use 
of communities and private landholders, managed for sustainable use of natural resources. Other 
scholars refer to peace parks as large conservation areas which straddle states’ political boundaries 
with the purpose of saving biological diversity, enhancing local community welfare and promoting 
peace and cooperation among the member states (Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016).  Proponents 
of TFCAs, or peace parks, argue that transboundary natural resource management is better at 
achieving the conservation objectives than isolated protected areas (Ramutsindela, 2014).  Some 
scholars have argued that TFCAs may not produce tangible results because they are too ambitious 
(Rusinga and Mapira, 2012) and “informed by a disparate array of discourses – anarchist, 
scientific, romantic, managerial and neoliberal – and bound up with an equally disparate range of 
environmental, economic and political agendas” (Wolmer, 2003:2). Based on claims of high 
capacities of straddling state boundaries as a means to achieve conservation objectives, as 
explained in Chapter Two, the TFCA approach has received strong endorsements in Southern 
Africa. Consequently, at the core of TFCAs is the drive to transform international borders and 
transnational spaces into a borderless landscape (Fall, 2003; Noe, 2012; Ramutsindela, 2014). This 
will allow free movement of wildlife across political borders. Proponents argue that TFCAs 
provide a holistic approach to managing complex drivers of biodiversity loss in Southern Africa 
and providing lasting solutions to diverse poor rural communities living close to the TFCAs. Thus, 
unlike the protected areas approach, TFCAs in Southern Africa represent a nexus for conservation 
and development (Ramutsindela, 2007). 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) 
influence member states to participate in TFCAs based on the TFCA’s claimed benefits. While the 
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SADC largely sees TFCAs as a mechanism to influence its objectives in terms of conservation of 
natural resources and regional integration, PPF raises funds to form and manage TFCA in Southern 
Africa. Thus, through overarching regional conservation policy objectives and financing 
arrangements, both the SADC and PPF have a direct influence on the architecture and functioning 
of TFCAS in the region. As such TFCAs are increasingly being embraced by various actors in 
Southern Africa, ranging from states, political leaders, local communities, nature conservation 
officials, border officials, conservation and tourism organizations, bilateral and multilateral aid 
agencies, the private sector Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), among others (Duffy, 2006; Adam & Hume, 2001). This is mostly in 
recognition of TFCA’s scales, which are capable of conserving biodiversity while at the same time 
achieving socioeconomic development and promoting a culture of peace (Hanks, 2003; 
Ramutsindela, 2004). Participating states invest huge portions of land among other investments. 
However, it is important to note that some parts of land reserved for conservation is already 
occupied by people. Therefore, the creation of and investments in TFCAs has implications for the 
local people. Although TFCAs are said to reconcile both conservation efforts and development, 
the benefits of conservation do not always trickle down to the local people (Ramutsindela, 2004) 
as seen in the continued poverty among the people living near the parks. As indicated above, the 
role of the state is cardinal because cross border resource management brings to the fore issues of 
sovereignty and national security (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016).  
The adoption of transboundary solutions due to the transboundary nature of environmental 
problems, has led to the emergence of what Duffy (2006) refers to as global environmental 
governance. Global environmental governance shifts conservation responsibilities from the states 
to non-state entities and complex, non-territorial global networks of international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank international organizations and environmental NGOs (Duffy, 
2006 Duffield, 2014). Thus, this approach has been criticised for only concentrating the benefits 
of conservation through tourism in the hands of a few elites. Similarly, Terborgh (2004) argues 
that conservation fails to achieve development due to political instability, power abuses and 
corruption, among others, by the government and international organizations. In relation to this, 
Zimparks (2011) argues that despite TFCAs gaining in popularity, their implementation on the 
ground remains difficult, especially in relation to delivering benefits to local people. 
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Therefore, for the local population to see and enjoy the benefits, conservation farming has been 
introduced in TFCAs. Incorporation of conservation farming is a 21stcentury entrant in TFCAs in 
Southern Africa. This is an idea that is spearheaded and implemented by non-governmental 
organizations, with the blessing of the state. This is because conservation farming is a quicker 
way of improving farm productivity, food security and profits among the poorest communities in 
these states. Conservation farming has been recommended as a solution to low agricultural 
produce and TFCA proponents1 have started to portray conservation farming  as a ‘quick win’ in 
TFCA projects (Haggblade & Tembo, 2003; Haggblade and Zulu, 2003; Arslan, et al., 2014).1.2 
Problem statement 
Over recent years, there has been an increasing coalition of interest in Southern Africa for 
management of natural resources that transcend political boundaries (Wolmer, 2003; Munthali, 
2007; Ramutsindela 2007; Anderson et al., 2013). To this effect, huge amounts of international 
and national financing have been pumped into TFCAs. Investments have included human resource 
development and the signing of treaties and IDPs among the participating countries. As such, 
TFCAs have been presented as a win-win situation between conservation and the local populations 
(Murphy, 2010). TFCAs are also seen as a vehicle for economic growth, peace and security among 
member states. TFCAs are promoted as a way of eliminating conflict over natural resources and 
to cooperatively encourage sustainable economic development (Duffy, 2005).  
Transborder management of resources requires a clear understanding among participating 
countries. In relation to this, Metcalfe and Kepe (2008:99) argue that “conservation of natural 
resources across borders requires governance across a tenurial mosaic of managerial units based 
on reconciliation of social, economic, and ecological objectives.” In addition, the implementation 
of TFCAs requires vast portions of land for wildlife mobility. Thus, some scholars have argued 
that large scale conservation promotes tourism, an economic argument that has raised the policy 
profile and popularity of TFCAs in the recent past (Anderson et al., 2013; Munthali, 2007; 
Ramutsindela 2007; Wolmer, 2003). Similarly, some scholars have posited that conservation of 
natural resources that transcend boundaries poses both a challenge and an opportunity for fostering 
security, stability, peace, international corporation and socio-economic growth (Ali, 2003; Hanks, 
                                                          
1 https://www.peaceparks.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/PeaceParksFoundationBrochureWeb.pdf, visited 12/10/19  
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2003; Wolmer, 2003). In this regard, TFCAs are seen to reconcile environmental conservation and 
development agendas. Adenle (2012) argues that for developing countries in Africa, conservation 
and wise use of biodiversity is cardinal in fostering development. Some scholars have questioned 
the role and credibility of TFCAs in fostering local and national development in regions like Africa 
(Katerere et al., 2001; Wolmer, 2003; Duffy, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2007; Buscher, 2013).  
Proponents of TFCAs argue that TFCA projects will lead to economic and social development, 
through job creation because tourism is cited as one of the fastest growing industries (Van der 
Linde et al., 2001; Sandwith et al., 2001; Hanks, 2003). However, in most parts of Southern Africa 
where TFCAs have been implemented, such benefits have not yet materialized (Anderson et al, 
2013; Chenje & Johnson , 1994). A critical review of literature (Wolmer, 2003; Ramutsindela, 
2004; Hughes, 2005; Duffy, 2016) indicates that TFCAs represent ‘green imperialism’ where 
nature is commodified and sold to the wealthy and powerful, under the guise of conservation. This 
works to satisfy the interests of a few elites in the tourism business, leading to what may be called 
privatization of natural resources out of the hands of the less powerful and often vulnerable local 
communities to a few networked and powerful elites. Thus, TFCAs have disadvantages the people 
for whom they are designed to save. In relation to this Ramutsindela (2004) argues that most of 
the rural communities situated adjacent to conservation areas live in absolute poverty, there are no 
indications of the promised benefits of conservation (Chiutsi and Saarinen, 2017). Similarly, 
Benjaminsen, et al., (2006) argue that conservation pushes the poor into absolute poverty by 
grabbing the natural resources on which they previously depended on. Dzingirai (2004) sees 
TFCAs as CBNRM at large, as a way of disenfranchising transfrontier communities by reducing 
their traditional access and control over resources. TFCAs shift the ownership of resources such 
as communal land on which community livelihoods depend to states and private business. Some 
scholars argue that TFCAs have made the rural communities more vulnerable by undermining the 
community based natural resources (Wolmer, 2003; Hutton, et al., 2005; Munthali, 2007). For 
Ramutsindela (2004: 62) TFCAs represent a form of: 
Glocalization, where traditional scalar boundaries are muddled and, importantly, actors are 
able to function on multiple scales simultaneously. … he sees the growth of TFCAs in the 
region (Southern Africa) as born of …the quest for global stewardship over, and…growing 
8 
   
commercial interest in, biodiversity, and…facilitated by post-apartheid (postcolonial) 
political, socioeconomic and historical circumstances that cannot effectively be reduced to 
particular scales. 
Therefore, TFCAs emphasize war, not peace. This is because areas earmarked for peace parks are 
not empty spaces but, instead, spaces filled with multiple networks that are equally interested in 
access and control of the resources in the area. This state of affairs leads to conflict and may result 
in violence and ‘bloodshed’ when the state uses excessive force to evict the occupants or original 
settlers. Furthermore, the exacerbation of inter-state differences induced by power imbalances and 
development status in the region, and harmonization of land use and legal systems across 
boundaries can easily become sources of conflict and controversy (Wolmer, 2003; Lunstrum, 
2013).  
Given the above policy and conceptual contradictions and dilemmas, it is clear that much research 
needs to be done to further understand the role and operationalization of TFCAs in Southern 
Africa. There is a need to understand the dynamics set in motion by the creation of peace parks in 
Southern Africa. Furthermore, in the wake of increasing adoption of TFCAs in the region, research 
needs to examine the nature and impact of investments that state and the private sector put in to 
exploit the claimed benefits of TFCAs. To fill these research gaps, this study examines the 
establishment of the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier conservation area and its dynamics on the 
Zambian component. It is important to understand the dynamics and implications of the Zambian 
government’s investment in the KAZA on the local people. This study will further analyse the 
nature and impact of investments made in the KAZA by actors on the Zambian component. 
1.3 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of the study is to investigate the motivations behind Zambia’s participation and its 
investment in the KAZA TFCA and the implications for the creation of KAZA on the local 
communities in Simalaha Community Conservancy in western Zambia. 
The study is guided by the following objectives:  
1. To document the motivation for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA 
2. To understand Zambia’s investment in the KAZA. 
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3. To explore the implications of the KAZA on the local population in Simalaha area 
Questions that guided the collection of data were: 
1. Why is Zambia participating in the KAZA TFCA? 
2. What has Zambia invested in the KAZA TFCA? 
3. What are the implications of the KAZA TFCA on the local communities on the Zambian 
side? 
1.4 The study site: The Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area 
Figure 1.1 below shows the location and boundaries of the KAZA TFCA. The KAZA TFCA is 
situated in the Okavango and Zambezi River, where the borders of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe converge (TCC, 2006; Cumming, 2008; KAZA TFCA Master IDP, 2013), 
covering an area of almost 520,000km2.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Location and boundaries of KAZA TFCA, Source: KAZA TFCA IDP, 2013 
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The area has a total of 20 national parks, 85 Forest Reserves, 22 Conservancies, 11 Sanctuaries, 
103 Wildlife Management Areas and 11 Game Management Areas. Zambia boasts a spectacular 
array of mega fauna and several international tourist attractions such as the iconic Victoria Falls 
(Metcalfe, 2008; Adams, 2009). The rationale for creating KAZA is that it is home to thousands 
of species of fauna and flora, including more than 200,000 African elephants and is one of the 
largest TFCAs in the world.  Therefore, KAZA re-establishes the ecological systems and corridors, 
which allow free movement of wildlife across human and politically imposed boarders (Cumming, 
2011; Jones, 2008; Bennett, 2003). However, the free movement of huge population of elephants 
has occasioned human-animal conflicts among the people living close to the parks (Metcalfe & 
Kepe, 2008). 
However, it must be noted that Figure 1.1 above does not represent the permanent boundary of the 
KAZA, but it is subject to change, because the KAZA landscape is expanding as participating 
countries increase their land contribution to the KAZA TFCA. Botswana is a case in point. It has 
increased its boundaries and has become the largest land contributor, followed by Zambia (see 
Chapter Five). This is in line with the provisions of the KAZA treaty. The KAZA boundaries 
include communal land. The KAZA covers 40% of state protected area and 60% communal land. 
The ownership of communal land in some Southern African states is vested in the hands of the 
president, this gives states authority over communal land and the local communities have less 
power and do not participate in high-level decision-making meetings (SADC, 2007). In chiefdoms, 
the chiefs are the custodians of the land. The link between communal land and conservation is 
based on the understanding that communal land acts as a repository, due to its rich biodiversity 
(Ramutsindela & Noe, 2012). In addition, the geographical space of TFCAs emphasizes the 
realization of a claimed positive nexus between conservation and tourism development. It is 
therefore essential that conservation and socioeconomic objectives are mutually reinforcing and 
not conflicting (Cumming, 1999; Metcalfe, 1999; Metcalfe, 2008). Due to the fact that the 
community makes a significant contribution in terms of sharing its space with wildlife, it is 
expected that the benefits derived from their conservation efforts should be mutual and not 
conflicting (Metcalfe, 2008). 
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Prior to the establishment of the KAZA, information shows that there were activities such as 
stocktaking in the participating countries in order to account for the resources and assets each 
country had (see Chapter Five). There was also a need for research to determine the geographical 
boundaries of the KAZA in each participating state. Not only was there a need for political will, 
but donors wanted to see the financial commitment from the participating countries before making 
payments, and financial commitment was in the form of an annual subscription fee of 60, 000 U$D 
per year (see Chapter Four). 
Furthermore, the KAZA establishment was preceded by cross border initiatives as far back as the 
1990s.  It began as the Transboundary Natural Resource Management initiative and the Okavango- 
Upper Zambezi International Tourism Initiative (OUZIT) in 1993. Here South Africa was actively 
involved through the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) that facilitated the creation of 
the Southern African Wildlife Sanctuary located in the present KAZA location. This initiative was 
in accordance with the SADC tourism sector project under the Regional Tourism Organization of 
Southern Africa (RETOSA) (PPF, 2006; Suich et al., 2004; Spenceley, 2008). However, OUZIT 
was later abandoned due to lack of support by the relevant governments, as well as its narrow 
scope, OUZIT only focused on expansion of the tourism sector and less attention was given to 
conservation. Later the “Four Corners” initiative was born. This name is derived from the fact that 
four countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana - shared a colonial border (Spenceley, 
2008). Coordination of this initiative was done by African Wildlife Fund (AWF) with funding 
from United States Agency for International Development (USAID). On 24 July 2003, a very 
important meeting took place, which defined the pathway of the KAZA. At this meeting, convened 
in Katimo Mulilo, the Ministers responsible for tourism in Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe (member states) agreed on the vision for the KAZA TFCA initiative (KfW, 2014). 
The Ministers of Environment and tourism in the member states met again on 7 December 2006, 
in Victoria Falls town of Zimbabwe, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding. An MoU is not a 
legally binding document but provides direction on the procedure to be undertaken when 
establishing a particular TFCA (SADC, 2007). Thus, MoUs set the institutional and political 
motion for the establishment of the KAZA TFCA (KfW, 2014). In signing this memorandum of 
understanding the countries committed (KAZA 2006) to: 
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1. Ensure co-operation at the national level among governmental authorities, communities, 
non-governmental organizations and the private sector; 
2. Co-operate to develop common approaches to natural resources management and tourism 
development and; 
3. Collaborate to achieve the objectives of relevant international agreements to which they 
are party.  
The MoU’s objectives are as follows: 
1. Foster transnational collaboration and co-operation among Member States in implementing 
ecosystems and cultural resources management through the establishment and 
development of the TFCA; 
2. Promote alliances in the management of biological and cultural resources and encourage 
social, economic and other partnerships among the Member States and the stakeholders; 
3. Enhance ecosystem integrity and natural ecological processes by harmonising natural 
resources management approaches and tourism development across international 
boundaries; 
4. Develop mechanisms and strategies for local communities to participate meaningfully in, 
and tangibly benefit from the TFCA; 
5. Promote cross-border tourism as a means of fostering regional socio-economic 
development (KAZA, 2006). 
The KAZA TFCA deal was sealed by the signing of a treaty on 18 August 2011 in Luanda, 
involving the Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Linell et.al, 2019). The treaty 
was important for the KAZA TFCA because it is a legal requirement for commitments to be 
announced publicly and is binding enough to show the seriousness attached to it (SADC, 2007). 
A treaty represents a bond and shows that the countries involved have a common goal. Most 
importantly it shows the political will and commitment, because when the president signs, it 
becomes binding for the country and thus making it acceptable and not easily reversible. This 
relates to Murphy’s observation that the political commitment of the countries is important for the 
success of TFCAs (Murphy, 2008; Munthali et.al, 2018). Thus, the KAZA treaty was signed to 
ensure that KAZA agreement cannot easily be changed due to changes in government regimes. 
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Therefore, the treaties are signed in order to gain political support, without which implementation 
of TFCAs may be difficult. 
Following the signing of the treaty, there was a need to adopt it. The adoption of the treaty differed 
from one country to the other. In relation to this, officials added that in some countries it involved 
going to parliament for ratification while in others adoption of the treaty falls within the mandate 
of the executive, meaning approval by the Cabinet is taken as ratification and was enough to adopt 
the treaty (Civil Society Organization 1, interview, 22 January 2018). In Zambia the treaty was 
adopted in 2011 by the Cabinet and taken to parliament, not to debate but to inform the parliament. 
Prior to ratification of the treaty there was extensive consultation, this was done because it had 
implication on the treasury of each country as each country needed to contribute the annual 
subscription fee therefore the treasury had to be involved (Civil Society Organization 1, interview, 
22 January 2018). Further, there was need for tax exemption on donor money by the treasury of 
each country. There was also need for vehicles from KAZA to be exempted from paying tax when 
moving in any of the five member states. 
Despite the treaty stating that the KAZA is supposed to take an integrated approach in natural 
resource management (KAZA, 2016). KAZA is dominated by the wildlife issues. This is because 
the entry point for KAZA TFCAs was wildlife. As such the KAZA technical committee, senior 
officials permanent, Ministers are all from wildlife departments and Ministries in charge of 
wildlife and tourism (See figure 1.2). Therefore, KAZA is more inclined to wildlife conservation 
as most officers working in the participating countries as liaison offices under the KAZA 
secretariat are mostly people who have been seconded from the wildlife sector (SADC, 2007). 
Thus, the KAZA in particular underplays forestry, fisheries and water resources, this signal a 
missed opportunity. This was confirmed by one government official who stated that the KAZA 
unit in Zambia sits under the Ministry of Tourism and Arts, because tourism is closely linked to 
wildlife and the main base for tourism development in Zambia is wildlife, therefore, wildlife is 
looked at as a tourist attraction (Civil Society Organization 1, interview, 22 January 2018). This is 
why the authority dealing with wildlife resource management sits in the ministry of tourism and 
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Arts. SADC reinforces the ‘wildlife coat’ 2of the KAZA because most times it is about ‘wildlife 
for fire’ it is rarely about the other resources. Therefore, the need for removal of ‘wildlife coat’ by 
technocrats which makes the mind shift very difficult, there is need for diversification of ‘mind-
set’ this means including other resources which are equally important. Furthermore, the KAZA 
TFCA operations and goals are complex. They are about creating a tourism-based economy while 
addressing the community varied needs. This calls for a multi sectoral approach. 
1.5 Strengthening participatory governance structures in the KAZA 
KAZA is one of the largest and most complex TFCAs in Africa and, as such, its clear management 
necessitated states to cooperate with each other in order to form a structure which can smoothly 
govern the KAZA. Therefore, member states’ sovereignty is constrained by the creation and 
management of transboundary conservation areas (Lungstrum, 2013). As such countries can no 
longer make independent decision on the use of their resources. In view of this the KAZA TFCA 
has a structure which contains a decision-making organ, called the Ministerial Committee, 
comprising of ministers at the top and their role is to give political guidance and approval (KAZA 
TFCA Master IDP, 2013). These Ministers are mainly in charge of wildlife and tourism sector in 
their respective countries. The committee of Ministers is assisted by the committee of senior 
government officials who are Permanent Secretaries in charge of wildlife and tourism within the 
KAZA landscape. Views from government and civil society officials indicate that the committee 
of senior official sits to either approve or adopt requests made by the KAZA secretariat. Below the 
Permanent Secretaries is a body of Joint Technical Management Committee which is composed 
of directors responsible for wildlife and tourism (Master IDP, 2013). 
The technical committee processes and clears documents before they are given to senior officials. 
This level of KAZA governance involves long detailed technical meetings that feed the upper two 
committees with technical and political messages on KAZA. The committee for Directors acts as 
a think tank of the KAZA. Below the Technical Committee is the KAZA secretariat. The KAZA 
Secretariat’s primary focus is to create the enabling environment for all stakeholders and partners 
                                                          
2 Terms used by civil society research participants to explain a singular focus of KAZA on wild animals. They use the term to 
express complaints that KAZA should not just focus on wild animals but should include other natural resources such as land.  
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to synergize towards the optimal realization of the KAZA objectives. The secretariat acts like 
‘glue’.  This ‘glue’ is required for collective mobilization of resources and capacity towards 
achieving the desired outcomes. It is also needed for coordination of activities among member 
states, thereby growing collective values towards sustainability (KFW, 2014). The KAZA 
secretariat includes liaison officers in each of the five participating countries whose role is to 
represent KAZA in those countries and also represent those countries to KAZA secretariat. The 
KAZA secretariat is hosted in Botswana. On the other hand, the SADC secretariat is also in 
Botswana Although there are claims that Botswana offered to host the secretariat, it can be argued 
that the location of the two secretariats is not coincidental, it is a planned move meant for the 
powers to radiate between the two secretariats. Figure 1.2 shows the KAZA governance structure. 
 
Figure 1.3: Organizational structure for KAZA TFCA, Source: KAZA, 2016 
From the diagram above, it is clear that the KAZA takes a top down approach in its decision-
making processes, which implies that theory is different from practice, as the KAZA decision and 
planning structure offers less meaningful participation of the people at the bottom (Spenceley, 
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2012). Given the above governance structure, it is clear that TFCAs alter the state’s exercise of its 
sovereignty over its people and borderland. As seen in figure 2 above, the states’ action is mainly 
influenced by the relationship with other participating countries and different actors. In other 
words, the state does not act independently. Therefore, it can also be argued that transboundary 
natural resources management have a tendency to transfer powers from individual states to 
collaboration by participating states, private sectors and the local people concerned, there by 
making individual states weaker (Strong, 1991; SADC, 2002). 
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
The content of this thesis is presented in seven interlinked chapters. Following this introduction, 
Chapter Two discusses the theoretical framework and analyses key issues. The chapter also 
reviews literature to highlight the evolution and complexity of TFCAs in Southern African states.  
In Chapter Three the methodology of the study is described. The chapter provides reasons why the 
case study was used, the strength and weaknesses of the case study method. The suitability of the 
case study to the research questions is also explained.  Further, data collection methods, including 
document analysis and observations, are discussed. Thereafter, I explain semi-structured 
interviews as the main research technique used for primary data collection in this study. 
Furthermore, measures implemented during the research process to ensure internal and external 
validity of research outcomes are presented. In Chapter Four I analyse the motivation for Zambia’s 
participation in the KAZA, before providing Zambia’s investments in the KAZA TFCA in Chapter 
Five. Chapter Six analyses the implication of the creation of KAZA TFCA on the local people 
using the Simalaha community as a case study. Finally, Chapter Seven provides reflections on the 
findings in chapters four, five and six. I conclude Chapter Seven by proposing directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL ECOLOGY, THE STATE AND TFCAs IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the formation of TFCAs and the relationships and dynamics that obtain in 
TFCAs. The chapter reviews literature on political ecology to establish the conceptual basis for 
interpretation of the findings and analysis chapters. Biersack (2006) argues that the formation of 
TFCAs creates new relationships and dynamics between people, the states and natural resources. 
TFCAs create new challenges and opportunities to the population on the margins of state power 
and neo-liberalism (Elden, 2013; Ramutsindela, 2017). Local populations face significant 
challenges ranging from destruction of the crop fields by wildlife, and unequal distribution of the 
TFCAs benefits. These dynamics shaping the formation and management of TFCAs can be 
understood using the concept of political ecology.  
The concept of political ecology is appropriate for examining the changing roles of the state and 
increasing power and influence of the private sector and land management dynamics in TFCAs 
(Duffy, 2006). Thus, this chapter discusses political ecology as a theoretical orientation of this 
study. The chapter analyses the practices of the state within a political ecology framework to 
understand how the state engages in the formation of TFCAs in Southern Africa.  The chapter is 
divided into four sections. Section provides the overall goal and structure of the chapter, while 
section two presents the theoretical orientation of the study and in the third section I discuss 
political ecology of the state. In the fourth section, I present the participation of the state in TFCAs 
and draw conclusions on the chapter. I now turn to political ecology as a theoretical lens for this 
study.  
2.2. Theoretical orientation of the study: Political ecology 
Political ecology has been explained differently by various scholars, with some emphasizing 
political economy and others stressing political institutions and environmental and social change. 
Bryant (2015) describes political ecology as an attempt to understand “the political sources, 
conditions and ramifications of environmental change.” Bryant & Bailey (1997:190) suggest that 
“political ecology” in the broad context focuses on interactions between the state, non-state actors, 
and the physical environment, whereas debates in “environmental politics” are generally 
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concerned with the role of the state. This study adopts Bryant & Bailey’s conception of political 
ecology because contemporary nature conservation of natural resources through TFCA has 
become a global operation which involves a complex network of actors, including state and non-
state actors, donor organizations, business organizations, NGOs, communities, academic 
institutions and think tanks in resource governance, rendering human-society-nature relations 
deeply complex and dynamic. Thus, political ecology facilitates close examination of processes 
that affect control, ownership, access and usage of natural resources, which include water, land, 
fish and forest among others (Robbins, 2012; Bryant, 2015). There are various aspects of political 
ecology, this study only focuses on the ones which are relevant to this study and they include 
neoliberalism, power, access and control over resources as well as networks.  
Over the years TFCAs have been linked to neoliberalism and, therefore, TFCAs act as a platform 
through which neoliberalization of nature takes off.  In line with this Büscher (2012) records the 
payments of ecosystem services in Maloti Drakensberg TFCA was based on neoliberal ideology. 
Neoliberalism in this context is simply understood as a process by which nature is subjected to 
market dynamics in order to expand and deepen capitalism (Ramutsindela, 2017) and is normally 
posited as a win-win solution to ecological challenges. In relation to this Büscher (2002:31) notes 
that 'market-based transactions' would 'reduce the need for state regulation' and become naturalised 
to guarantee 'measurable deliverables' and 'sharpened performance of conservation actors'.  
Thus, neoliberalism favours the capitalist business interests of a few elites over poor people 
because the business elites seek to exploit nature, employ cheap labour and do not prioritize the 
interests of ordinary people. This has resulted into enclosure, exclusion, and dispossession of 
natural resources including land. In neoliberal settings, some states enter into agreements with 
business and investors with the promise of increasing capital and investments. Thus, 
commodification has reduced nature to a commodity, advertised and traded through international 
agreements, resulting in the emergence and neo-liberal practices through which industries have 
emerged to exploit it. Consequently, there has been a shift of ownership of nature from the state 
and public to individual hands that are mostly foreign investors and only a few local elites benefit 
from such transactions. Fringe benefits of nature commodification accrue to local and often poor 
populations in the form of low wage jobs and low value commodity supply opportunities and 
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corporate social responsibilities projects.  This is usually the case in instances where the state 
choses to become a mere facilitator of private sector investments and hopes to create value for 
local populations through the ‘effects’ of wealth accumulation. Thus, for TFCAs to realise their 
full potential in Southern African states, there is a need for an equal amount of investment by the 
state and the private sector (see Chapter Five). Castree (2010; 2015) cautions that adoption of 
neoliberalism by the Southern African states without adapting it to their context, prevents them 
from achieving sustainable development objectives and reduces the potential of reducing poverty 
through TFCAs mere promissory note. Owing to the above, I argue that neo-liberalization creates 
a system which goes beyond capital penetration, favours arguments for economic supremacy and 
subordinates nature and social development goals of communities and the state.   
Political ecology can also be understood as an interconnection between nature and society achieved 
through various forms of access and control and their implication for the health of environment 
and sustainable livelihood. For Sutton (2004) political ecology is seen as the study of day-to-day 
conflicts, debates, alliances, negotiations that results in definitive behaviour, and how politics 
affects or structures resource use and control over the resources. The creation of TFCAs provides 
new spaces that challenge state’s power to control the resources. In relation to this Bryant and 
Bailey (1997) social actors with asymmetrical political power are continuously competing for 
access to and control of natural resources. In TFCAs, one can argue that a double hegemony exists 
where the state vigorously pushes for private sector investments and where neo-liberal interests 
manifest through networked industries exploiting a commodified nature. This type of hegemony 
by and large works to exploit nature and local poor populations, creating hereto a favourable 
environment for neo-liberalism, anchored by control over resources. In addition, governmentalities 
tend to be practiced differently in TFCAs as borderlands create dynamic, environmental politics 
(Rosenbaum, 2016). In relation to this, Peluso and Watts (2001) argue that limiting of access and 
control to natural resources creates conflicts and struggles. This is not different from TFCAs, as 
the creation of TFCAs implies restrictions on access to and control of resources. Thus, such 
interactions and new relations can be understood and addressed using tools which political ecology 
provides. Political ecology is also cardinal in interpreting power and power relations by various 
actors. Thus, political ecology provides a tool box for questioning uneven power relations in 
TFCAs. 
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Thus, in this study, political ecology facilitated the investigation of the multiple networks which 
play out in conservation politics at various levels (local community, national, regional and global). 
At the centre of political ecology are different actors which include local communities, the state, 
civil society, international development agencies, and local financial institutions among others. It 
is in these network dynamics that power and influence are situated, flow and manifests. In bringing 
to the fore various power relations on multiple geo-political scales, political ecology provides a 
structure that allows close examination of interactions between multiple actors (Peet and Watts, 
1996; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Houtum & Singh, 2002). Political ecology is said to be power 
laden and not politically inert; similarly, TFCAs are processes continuously driven by power 
relations (Peet & Watts , 1996; Robbins, 2004; Duffy, 2006). Thus, the interconnectedness of how 
ecosystems work can be interpreted and explained using political, social and economic meanings 
(Duffy, 2006). As such, political ecology can also be seen as an analysis of the complexity of social 
and environmental change as a product of intersecting and conflicting economic, social and 
ecological processes that operate at different levels. Therefore, the framework can be used to 
explain people-state-nature power relations and matrixes in TFCAs Khani, 2010). In the next 
section I focus on political ecology of the state. 
2.3 Political ecology of the state and TFCAs 
The state is perceived and analysed differently by various scholars. For Peruzzotti (2015:1) state 
refers to a “specific institutional configuration that resulted in the establishment of a sovereign 
structure of political authority within a territory”. It consists of a cluster of constitutionally 
regulated agencies that have supreme jurisdiction over a delimited territory and population. This 
study adopts Ioris’s (2014:1) definition of the state as a “result of socio-natural interactions and 
multiple forms of contestation, from a critical politico-ecological approach.” Thus, political 
ecology of the state involves a reactionary and inherently contradictory approach to the co-
management of environmental, political, and economic burdens by several actors (Mullenite, 
2015:54). Vaccaro (2013) argues that through conservation the state extends its administrative 
control over its natural resources within its boundaries. Consequently, state’s decisions affect the 
functioning of the environment either positively or negatively. The state therefore performs several 
roles in relation to TFCAs. This study focuses on three roles of the state, which are negotiating 
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and producing socio-ecological and socioeconomic disruptions, protection and provision of land 
for conservation purposes (Mullenite, 2015) as well as ‘steward of the natural environment on 
which its existence ultimately depends’ (Walker, 1989: 32).With regards to TFCAs, the state plays 
a role in harmonizing policy, and imposing sanctions  on  offenders, for example, the 
implementation of the fish ban by Zambia and Namibia, providing land on which the TFCAs are 
established,  is done for various reasons, including achieving conservation objectives and social-
economic development aspirations (Linell et.al, 2017).The state achieves its objectives  by taking 
advantage of its historical and contemporary role as reproducer of a consumption-based capitalist 
economy (Mullenite, 2015). 
The practices of actors in TFCAs determine access to resources and create a dynamic set of 
relations that both include and exclude. Nuanced understanding of TFCAs cannot be robust if 
actors and elements are studied in isolation. Thus, political ecology provides a platform for 
understanding TFCAs, which involves different actors including community, donor agencies and 
the states, among others. These actors interact at different levels and scales. The actors involved 
also exercise different forms of powers. In these interactions, the state is seen to be important due 
to its capacity to enact and enforce laws which regulate the usage and access to resource by various 
actors involved (Singh and Houtum, 2002). In relation to this, Durand (2019) argues that in 
hierarchical societies conservation discourse entails social relations can be understood as a way of 
preventing the less powerful from accessing and utilizing valuables cardinal for human’s and 
ecosystem’s wellbeing. For example, during the apartheid era black South Africans were denied 
access to the national parks, which were the sole preserve of whites (Ramutsindela, 2008). Thus, 
political ecology provides a framework for examining the politics of TFCAs and management of 
shared resources (Duffy, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2017). However, Ioris (2014) maintains that the 
state’s actionsshould not be seen as a set of regulatory agencies but as complex structures and 
strategies reflecting the balance of political power and the growth of social antagonisms. 
Owing to the forgoing theoretical propositions on political ecology, it is clear that the state plays 
a critical role in creating conditions that enable or disable other actors such as NGOs, local 
communities and the private sectors to access natural resources. Such monopoly of power by the 
state over resources, including land on which protected areas are established, is used to evict and 
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kill indigenous people in order to force them out of land earmarked for conservation purposes 
(Dowie, 2009; Ramutsindela, 2017). A case in point here is the Limpopo National Park (LNP) 
where about seven thousand (7000) people were relocated from the interior of the park against 
their will by the Mozambican state (Lunstrum, 2013; Ramutsindela, 2017).This act is not very 
different from the expropriation of land and resources for wildlife and marine conservation 
belonging to local people in Tanzania (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). This clearly shows that 
at times the state abuses its power to intimidate and brutalize its own citizens, who are mostly the 
poor.  
Similar to the earlier arguments, Biersack (2006) maintains that political ecology is a ‘power laden’ 
concept. Similarly, TFCAs are not apolitical as they are influenced by the state, financiers and 
societies within which they are created. The interaction of the trio is shaped by power, power 
relations and different interests. The main actors in TFCAs include PPF whose main purpose is to 
facilitate the formation of TFCAs in Southern Africa, conservation-based organizations including 
World Resources Institute, the Nature Conservancy, and WWF whose interest is explicitly 
bioregion-focused conservation strategies (Wolmer, 2003). I use Political ecology to examine how 
the state exercises control over their resources and its people leaving in or nearby conservation 
areas while participating in TFCAs. Given the arguments by Biersack (2006:3) and Robin 
(2012:14) on the impact of “action of political institutions” and “the importance of environmental 
change” and how these drive human-environment relationships, the use of political ecology in the 
study will help to examine the Zambian political system (the state) governance of resources and 
human beings in KAZA TFCA. 
2.4 Participation of the state in TFCAs 
Management of shared natural resources by African states is not a new practice, but one which 
occurred long before the introduction of peace parks. This is evidenced in border towns where co-
existence of cultural and family ties have continued despite the colonial boundaries which did not 
account for cultural relationships and ecosystems. In addition to this, the communities are also 
well aware of the corridors for wildlife migration (Murphy et al., 2004; Van der Linde et al., 2001; 
Bennett, 2003).  The corridors facilitate the movement of wildlife.  For example, the creation of a 
TFCA for the Mozambique-South Africa border links St. Lucia Greater Wetlands Park, Ndumo 
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and Tembe Elephant Park in South Africa with Maputo Elephant Reserve in Mozambique. The 
creation of this TFCA facilitates the movement of elephants from South Africa to Mozambique 
through their ancient animal corridor (Duffy, 2006).  
Historically, TFCAs arose as nation-states lost overriding controlling powers on national and 
regional economies at the dawn of liberalism policies in many parts of the wold at the end of the 
Cold War. At this time, powerful on-state private sector actors and international organizations 
emerged as legitimate in global political and conservation endeavours (Duffy, 2007; Büscher and 
Ramutsindela, 2016). The late 18th century saw the signing of a treaty between the King of France 
and the Prince-Bishop of Basel to protect the boundary, shared wildlife and forest (Chester, 2006).  
In the 20th century more formal agreements with the aim of enhancing peace and cooperation 
through nature protection were signed between the USA and Canada, which saw the establishment 
of the Waterton Glacier International peace park in 1926, this marked the first peace park in the 
world. It should be pointed out, as Whande (2007) notes that Southern Africa witnessed major 
changes in the 1990s when the apartheid era in South Africa, the civil war in Mozambique and 
South Africa’s occupation of Namibia reached an end. Owing to all this, peace parks were 
proposed as a model to foster reconciliation, peace and co-existence in Southern African states 
(Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016). This resulted in the birth of new forms of cooperation, 
collaboration and regional development, which could be driven by conservation (Duffy 2007). In 
Southern Africa Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) between South Africa and Botswana was the 
first TFCA (Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002; Ramutsindela, 2004), the establishment of this TFCA 
was sealed with the signing of an agreement in April 1999 (SADC, 2007).  
The state used state departments to convene high level meeting to discuss the formation and 
structure of TFCAs. Thus, TFCAs bring to the fore the national agenda (Ramutsindela, 2007). This 
TFCA was only officially opened by the two presidents from both countries in May 2000. Since 
the establishment of the Kgalagadi, more efforts have been put in place to ensure that more TFCAs 
are established in Southern Africa. Thus, the formation of TFCAs draws together high-profile 
people in states such as heads of states, ministers, permanent secretaries among others. All these 
represent various national issues beyond conservation from their respective countries (Büscher, 
2013). Further, TFCAs require a vast portion of land, which calls for debordering of the 
24 
   
international borders in order to allow wildlife to move freely and contribute to social economic 
development through tourism (Ramutsindela, 2007).  Therefore, states play a key role in 
delineating boundaries on which conservation takes place (Ramutsindela, 2017). The creation of 
a transnational conservation space depends on the reconfiguration of the authority of the state. In 
peace parks, such a process takes place through memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and treaties 
that act as legal instruments to tame the authority of the state in TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2017: 
1008). Clearly, this shows that TFCAs are beyond national imaginaries, but  are embedded in 
bioregional planning (Wolmer 2003; Ramutsindela and Noe, 2012). 
The MoUs and treaties respect the sovereignty of the state and the legitimacy of the international 
border, but also serve as instruments by which the restructuring of the authority of the state is 
legitimized. The transnational space of peace parks limits the authority of individual states in that 
space, while at the same time introducing new obligations that the state should perform through 
treaties. Therefore, TFCAs are ‘non-Sovereign transboundary spaces’ (Ramutsindela, 2017). The 
creation of TFCAs is based on the actions of the state to create a united and borderless African 
continent and signals a desired return of most African leaders to the African ideals of the 1960s 
(Nkrumah, 1963).  
Therefore, the earlier TFCAs in Southern Africa were in the form of Transfrontier Parks, with the 
emphasis on conservation of biodiversity (SADC, 2007). These TFCAs took a top-down approach, 
which is evident in the signing of the treaties by senior state officials. This reflects state governance 
and automatically leaves out the local people from decision making positions. Thus, the state took 
centre stage at national level while the local people were not informed, and in certain instances 
they only knew about the project upon seeing activities taking place in their area. Thus, the local 
people were not part of the decision-making process, but mere spectators.  This has weakened the 
nations and facilitated the recreation of a colonial vision in African conservation (Rusinga, and 
Mapira, 2012) and eroded the countries’ sovereignty. In relation to this, some scholars argue that 
linking of conservation to underdevelopment creates room for the re-entry of former colonizers 
and external actors, thereby bringing about ‘sovereignty bargains’ (Singh and Houtum, 2002).  
Furthermore, the state’s ability to regulate the use of resources is normally challenged in that most 
states in Southern Africa are weakened due to a lack of capital as such states confront influential 
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entities with capital often backed by private security arrangements. Therefore, in most TFCAs 
states do not influence spending because real power is held by the non-state actors, while states 
are ‘hollowed out’, limiting both its power and capacity to control access and use of resources. In 
this case, state power, institutional arrangements, national borders and legislation are less 
meaningful, rendering TFCA projects externally controlled.   
Despite individual states’ lack of control in TFCAs, Southern African states are increasingly 
participating in TFCAs because of the claimed potential benefits which they may derive from them 
(see Chapter Six). There are many reasons for states’ participation in the TFCAs, including the 
individual expected gains as TFCAs are viewed by some states as a platform for lobbying support 
in the political, social, economic, and environmental sectors (Ramutsindela, 2004). Other reasons 
for states participation in the TFCAs include conservation of biodiversity, regional integration and 
regional peace. Peace parks are also perceived by the states as key in promoting tourism and 
modernizing conservation policy as this has potential of taking economic development to rural 
areas and alleviating poverty. Thus, states participate in TFCAs because they perceive TFCAs as 
a vehicle to reconcile development and conservation (see Chapter Four). Accordingly, PPF 
maintains that TFCAs entail the promotion of regional peace and stability among states, 
conservation of biodiversity which results into creation of jobs through tourism development. 
Thus, proponents of TFCAs claim that TFCAs enable human and animals to co-exist 
(http://www.peaceparks.org/tfca.php). This relates to Barnes (1998)’s observation that TFCAs 
have the potential to generate income in participating states by satisfying the growing demand for 
‘adventure nature-based tourism.’ 
In addition, TFCAs in Southern Africa are closely associated with creation and functions of SADC, 
a Southern African state grouping that seeks to promote cooperation among member states. In 
order to achieve its goal, SADC affected a protocol on wildlife conservation and law enforcement 
in the late 1990s (SADC 1999). Among other things this protocol recommended the establishment 
of the TFCAs by member states. Not only did SADC support the already existing TFCAs 
spearheaded by the PPF but also endorsed and promoted the formation of new TFCAs. The 
member states did not contest this decision because they saw the need to participate in conservation 
of resources through creation of TFCAs. As such by 2002, SADC had officially sanctioned the 
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establishment of twenty-two (22) TFCAs across the region (Ramutsindela, 2008).  Today, there 
are 18 TFCAs in the SADC region. Figure 2.1 below shows the TFCAs in Southern Africa.  
 
Figure 2.1 TFCAs and TPs in Southern Africa, Source: (www.peaceparks.co.za) 
 
Contrary to the earlier arguments the state loses its sovereignty to external forces including donors. 
Lunstrum (2013) uses the concept of articulated sovereignty to argue that donors do not in any 
way erode state power, because donor funding for TFCAs enables the state to create a physical 
presence through infrastructural and institutional development in places which could be otherwise 
inaccessible to the states due to inadequate transport as a result of limited financial capacity. Thus, 
states are motivated to participate in TFCAs due to donor funding which is channeled to 
conservation. Lunstrum (2013) also suggests that partnerships between the state and extra-
territorial actors can help the state consolidate power in these often-peripheral areas. As Lunstrum 
(2013) and Duffy (2001) note, contrary to previous assertions that TFCAs reduce the sovereignty 
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of the state, through external funding the state is able to make more impactful contributions in 
these frontiers. Lunstrum (2013) suggests that partnerships between the state and extra-territorial 
actors can help the state consolidate power in these often-peripheral areas. However, is important 
to point out that states are at different levels of development and in the management of 
transboundary natural resources, states exhibit different forms of power (Ramutsindela, 2008). 
In relation to this, most TFCA treaties and memorandum of understanding (MoU) uphold the 
state’s sovereignty. The 2002 Treaty of the GLTP is a case in point (Büscher and Ramutsindela, 
2016). While the treaties and MoUs of TFCAs legitimize the states, the authority of the individual 
states to control the TFCAs is limited, because they cannot exercise control over the resources in 
TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2017). Therefore, states are seen to be part of the processes which limit 
their authority in TFCAs. 
2.4. Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter highlights the three roles of the state in TFCA as follows: negotiating 
and producing socio-ecological and socioeconomic disruptions, protection and provision of land 
for conservation purposes as well as ‘stewardship of the natural environment on which its existence 
ultimately depends’ (Walker, 1989: 32).The state also plays a role in harmonizing policy and 
sanctions imposed on the offenders. Chapter Two argues that although the states participating in 
TFCAs are perceived to be sovereign, the reality remains that countries give up part of their 
sovereignty over part of the territory making up the TFCA, and the ensuring TFCA space becomes 
a shared territory under shared regulations and decision-making protocols.  The chapter argues that 
TFCAs are a platform through which neoliberalism plays out, implying that the non-human world 
is subjected to market forces, resulting in dispossession of resources, disempowerment of local 
populations and environmental injustice caused by the irruption of the conservation effort of the 
economically powerful external actors. Thus, political ecology was cardinal in interpreting the 
state- people-environment and power dynamics in TFCAs. TFCAs also brings together an intricate 
of actors’ network who exert different forms of political power and compete for access to and 
control of natural resources. The following chapter provides the methodology of the study.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology used to meet the objectives of the study. The study took a 
descriptive and interpretive inquiry designed as a case study. In this study, methodology is 
understood as in-depth method and process through which data is collected and the philosophies 
underpinning the analysis and collection of the data (Creswell, 2009). The chapter begins by 
discussing the methodological approach used to understand the motivation of the Zambian 
government’s participation in the KAZA, its investments and the implications of the creation of 
the KAZA on the local communities on the Zambian side. It then outlines the study techniques and 
justifies the selection of KAZA and Simalaha (within the KAZA) as the case study. I conclude this 
chapter by providing an overview of the ethical issues.  
3.2 Study approach 
This section discusses the study design and methodological approach. The section also discusses 
the overall methodological approach, data collection instruments and data analysis and data 
presentation approaches.  
3.3 Study design and argument for the case study 
This study uses a case study as a qualitative approach to achieve its objectives (Stake, 2008; 
Flyvbjerg, 2011). Case study has been defined differently by various scholars, and for the purposes 
of this study Yin’s definition of case study has been adopted.Yin (1994:23) defines the case study 
as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used.” Using a case study contextual, complex phenomenon of 
the KAZA can be clearly understood. In relation to this, Baxter and Jack (2008) argue that a case 
study offers the tools for researchers to study complex phenomenon within their context. Case 
study allows for close examination of complex real-life issues within their context over a long 
period of time (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin. , 2014). Thus, case study was suitable for this research 
because the KAZA experiences are complex reality issues, which needed to be explored within 
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their unique context in order to be understood. Furthermore, the case study enabled me to gather 
in-depth information because the participants provided context-based narratives. It also allowed 
me to do intensive analysis of the government’s investments in the KAZA TFCA and its 
implications for the local population (Stake, 2008; Creswell, 2009). In relation to this, Yin (2009; 
2014) argues that case studies provide an in-depth exploration of multiple complexities of the 
uniqueness of a particular project, community, policy, institution and system in reality. This is 
because a case study seeks to “…describe, decode, and translate … naturally occurring phenomena 
in the social world” (Maanen, 1983: 9). A case study is a more interpretive paradigm, 
phenomenological approach and constructivism as a paradigmatic basis. Therefore, it is suitable 
for this study as it unveiled the Zambian government’s interest in the KAZA and its investments. 
Furthermore, the case study is more appropriate for this study because it answers qualitative 
research questions by seeking to respond to the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ context-bounded research 
questions (Yin, 2003). Thus, more specific data on the KAZA was gathered when the participants 
addressed the “Why” and “How” question of Zambia’s participation in the TFCA through the 
KAZA initiative and when addressing the ‘what’ question of government’s investment in the 
KAZA. The study also gave detailed, but specific information on “what” implication the 
establishment of the KAZA has on the local community. A Case study was cardinal in uncovering 
the key role players in the KAZA project in order to determine the power relations, access and 
control over the resources. Thus, through detailed contextual analysis of existing institutional 
relationships and power dynamics among key partners and the local communities, a case study 
was useful for investigating KAZA TFCA as a contemporary way of conservation in a real-life 
context. In relation to this, a case study is said to function as “an empirical inquiry that investigated 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 1994; 2003: 13; Gerring, 2004). 
Thus, the case study enabled me to acquire a deep understanding of the link between participation 
in the KAZA, investment and the implications for the local communities. The KAZA TFCA and 
its related institutions and policies were treated as bounded entities shaping and influencing 
decisions, investments, outcomes and impacts of the KAZA TFCA investments and processes on 
the local population.  
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The KAZA is a complex project involving five states and several actors. Thus, for this research’s 
objectives to be achieved the research methods needed to be in line with the research questions. In 
relation to this Flyvbjerg (2011) argues that the selection of the method does not depend on the 
wellness of the method but on what is to be explored. Therefore, after careful consideration of the 
research questions and subject, I chose to use the case study. The choice of the case study research 
method was based on the understanding that the concept of TFCA is institutionally driven and its 
management is embedded in nuanced institutions, policies and local contexts.  
Thus, enhanced understanding of natural resource management and development outcomes of 
TFCAs should be grounded in interpretive and realistic research paradigms (Krauss, 2005). The 
interpretive paradigm is premised on the belief that reality should consist of people’s experiences 
and thus, adopt an inter-subjective epistemology and the ontological belief that reality is socially 
constructed. Accordingly, in this study people working in the KAZA through the civil society 
organizations, government representatives and local communities provided their different 
experiences based on their varied realities. Furthermore, Zainal argues that case studies are useful 
in “exploring and understanding of complex issues” (2007:1). This made a case study useful in 
understanding the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component because it is complex as it involves 
different issues such as various role players exercising varied levels of power, authority and control 
over resources, the investments by different states/donors and how the states retains its sovereignty 
to control the resources amidst other donor agencies, different land tenure and governance among 
others. 
For Stake (1994) and Yin (2003) the truth is relative and depends on ones’ perspective. Similarly, 
the condition of poverty or wealth in the KAZA is a lived reality and is relative. As such it was 
studied from different perspectives. I wanted to explore different levels of poverty or wealth 
experienced by the local communities in the KAZA region; and therefore, the case study presented 
a favourable environment in which to discuss the local people’s real life situations from different 
perspectives. This relates to Healy & Perry (2000)’s argument that realism concerns multiple 
perceptions about a single reality. In relation to this Walsham (1993) agrees that in-depth 
examination of the phenomenon of interest allows interpretivists and realists to attempt to derive 
their constructs from the field. Thus, case studies enable researchers to collect in-depth 
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explanations of social behavior and realities (Zainal 2007). Furthermore, a case study allows for 
analysis of a unit which provides a minimum level of study, thus the case study method allowed 
for intensive analysis of Simalaha and the KAZA on the Zambian component, the various role 
players at each unit in order to understand if the motivation to participate in the KAZA matches 
the investment efforts and what this meant at the lowest point level of the local community. 
Therefore, this method was chosen on the basis that it would facilitate a thorough understanding 
of Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, its investment and the implications of the creation of the 
KAZA on the local community.  
3.4 Research techniques 
In this sub-section, I discuss the methods of data collection. The section explains all the methods 
that were used to gather both primary and secondary data. In addition, the section presents 
secondary data sources and explains how challenges encountered during data collection were 
addressed to ensure research validity. In the following paragraph, I discuss semi-structured 
interviews.  
3.4.1 Data collection technique: Semi-structured interviews 
The research employed in-depth semi-structured interviews in order to achieve its objectives. Semi 
structured interviews are said to be a non-standardized tool used for data collection in qualitative 
research (Kajornboon, 2006). Semi structured interviews provided a systematic way of talking and 
listening to people in order to collect useful data from targeted individuals. Based on this kind of 
research, in-depth semi-structured interviews were selected in order to uncover important issues 
in the establishment and management of KAZA, as well as investments in the KAZA. This is so 
because semi-structured interviews are open in nature, they allow for open ended questions which 
may not be predetermined. Prior to doing field work, an interview guide was developed. This 
interview guide was used in the field during the interviews to provide order and direction to the 
discussions. Corbetta (2003) explains semi-structured interviews as “the order in which the various 
topics in a research are dealt with and the wording of the questions are left to the interviewer’s 
discretion” (2003: 270). Thus, semi-structured interviews offered an opportunity for both the 
research participant and I to seek clarification on the questions and the responses. Therefore, after 
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each question, further questions, were asked through probing, which enabled the respondents to 
provide more information which they may otherwise have left out (Gibson & Brown, 2009; Patton, 
2015). Further, semi-structured interviews allowed me to interact formally and informally with the 
key informants who included government officials, Simalaha project staff, and local community 
members in Simalaha Community Conservancy who have been affected by the creation of the 
KAZA, traditional leaders and civic leaders (Corbetta 2003; Denzin 2005).  Table 3.1 shows the 
number and organization of informants. 
3.1: List of research participants 
S/N Date Name of participant Organization 
1 24 November 2017 
22 January 2018 
 
Civil Society 
Organization senior 
official 1 
Nature 
Conservancy 
2  22 January 2018 
24 November 2017 
Funding Agency official 
1   
KFW 
3 
 
4 
December 2017 
 23 January 2018 
5 December 2017 
Civil Society organization 
official 2 
Civil Society     
Organization Official 3 
 
WWF 
 
Panthera 
5 27 July 2018/19 Civil Society 
Organization official 4 
WWF 
6 3 November 2017 
22 January 2018 
16 August 2018 
Government official 1, Ministry of 
Tourism & 
Arts 
7 23 January 2018 
17 November 2017 
Government official 2 Ministry of 
Tourism & 
Arts 
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8 12 December 2017  
22 January 2018 
2 March 2018 
Government official 3 Ministry of To 
Tourism and 
Arts 
9 23 January 2018 Government official 4 Ministry of 
Tourism & 
Arts 
10 24 November 2017 Government official 5 Ministry of 
Tourism & 
Arts 
11 12 December 2017 Government official 6 Ministry of 
Tourism and 
Art 
12 22 January 2018  Senior government 
official 7 
Ministry of 
Tourism and 
Arts 
13 24 July 2018 Government official 9 Mwandi 
Secondary 
School  
14 26 July 2018 Government officials 10, Kasaya 
Primary 
School 
15 25 July 2018 Civic leader 1 Mwandi Town 
Council (Local 
Authority) 
16 25 July 2018 KUTA (Council of 
traditional leaders 1) 
Senior Chief 
Inyambo Yeta 
Chiefdom 
17 27 July 2018 PPF official 1 PPF 
18 25 July 2018 PPF official 2 PPF 
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19 27 July 2018 PPF official 3 PPF 
20 27 July 2018 PPF official 4 PPF 
21 28 July 2018 Local trader1 Mwandi 
district  
22 28 July 2018 Local trader2 Mwandi 
district  
23 28 July 2018 Local trader3 Mwandi 
district 
24 26 July 2018.  Local community farmer 
1 
Simalaha 
Community 
Conservancy 
25 27 July 2018 Local community farmer 
2 
Simalaha 
Community 
Conservancy 
26 26 July 2018 
26 August 2018 
Local community farmer 
3 
Simalaha 
Community 
Conservancy 
27 26 August 2018 Local community farmer 
4 
Simalaha 
Community 
Conservancy 
28 27 July 2018 
5 January 2019 
Local community farmer 
5 
Simalaha 
Community 
Conservancy 
29 27 July 2018 Local community farmer 
6 
Simalaha 
Community 
Conservancy 
30 27 July 2018 Local community farmer 
7 
Simalaha 
Community 
Conservancy 
Source: Author, 2018 
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Such interactions accorded me an opportunity to quickly reflect on the responses and ask more 
questions on government’s motivation for participation in the KAZA TFCA. Based on the 
responses, I also raised follow-up questions to clarify and validate the data. Clarity and validation 
sought after the field visit was done via phone calls, WhatsApp and through emails. I took notes 
from phone calls on certain issues while, WhatsApp messages and emails replies   were used as 
text to fill identified data gaps. Follow-ups were done in order to get in-depth responses to what 
the government of Zambia had invested in the KAZA as well to gain insight into the implications 
of this participation and investment for the local communities. Semi structured interviews enabled 
the respondents to open up as much as possible, which allowed me to gather a lot of data. It is also 
important to note that some respondents were not as open and seemed unwilling to share 
information despite interrogating them, and thus I interpreted their non-verbal gestures. Further, 
the interviews were supplemented by field notes, observations and pictures were taken of some of 
the issues observed. All interviews conducted were recorded with the permission of the 
respondents. 
The use of semi-structured interviews facilitated smooth discussions which enabled the 
participants to tell their stories (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). This led to collection of detailed data 
relevant to the research questions. This technique offered long narratives which complemented the 
study. Therefore, this technique became a basis for construction of reality that enables the 
researcher to better understand the participants’ actions thereby aiding in meaning making in the 
process of data analysis. This way of applying the technique is described as a site where 
interviewees and interviewers converge to construct meaning for a research project (Roulston, 
et.al, 2003).  
3.4.2 Document and literature review 
To supplement the above discussed data collection tools, other sources of primary data included 
minutes from KAZA related meetings, pre-feasibility study reports, IDPs implementation reports, 
regulations and KAZA memorandum of understanding and treaties among others were used. The 
documents reviewed acted as pointers during proposal formulation and fieldwork and formed a 
basis for testing the factuality of the data collected through interviews and observations. This was 
complemented and substantiated by reviewing institutional records on KAZA contributions to 
36 
   
national tourism development in Zambia, academic publications on the KAZA, consultant reports, 
organizational brochures, institutional reports, institutional magazines, Leaflets, newspapers, 
published and non-published material on KAZA, policy documents governing wildlife 
management in Zambia, newspaper articles and internet sources among others. The use of several 
technics enabled the inefficiency of one tool to be offset by the other, as well as collect all the 
necessary information useful to the research. Reviewing of published literature on the KAZA was 
cardinal in enabling me to understand the discourse of TFCAs in Southern Africa and trace the 
gap to be filled by this research (Gibson & Brown, 2009).  
3.4.3 Seeing is believing- Observation as a method   
Observation formed one of the key methods used in this study. Cowie (2009) defines observation 
as conscious noticing and detailed examination of participants’ behaviour in a naturalistic setting.  
This research adopts Kawulich (2012)’s definition of observation who defines it as a systematic 
description of the events, behaviours, and artefacts of a social setting. Observation creates an 
opportunity to obtain rich, detailed descriptions of the social setting in the field and record in the 
field notebook. While observing a researcher is able to view unscheduled events, improve 
interpretation, and develop new questions to ask the informants (Kawulich, 2012). Observations 
enable researchers to describe existing situations using the five senses, providing a ‘written 
photograph’ of the situation under study (Siame, 2017). Similarly, during the fieldwork in 
Simalaha active observation was another way of collecting and validating data. Through 
observation, I consciously noticed and examined participants’ behaviour. In the field, I also used 
observations to take note of physical changes in the KAZA. I observed changes in various villages 
in Chief Sekute’s and Senior InyamboYeta’s Chiefdoms and took note of local communities’ 
interactions with wildlife, local communities’ gardens, domesticated animals, wildlife, school, 
solar power at the primary school and water sources in Simalaha Community Conservancy. I also 
paid attention to body language, intonations, pitches and pauses to interpret what the respondents 
were communicating with the use of non-verbal language, and this is used to comprehend the 
verbal responses as advised by Creswell (2009) and Patton (2015). Observations were made during 
interviews, meetings and during field trips in the Simalaha conservancy and recorded in the note 
book. Pictures were also taken to enhance interpretation of the data collected.  During interviews, 
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observations included taking note of ‘moves and actions. Thus, observation helped me verify the 
information given by the research participants. 
3.5 Sampling process and sample size 
This study used purposive sampling to select the research participants. As Onwuegbuzie and Leech 
(2007) have noted, purposive sampling’s logic and power lies in the selection of cases that are rich 
in information and offers the greatest insight into the research objectives. Purposive sampling was 
used in order to select the participants based on their active involvement in the KAZA project on 
the Zambian component, knowledge of the project, and those affected by the KAZA in Simalaha. 
This was to ensure that only those with experience and stakes in the KAZA were included as the 
study population. The use of purposive sampling is recommended when researchers need specific 
information on a particular case which is of value to their project (Gubrium, 2010). Participants 
were drawn from various organisations and government departments as shown in Table 3.1 above. 
These research participants were only those directly involved and had prior Knowledge of the 
KAZA project. As shown in Table 3.1, there are basically five groups of people that participated 
on this study. The government officials provided information on reasons for Zambian 
government’s participation in the KAZA, the amount of investments and how this participation 
benefits the state. The traditional leaders were key in explaining the entry point of the KAZA 
TFCA (the establishment of the KAZA TFCA and their expectations) and their perceived impacts 
of the KAZA on their subordinates. More information on funding and the KAZA establishment 
was obtained from the civil society officials and the funding agency. Finally, from the local 
communities comprising of farmers, fishermen and local traders, I captured the lived experiences 
of how the creation of the KAZA has affected their lives. 
Prior to beginning of field work, I visited an environmental NGO where I had a meeting with the 
director, with a view to getting more information on the KAZA and stakeholders involved in the 
KAZA project on the Zambian component. After a thorough explanation of the KAZA, the director 
introduced me to the KAZA office in Zambia. I later visited the KAZA office, which is situated at 
the Ministry of Tourism and Arts. The KAZA office did not only serve as a hive of the information 
on the KAZA development but was also key in identifying the key stakeholders in the KAZA 
project. They compiled a list of key organizations involved in the KAZA, each organization’s focal 
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point staff and their contact numbers and email addresses. This made it easier for me to contact 
these people through phone calls and emails. These people became representatives of their 
organizations during the interviews. Later the KAZA office introduced me to the Simalaha project 
manager who acted as a middle person between the Simalaha local communities, the Traditional 
Council (Kuta) and me. This enabled me to collect data in Simalaha without much difficulty, given 
the strict traditional procedures in the Lozi land. Through this process thirty (30) interviews were 
recorded as shown in Table 3.1 above. All the interviews were recorded with the consent of the 
participants. Below is Figure 3.1 showing the Kuta and researchers after the interview.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: The members of the Kuta and researchers after the interview, Source:Author, 2018 
It is also important to note that qualitative research has no predetermined sampling size, thus the 
research followed the concept of saturation as advised by Mason (2010). Thus, the reoccurrence 
of responses to the questions signalled saturation. Therefore, in context of this study the 
knowledgeable participants were interviewed till the saturation was achieved (Mason, 2010; 
Bernard, 2000).   
3.6 Limitations of the case study method 
Although case study approaches are sought-after in social research (Johnson, 2006), they remain 
a controversial approach with many critics (Zainal, 2007). Similarly, Yin and Zainal outline a 
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number of disadvantages to the case study approach (Zainal, 2007; Yin, 1994). Case studies are 
said to lack rigour. In relation to this, Yin (1994:21) notes that, “too many times, the case study 
investigator has been sloppy, and has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the 
direction of the findings and conclusions” This exposes the case study’s biasness towards 
verification which is also referred to as a tendency by the researcher to confirm own preconceived 
notions. Hence this method is said to lack objectivity thus rendering it non-scientific.  
Case study also suffers from the weakness of generalizability. Generalizability is considered as the 
most prominent critique of the single case study method. Case studies are said to generalise based 
on one case, thus critics have argued that this lacks validity and cannot offer enough grounds on 
which conclusion can be generalised (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995; 1997; Zainal, 2007; Yin, 2014; 
Harrison et.al, 2017). In relation to this, Krusenvik (2016:6), maintain that, “one of the biggest 
concerns and most common critiques against case studies, is its lack of scientific generalizability”. 
The major problem is that the studies are highly specific, that is, they only relate to a particular 
context. Critics believe that, in fact, the study of a small number of cases cannot offer any grounds 
for establishing reliability or generality of findings (Krusenvik, 2016).Willis (2014) argues that a 
researcher needs to be as explicit as possible about the degree of uncertainty about the validity of 
the data and nature of context that allows for generation, otherwise, a case study method may not 
offer anything beyond the particular case. Similarly, Ragin (1987) argues that case study 
approaches value understanding of complexity over generality. Further, to Ragin (1987) the case 
strategy is not able to cope with a number of cases sufficient to yield general results, but it can still 
give valuable insights. For Yin (1984) case studies are` too long and difficult to conduct, normally 
the high volumes of data produced becomes difficult to manage and organise systematically and 
produce massive number of documents. For this study, I encountered several challenges in my use 
of case study approach. For instance, it was difficult to use the local language and I had to depend 
on local people to provide interpretation for me. The other challenge in understanding the bounded 
reality was the issue of gate keeping whereby the local KAZA staff wanted to choose all research 
participants. Noticing a high possibility for bias in the choice of who attends to the interview 
requests, I had to independently make request for about half of the participants, and this included 
most the claimed beneficiaries (mostly women) of the Simalaha conservancy.    
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3.7 Countering weaknesses of a case study method 
Like any other scientific inquiry process, the case method has limitations. Below I explain how I 
handled these limitations.    
3.7.1 Ensuring methodological validity: Generalisation based on case study findings 
The prominent critic that one cannot generalise to a wider population based on a single case limits 
the case study as a scientific method. Yin (1994:10) addresses this by arguing that “case studies 
are able to yield propositions” enough to offer insights in understanding phenomena in different 
circumstances. Yin further addresses the generalisation critique that case studies “provide little 
basis for scientific generalisation” by stating that, this is not their purpose and that “cases studies, 
like scientific experiments are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universes” (2009:535). In defending case studies, Woodside (2010) argues that the objective of 
case study research is not to generalize findings to a population but to prove theory. Siame (2017) 
also claims that case studies are generalizable to theoretical claims but not to populations or 
universes. I argue here that criticism of generalizability is of little relevance when the intention in 
this study is one of particularisation, the dynamics in the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian side with 
focus on Simalaha community. My aim in this methodological approach is to maximise on 
empirically-rich, context-specific, holistic accounts that a case study offers (Willis, 2014). 
Therefore, prepositions and concepts contribute to literature on TFCAs ideas and generate new 
perspectives in theoretical debates. Thus, the value of the case research method is not in 
generalising to all other contexts but, rather, in achieving depth in studying the phenomena and 
generating concepts, ideas and principles that characterise a particular research phenomenon. In 
this thesis, insights from KAZA TFCAs can contribute to theoretical understanding of TFCAs in 
contemporary conservation. This is not to suggest that the study of the KAZA in the Zambian 
component will be applicable in studying TFCAs in all parts of the world and in different contexts, 
but insights from this study can be used to understand similar cases in other places. In relation to 
this, Flyvbjerg (2001; 2006) notes that case studies provide a learning and action taking basis 
guided by judgement and not application of abstract universal rules. Accordingly, Duminy et.al 
(2014:39) and Siame (2017) argue that the value of the case study method lies in the “power of a 
good example as a source of theoretical development.” As such a case can only offer lessons if it 
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is “relatable and transferable” enabling an experience-based learning (Duminy et al, 2014:23). 
Therefore, case studies should not be blindly adopted and applied in other places. There is a need 
for careful consideration of context before transferring the insights offered by a particular case. 
3.7.2 Dealing with the tendency for a subjective bias 
The rigor of the case study method is not in any way less strict than that of other scientific methods. 
Case studies exhibit their own different vigour. The case study method is advantageous over other 
methods for this particular study because of its ability to “close in on real-life situations and test 
views and theory directly.” (Flyvbjerg, 2006:235). When used in TFCAs, case study brings details 
of Zambia’s motivation to participate and invest in the KAZA, it also closes in on the implication 
of KAZA on the local people as they unfolded in practice (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  Further, following 
conducting intensive in-depth case studies some researchers have dismissed their preconceived 
views, assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses as wrong and that the case material has signalled 
the revision of their hypotheses on essential points, resulting in what is known as ‘falsification 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998; 2001; 2006). The case study method presents data of real-life situations (Zainal, 
2007) and is useful for testing ideas, principles and concepts based on what exists. As, such, the 
case study method is empirical enough as it is grounded in reality. This makes it suitable for this 
study because the establishment of the KAZA and its impact on the local communities is a real-
life situation. Owing to this point of view, the proximity to reality, which the case study entails, 
and the learning process that it generates for the researcher is the basis for advanced understanding. 
As such, Flyvbjerg (2006: 236) emphasises:  
 
The case study method contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s 
preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On the contrary, experiences indicate 
that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than 
toward verification. 
The other way of overcoming the limitation is by triangulating the study with other methods in 
order to confirm the validity of the process. Triangulation is a technique which involves 
‘crosschecking’ two or more sources of data or methods in order to confirm validity, accuracy and 
reliability of findings (Duminy et al, 2014; Stake, 2006; Zainal, 2008). Triangulation enables the 
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researchers to control bias and establish the validity of propositions and findings which is an 
essential component in research designing and data collection process. In this research other 
methods such as interviews, observation, document and literature reviews among others were used 
in order to validate the information.  
Thus, in order to ensure factuality in interpretation of data, triangulation techniques are required 
(Stake, 2008). Triangulation also facilitates ‘pattern matching’ between the framing theory and the 
empirical observations and analysis of the case. Using the case study method, the researcher 
collects and stores multiple sources of evidence in a comprehensive and systematic way so as to 
uncover converging lines of inquiry, contradictions, themes and patterns (Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997). 
By using multiple sources of evidence, and incorporating converging lines of enquiry, the process 
of triangulation and corroboration (Yin, 2009) guarantees factuality and reliability of the case 
study. In the research process, I reflected on various views and observations, thereby allowing a 
reflexive process of knowledge generation, which was not limited to documentation and 
interviews.  
To ensure that views were cross-checked, the interviews involved research participants from non-
government organizations, government officials, civil society organizations, local communities 
and traditional leaders. This combined team of informants allowed for views to be cross-checked 
from various perspectives, pattern matching, identification of conflicting views and conflict 
pointers. All these views were scrutinised and treated equally. Similar questions were asked to 
different informants, this was done in order to identify gaps for further inquiries on issues that 
needed additional understanding.  
 Views from informants were subjected to the contents of project documents, minutes from the 
meetings, organizational brochures, KAZA Memorandum of Understanding, Treaties, physical 
infrastructure, newspapers, progress reports, and feasibility studies reports. Finally, additional 
triangulation of the data involved scrutiny of the transcribed material by selected research 
participants. After transcribing the first set of interview scripts, they were sent to key informants 
for review and scrutiny. In the second phase of the interviews aspects that seemed unclear were 
subjected to more scrutiny through follow-up phone interviews and through email and WhatsApp 
exchanges with representatives from civil society organizations and government agencies. In 
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relation to this Duminy et al (2014:36) argue that, these feedback processes and procedures are 
particularly useful to ensure factuality. 
Further, as this study sought to deepen understanding of relationships between political, economic 
and social factors with the environment as a backdrop of the study site. The study makes 
contribution to methodological advancement in political ecology. The contested nature of changes 
as a result of the creation of Simalaha conservancy shows that case study methods gets the 
researcher close to lived reality and increases the understanding of how power works to create 
different forms of loses and benefits for different actors. For example, the case study method 
enabled me to critically engage with the creation of Simalaha conservancy and its role in 
facilitating the loss of farm land by the local people and the introduction of conservation farming 
in people’s backyards. The case study method allowed me to get closer to conflicted and contested 
claims of benefits and costs for different interest groups such as the local communities (Including 
traditional leaders, fishermen, farmers and traders), environmental organisations’ officials and 
government official among others participating in the KAZA on the Zambian component. Thus, 
the methodological approach allowed me to effectively succeed in politicizing environmental 
issues and phenomena in Simalaha conservancy. The methodological approach succeeded in 
generating data that allowed for effective analysis of the distributive role of power in terms of loses 
and gains in TFCAs.   
3.7.3 The dense case study-The case as a reality 
Case studies are known for their long, rich, detailed contradictory and complex narratives of real-
life situations. Such narratives may be challenging or even impossible to summarise into clear 
scientific formulae, general propositions, and theories (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Thus, case studies tend 
to derail the research process. However, the huge volumes of data gathered enabled this study to 
present in-depth realities of intricate events and processes, the motivation of the government to 
participate in the KAZA, the government’s investment in the KAZA and the subsequent impacts 
on the local communities on the Zambian component.  
The narratives focused on in-depth analysis of particular events key for Zambian government’s 
participation in the KAZA, the kind of investments in the KAZA and how these are impacting on 
the local communities. Interviews enabled me to interact with various stakeholders and key 
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informants in the KAZA TFCA, writing and getting feedback enriched the KAZA and the 
Simalaha case in particular. The case material was found to be rich and dense due to the nature of 
the inquiry. The dense case study was important as it enabled me to understand the KAZA and its 
dynamics on the Zambian component. This uncovered the power relations between the states, 
funding agencies, civil society organizations and local communities. Policy contradictions and 
action on the ground were also uncovered. In relation to this, Rorty observed that “the way to re-
enchant the world is to stick to the concrete and provide rich narratives” (Rorty1985:173). 
Similarly, Nietzsche (1969) invites researchers to pay attention to “little things” in order to allow 
for the generation of unquestioned rich narratives. As such researchers should avoid summarising 
rich and dense cases Peattie (2001). Peattie maintains that: 
It is simply that the very value of the case study, the contextual and interpenetrating nature 
of forces, is lost when one tries to sum up in large and mutually exclusive concepts. The 
dense case study is more useful for the practitioner and more interesting for social theory 
than the high-level generalisations of theory. The case story is itself the result. It is a ‘virtual 
reality’ (Peattie 2001:260). 
Owing to the above arguments the choice of Simalaha recovery area is based on its importance to 
Zambia as well as to the entire KAZA landscape. The selection of Simalaha is also based on the 
fact that the Simalaha project endeavours to achieve one of the KAZA’s main objectives of joining 
fragmented wildlife habitats in order to form an interconnected mosaic of protected areas and 
transboundary wildlife corridors for the facilitation and enhancement of free movement of wildlife 
across colonial borders (PPF, 2004). As such Simalaha project was given priority as it marks the 
first strategic step towards the creation of a wildlife corridor. This corridor will link Chobe 
National Park in Botswana to Kafue National Park in Zambia. Thus, once fully functional the 
Simalaha conservancy will restore ecosystem health and conserve biodiversity, thereby mitigating 
habitat fragmentation. This will also result into the revival of culture which was lost when the 
biodiversity in the area was depleted. It is also hoped that the reintroduction of wildlife to the area 
will boast tourism which will in turn bring revenue to the area resulting into economic growth and 
improved social services. This will translate to improved welfare of the local communities. Thus 
not only is Simalaha strategically positioned to act as an animal corridor but is culturally, 
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economically and socially important to the local people, hence the need to understand the KAZA 
through the Simalaha case. 
Consequently, the choice to study the KAZA TFCA was due to the conviction that a relationship 
exists between the choice of the case and its value to generalize. As such, prior to proposal 
presentation and data collection, a thorough literature review on TFCA in Africa was undertaken 
to determine an advanced TFCA case that would provide me with sufficient materials for analysis. 
I reviewed reports and academic publications on TFCAs in Southern Africa.  Based on the 
literature reviewed, I chose to study the KAZA due to its uniqueness. Firstly, KAZA is said to be 
the world’s largest TFCA and the first to bring together five countries to conserve the common 
species in the KAZA landscape. Secondly, the KAZA boasts of being home to the largest 
population of African elephants in the world. Finally, the KAZA is endowed with multiple natural 
resources and rich cultural heritage which are positioned for global tourist attraction. Based on 
this, I was convinced that, the study of the KAZA would provide  me with rich material for 
analysis. It would have been more interesting to look at the entire KAZA landscape. However, due 
to limited time and finances; I focused on the Zambian component of the KAZA 
3.8 Limitation of interviews 
The interview process encounters some challenges (Roulston, et al., 2003). The common 
challenges include failure to observe time and, in some cases, forgetting the appointment despite 
sending several remainders a day before the agreed day, answering phone calls and attending to 
other clients during the interview process, limited time offered for interviews and a tendency by 
some participants to hide information. Another limitation was that of communication breakdown 
due to language barriers, the Simalaha area in Western Province of Zambia is predominantly 
inhabited by the Lozi3 people, this group of people mostly speak Lozi While some community 
members could speak basic English, other informants could only speak Lozi, a language which the 
research neither speaks nor understands, this made it difficult for the informant and I to interact. 
Further, although not prominent some participants contradicted each other on certain issues such 
                                                          
3 The Lozi people are a language group of more than 46 different ethnic groups primarily of 
western Zambia, inhabiting the region of Barotseland-   
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as the benefits derived from the creation of the KAZA TFCA similar to Susan’s observation 
(Susan, 1997), thus making the process of analysing data a challenging task (Kvale, 1996) 
3.9 Remedies to challenges during the interview process 
For the participants who could not observe time, too busy on phone and attending to other clients 
while the interview was in process, I exercised maximum patience until the interviews were 
successfully completed. Further, in order to achieve objectivity from the respondents, material 
promises, and reciprocity behaviour were not tolerated. In addition to this I will submit one 
research report to the Ministry of Tourism and Arts. Further, to overcome the challenge of 
language barrier, the field contact person acted as a translator for both English and Lozi. In order 
to ensure objectivity in the collection and interpretation of the data, I avoided being informed by 
my preconceived ideas on the subject. In doing so, I also ensured reflexivity and transparency. In 
relation to this Qin (2016) maintains that the researcher’s position may affect the outcome of the 
research. Further, households in the Simalaha Conservancy are mostly headed by the men. Thus, 
the men who participated on this research could not give chance to the women to participate in the 
interviews. However, the creation of TFCAs and the KAZA in particular affects the livelihood of 
men and women differently, therefore women were met separately, away from their homes and 
interviewed in order to fill this gap and also get gender balanced view on issues affecting them. 
3.10 Data analysis: making sense of the data 
Like any other qualitative study, this study ensured safety in the storage of data to prevent data 
from landing in the hands of unknown individuals. Transcribing followed within seventy-two 
hours after interviews, to enhance data and information capturing during the transcribing process, 
or else I could forget some data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). The transcribed data was checked 
against the voice script in order to ensure accuracy and that no data was omitted. Later, unnecessary 
data such as greetings, laughter and jokes, among others, were removed in order to remain with 
content related to the research questions. Transcribing involved the process of listening to the 
interview scripts and writing. Transcribing guided me to uncover the various themes, this involved 
matching the themes from the interview scripts and documents to research questions (Creswell, 
2013; Patton, 2015). All themes from each interview script were identified with the research 
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question and used to build on similar ideas. The themes identified included Conservation, Tourism, 
regional integration, SADC membership, implications on local communities and Government 
investments. These themes were collated in order to facilitate interpretation and analysis. In 
addition to this a field note book was used to record all relevant events and experiences that were 
observed and the responses of the participants. This accorded me an opportunity to reflect on the 
given responses, unfolding issues and enabled me to come up with new questions.  Further, 
interpretation of non-verbal body language and field documents relevant to the study provided 
more data for the research. Furthermore, documents relevant to the research questions were also 
used to substantiate the data collected. 
3.11 Ethical consideration and conclusion 
Prior to embarking on fieldwork my supervisor wrote me a letter of introduction for use during 
fieldwork. This letter was shown to all organizations and individuals who participated in this study. 
The letter, seeking authority to conduct interviews with government officials, was submitted to the 
permanent secretary at the Ministry of Tourism and Arts, who forwarded it to the Department of 
National Parks and Wildlife for action. Authorisation to conduct research was given through the 
Department of National Parks and Wildlife established structure, and no written clearance was 
required. For other participating organizations the letter was presented directly to the research 
participants prior to beginning the interviews. For the local communities and traditional leaders in 
Simalaha Community Conservancy, no introductory letter was required. I was introduced verbally 
by the Simalaha Community Conservancy manager to the traditional leaders and local community 
members. In all the interviews conducted I explained the objectives of the study and participation 
was on a voluntary basis.  
Anonymity was granted to those that sought it. Issues of confidentiality were treated with utmost 
respect whenever they were sought by the interviewees. I omitted the data that I thought would 
harm the participants in any way and some were presented anonymously. Prior to the interview 
the purpose of the interview was explained and some participants who wished to preview the 
interview guide were accorded a chance to do so. This was done in order for the interviewee to 
make an informed decision to either participate or not to participate. This is in accordance with the 
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etiquettes demanded by the fundamentals of good research (Kajornboon, 2006). Additionally, the 
principles which govern research at University of Cape Town were applied in this study.  
3.12 Conclusion 
The formation and operationalization of KAZA have been largely driven by political and 
community development objectives. This has led to the project being laced with the political 
ecology of nature conservation. The debates on KAZA are driven by both top-down and bottom 
up voices. Thus, studying such a socio-politically complex conservation project requires use of a 
nuanced qualitative approach that can allow me to get to the depth of state motives and activities 
on hand, and private sector and community development imperatives. Qualitative approach was 
used in this study to collect rich context informed descriptive data on the formation and 
operationalization of the KAZA. A qualitative approach to the study of TFCAs illuminates on 
debates that call for context specific study of nature conservation and rural development, and 
further uncovers the importance of understanding of concrete ‘little things’ in transboundary nature 
conservation projects and tourism development in contexts that are poverty ridden and governed 
through a hybridised regime- juxtaposed modern state authority on a very top-down traditional 
authority system. A qualitative approach was useful in tracking unique events; enlightening the 
experience and interpretation of events by actors with varied stakes and roles in the KAZA TFCA. 
Thus, this methodological approach provides an opportunity for all voices to be analysed and 
interpreted to generate nuanced understanding of the KAZA TFCA set up on the Zambian side. 
The rarely heard groups in TFCAs, including small scale farmers and fishermen, were reached and 
interviewed on issues that define the successes and pitfalls of the KAZA TFCA. The methodical 
approach enabled me to zoom in on specific minute events in Simalaha community Conservancy. 
Therefore, I found qualitative research to be more insightful when seeking answers to both the 
asked questions and those which were not thought of when designing the research. The approach 
allowed me to achieve triangulation as an important aspect of qualitative research methods. Thus, 
the methodological approach facilitated both the internal and external validity of the study. Having 
discussed the methodology, the next chapter discusses the motivation of the Zambian government 
to participate in the KAZA.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: MOTIVATION FOR ZAMBIA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE KAZA 
4.1 Introduction 
The KAZA TFCA treaty recognizes that KAZA as a regional development programme has the 
potential to contribute towards social and economic development, conservation of natural 
resources and regional integration among others.  Thus, as highlighted in Chapter Two and also 
shown in Chapter Five, states participate and invest in the KAZA for various reasons. This is 
because states have individual needs and expected gains from TFCAs which include, enhancement 
of conservation of biodiversity, promotion of socio-economic development for rural community 
through tourism, thus they are seen as nodes of rural development. TFCAs are also seen as practical 
means of achieving regional integration, maintaining peace and security. Accordingly, this chapter 
focuses on Zambia’s motivation for participating in the KAZA TFCA. The motivations for 
Zambia’s participation are divided into five main themes: regional integration, being part of the 
global conservation agenda, regional blocs and TFCAs: KAZA-SADC relations, easing tourists’ 
movement through the KAZA Univisa: the dynamics and social economic development.  
4.2 Regional integration 
Regional integration was pointed out as one of the major reasons for Zambia’s participation in the 
TFCAs (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Regional integration is understood 
as a process by which nations in a geographical proximity use similar rules and institutions to enter 
into agreement for a common cause, it could be economic, environmental or political reasons 
among others (Vanheukelom & Scott, 2016). Thus, regional integration is said to be instrumental 
in resolving problems which straddle political boundaries and cannot be addressed by individual 
state (Vanheukelom & Scott , 2016). Therefore, TFCAs and the KAZA in particular offers an 
opportunity for actualizing regional integration through tourism. The claim here is that KAZA 
promotes dialogue and conversations among member countries and promotes innovations to 
ensure free movement of the people and wildlife in the region. In relation to this, one government 
official pointed out that, “there is power in unity, if countries talk to each other, they are likely to 
live in harmony and are less likely to be in conflict with each other.” (Government official 1, 
interview, 3 November 2017). This relates to another government official who added that an 
interaction with member states leads to Peace and tranquility, eases movement of animals and both 
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human beings and goods from one country to the other thereby promoting cross border trade in the 
KAZA landscape (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). Although peace has been 
closely linked to TFCAs none of the TFCAs in Southern Africa has Peace as one of its objectives 
in the treaty (SADC, 2007; Metcalfe and Kepe, 2008).  Zambia’s participation in the KAZA TFCA 
is linked to the regional commitments (SADC, 2007). This links to views by civil society actors 
that the KAZA has the potential of promoting cross border trade, internationalization of businesses 
and improved balance of payments (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 
November 2017).  
Furthermore, some government officials and scholars argue that regional integration is about 
managing resources together, harmonization of laws, policies, practices and pronouncements 
(interview, Government official 3, 12 December 2017; Bilal & Vanheukelom, 2015). For example, 
the fish ban policy which used to be observed by Namibia and Zambia at different times is now 
synchronized and now the two countries endeavor to do it at the same period. Previously, Zambia 
implemented a fish ban from December to February on the other hand the implementation of a fish 
ban in Namibia was undertaken in September. This presented inconsistence in managing shared 
resources, and as such the implementation of the fish ban did not yield the desired results. For this 
reason, when Zambia was developing a fisheries management plan, Namibians were involved, and 
the Namibian communities participated in the meetings. As a result, the people put pressure on 
their government so that the government ensured that the fisheries departments synchronized the 
fishing bans (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). 
 Eventually, the Namibian government adopted a fish ban and it is currently being implemented at 
the same time as Zambia’s (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to 
this, interview data indicate that the synchronizing of the fisheries policy has led to an increase in 
the fish resource during the fish ban, as it is believed that breeding takes place during the period 
of fish ban (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017; Government official 3, interview, 
12 December 2017). However, even if the fish ban is implemented at the same time by both 
countries illegal fishing still occurs during fish ban. To confirm this, the local traders noted that 
even if it is difficult to trade during certain periods of the year because the government implements 
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a fish ban in the area, it is difficult for us to stop fishing because that is the source of our livelihood. 
Some local traders noted that: 
 During the previous fish ban we were caught by the scouts, our fish was confiscated and 
we are charged a penalty of K100” (Local trader1, interview, 28 July 2018). 
During the last fish ban we were arrested by the police because we were caught with the 
fish, we were only released after paying a K300 (Local trader 2, interview, 28 July 2018; 
Local trader 3, interview, 28 July 2018). 
The government of Zambia implements the fish ban through the Fisheries and Livestock 
department which is mandated to manage the fish resources. In the KAZA region the community 
scouts supplement government efforts in management of the fish and other resources, other 
government wings such as the Zambia Police, Department of National Parks and Wildlife among 
others also take part in enforcing the law. From the above narratives, illegal fishing in the KAZA 
region shows that despite the fish ban fishing continues and some fishermen go unnoticed. Further, 
the disparities in the penalties given to offenders reveal uncoordinated implementation of the law 
(Fisheries Act, 2011). Thus, there exist gaps between the law in theory and that which is practiced. 
The disparity in the charges given for the same offense is a clear sign that not only are the fishermen 
in conflict with the laws, but the law enforcers also do not adhere to the law provisions.  Similarly, 
a government official pointed out that there are complaints from Namibia and Botswana that the 
animals are poached a lot when they cross over to the Zambian side despite (Government Official 
8, interview, 25 July, 2018). This is recorded despite the harsh penalties given to the offenders 
when caught. 
In relation to the above penalties, sentences and punishments on wildlife crimes are yet to be 
integrated and this -continues to present challenges in implementing fully the KAZA Treaty on the 
Zambian component. For example, in Zambia, a sentence of 15years imprisonment with hard labor 
is slapped on the person that is found in possession of ivory or ivory products such as bangles and 
bracelets among others without a permit, while in Namibia, being in possession of any worked-on 
Ivory is not an offence. By definition, worked on ivory means ivory just cut into pieces 
(Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Therefore, in Namibia, if one is found in 
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possession of pieces of ivory or ivory ornaments, he/she is not convicted of committing a crime 
because the ivory is worked on. Such disparities call for harmonization of both policy and practice 
in member states added a government official (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 
2017). In relation to this, data from government sources show that in the entire SADC region, 
Zambia has the toughest sentences, therefore, offenders would prefer to run to the neighboring 
states where the punishments are less stiff. Hence, the need for harmonization of rules, laws and 
regulations for effective joint management of resources (Government official 3, interview, 12 
December 2017; Maboko, 2017). Government sources indicate that in order to curb poaching, joint 
patrols, sharing of information and intelligence, knowledge and skills on wildlife management 
among member states are being tried and implemented (Government official 3, interview, 12 
December 2017). 
 Despite the efforts to harmonize and manage the KAZA region jointly, there exists “variation in 
the natural resources management regimes among the partner countries, as well as significant 
differences in tourism development efforts, policies, and practices across the KAZA TFCA 
landscape” (KfW, 2014). In relation to this, some scholars argue that it is difficult to harmonise 
policies let alone legislation, this is because each country has its own independent legal statutes, 
acts, and so forth (Sinthumule, 2018; Linell et.al 2019). In relation to this Rusinga & Mapira  
(2012) argues that there exist sharp differences in policies on engagement with international 
communities on security as well as developmental issues. Furthermore, there is no regulatory body 
or penalties to enforce policy and ensure that all the partners comply with the set agreements, thus 
countries are not motivated to abide. Furthermore, civil society representatives maintain that the 
countries remain divided on a number of things for example, each country does its own marketing 
of the KAZA, despite the introduction of the KAZA Univisa between Zimbabwe and Zambia 
(Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018; see Chapter Four).   
Tourism marketing remains divided and the money collected by each country remains in that 
country, there is no mechanism for sharing of the revenue collected. Although it is a positive step 
towards integration, implementation and management of the Univisa resources is not well 
coordinated. Similarly, civil society organization insist that despite scholars arguing that TFCAs 
have the capacity to drop colonial fences, enhance the movement of animals, human and goods 
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across borders (Hanks, 2003) practices in TFCAs through the KAZA show that tourism reinforces 
colonial fences.  
For example, Namibia markets its tourism industry in Germany, and it is easy for it to do 
so due to its historic background than Zambia (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1 
interview, 22 January 2018; Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 
November 2017). 
Owing to the above discussion, it is clear that narratives on the KAZA point to the fact that 
harmonization of policy is not a straightforward task, but a complex one as the harmonization of 
policy in specific areas and on specific TFCAs creates a bigger gap in other areas of the countries’ 
resource management. This is because when policy is harmonized in one area in a particular TFCA, 
it implies that, that area will be governed by multiple member state laws and regulations while 
other domestic protected areas outside that protected area (TFCA) will be governed by the national 
laws and regulations thus causing fragmentation in the governance of the resources. Therefore, 
harmonization of policy has an implication on the wider country’s biodiversity and enforcement 
of the national and international conservation protocols and practices.  
Although government officials have maintained that regional integration does not take away 
countries’ sovereignty and that the idea of TFCAs is protection of wildlife when they move across 
boundaries. This is also clear in the treaty that member states have the sovereignty and cannot lose 
their identity to regional integration (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 
2017).Similarly, another government official maintained that the KAZA Treaty has not come to 
take away the individual member country’s intervention that have been happening, it has come to 
complement the natural resources management efforts of member states (Government official 3, 
interview, 12 December 2017). On the contrary, some scholars have argued that regional 
integration takeaway the country’s sovereignty as the funders influence the country’s decisions 
(see Chapter five). Similarly, other scholars maintain that TFCAs are part of the global 
environmental governance schemes (Duffy, 2006).  
Therefore, states through their regional cooperation are encouraged to participate in order to derive 
more benefits from schemes. In Zambia, the KAZA Project is more of a tourism issue than peace. 
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In terms of regional cooperation, the Univisa is a clear illustration of the efforts to ensure seamless 
flow of tourists but, nothing is mentioned on how the Univisa can be a source of regional 
insecurity. Further, it is established that marketing of the KAZA and Univisa seems to be done at 
national level and not as KAZA as a whole. This point to one major issue in TFCAs, countries and 
regions are usually at different levels of development and stand to benefit differently within the 
TFCA arrangement. In this case, Zimbabwe and other countries in the KAZA TFCA seem to have 
better tourism and development infrastructure than Zambia. There are no significant benefits from 
TFCAs to poor nations because the environmental governance scheme tends to advance the 
interests and control of the political and business elites on resources (Mbaiwa, 2003; Duffy, 2005; 
Spenceley, 2008; Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016 Lineel, 2018). Further, wealthier 
countries with well-developed infrastructure such as roads, accommodation facilities and better 
policies tend to benefit more than the poorer countries with less developed infrastructure and poor 
policies (Ramutsindela et al. 2012), here the Zambian component of KAZA is the case in point. In 
relation to this, it can be argued that the benefits of TFCAs are overshadowed by elements of 
corruption, inequality and aggressive behavior by the few elites who seek to protect their own 
interest and control resources.  
4.3 Regional blocs and TFCAs: KAZA-SADC relations 
In Africa, regional blocs such as Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
East African Community (EAC), SADC, Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) among others play a cardinal role in facilitating regional integration, easy mobility of 
people and goods, promotion of trade and tourism, international and regional investment, 
promotion of peace and security among others. It is important to note that there are diverse and 
specific functions for all the regional blocs, however, their main aim is to promote economic 
development and corporation (Ntara, 2016). Accordingly, SADC has been key in reinforcing 
regional integration by encouraging countries to participate in activities of common interest. 
SADC Member States have a long history of collaboration in various calls of mutual interest. 
Previously they united and offered each other military assistance, political and ideological ideas. 
Today the SADC countries are cooperating in natural resource management (Rusinga and Mapira, 
2012). In relation to this, SADC encourage states to participate in TFCAs because TFCAs’ roles 
and functions sit within the SADC mandate of facilitating regional integrity, peace and security 
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and economic development among others. Similarly, SADC supports sustainable management of 
the fish resources through its SADC protocol on fisheries signed by member states in 2001 (SADC, 
2017). The protocol recognizes member state’s responsibility to effectively manage the shared fish 
resource and facilitates regional integration. By signing this protocol signals the willingness by 
member states to harmonize their fisheries related legislation and protect aquaculture. 
Accordingly, the findings show that one of the major reasons for Zambia’s participation in the 
KAZA is that TFCAs are part of the SADC agenda meant to promote socio-economic development 
through sustainable tourism development, creation of jobs and conservation of biodiversity among 
others (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Accordingly, by ratifying SADC 
protocol on Wildlife and Law Enforcement in 1999 Zambia exhibited its political will to 
participate and promote TFCA projects (SADC, 2007). Thus the legal basis for establishment, 
development and management of TFCAs is the SADC Protocol on Wildlife and Law Enforcement 
Article 4, 2 (f): “to promote the conservation of shared wildlife resources through the establishment 
of TFCAs.” 
Member states have participated in the KAZA because it is in line with the SADC initiative of 
efficiently managing wildlife and conserving biodiversity in the region, using tourism and the 
auxiliary enterprises as a vehicle for improving the living standards of the local people (Terms of 
Reference: Consulting services for the mid-term review of the KAZA TFCA Project BMZ Project 
No. 2006 65 646 and BMZ Project No. 2009 66 788). SADC plays a major role in recruiting 
member states to participate in the TFCAs. In relation to this SADC (2007: 10) states that “SADC 
Secretariat facilitates, coordinates, supports and guides the processes of TFCA formation and 
implementation of TFCAs, it also encourages enabling conditions for TFCAs to flourish in the 
region.” TFCA are also backed by other SADC protocols which include but are not limited to 
Protocol on Shared Watercourses, revised in 2000, the Charter of the Regional Tourism 
Organization of Southern Africa (RETOSA) of 1997, SADC Protocol on Development of Tourism 
of 1998 (SADC, 2007). 
 In line with this, one government official insists that Zambia is participating in the Kavango 
Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA) because the KAZA is a SADC approved 
programme (Government Official 3, interview, 22 January 2018).  Another government official 
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stated that The KAZA programme is by and large a SADC driven issue within countries 
(Government official 2, interview, 12 December 2017). This was confirmed by a SADC report 
(SADC, 2007) which states that SADC is responsible for the facilitation of the formation and 
implementation of the TFCA in the Southern African region. It also helps member states access 
the required funding for the implementation of projects. This relates to one civil society official 
who maintained that “we fund the KAZA because we were requested to do so by SADC,” 
therefore, SADC is the strong driver behind KfW funding’ (Funding Agency official 1, interview, 
24 November 2017). As such Zambia’s participation in the KAZA is inevitable as it fulfills its 
regional obligation thereby being involved in the environmental governance. In relation to this 
another research participant argued that in 2003, Zambia ratified the SADC Protocol on Wildlife 
and Law Enforcement in this protocol there are a number of interventions and among them is to 
encourage partner member states to collaborate where there is mutual interest (Government official 
4, interview, 22 January 2018).  
Therefore, the established mutual gains for KAZA member states and SADC in general involve 
anticipated tourism development, job creation, protection of biodiversity resources and promoting 
inclusive socio-economic growth and development through tourism (Suich et al., 2004; Spenceley, 
2008). In relation to this a government official added that the KAZA Project is recognized as a 
regional project by SADC and SADC is interested to see the reports of the progress of the KAZA 
(Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). KAZA TFCAs has received recognition by 
SADC as the good practice that other countries can learn from, thus, the KAZA is effectively 
implementing the collaboration in order to safeguard the natural resources for both the member 
countries and the entire SADC. This relates to a government official who further argued that SADC 
has stamped and supported the TFCAs as initiatives that can bring many benefits for the region in 
terms of economic growth and prosperity (Government official 4, interview 22 January 2018). 
Similarly, a senior government official added that SADC Protocol on Wildlife and Law 
Enforcement calls for collaboration in the management of resources therefore; SADC supports the 
joint management of resources in the KAZA landscape by and through partner countries (Senior 
Government Official 2, interview, 17 November 2017).  
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Owing to the above, it is clear that SADC promotes TFCAs as one of the crucial tools in fostering 
peace and tranquility in the region. SADC and other supporters of TFCAs have used the notion of 
peace as one of the aims for the establishment of TFCAs. Although peace has been closely linked 
to TFCAs, none of the TFCAs in Southern Africa has Peace as one of its objectives in the treaty 
or objective (Metcalfe and Kepe, 2008; SADC, 2012).  There also exists a direct synergy between 
the SADC Secretariat and KAZA Secretariat. This is proved by the fact that the KAZA Secretariat, 
which is largely responsible for  protocols, administration, facilitation and monitoring of KAZA 
activities and outputs is situated  in Botswana, where the SADC Secretariat responsible for 
facilitation, formation, implementation, fundraising for TFCAs has its headquarters .Thus, it can 
be argued that power on KAZA management radiates from SADC headquarters.   
4.4 Conservation of biodiversity 
The findings show that, the Zambian government participates in the KAZA because the objectives 
of the KAZA fit into the country’s vision for management of resources. Like other participating 
states, Zambia advances conservation objectives as the primary reason for its participation in the 
KAZA. As such Zambia is one of the largest contributors of land to the KAZA.  This is because 
TFCAs have the capacity to cover large areas for conservation purposes. Accordingly, TFCAs 
have gained much popularity because they are seen to be promising to enlarge conservation spaces 
by dropping fences and achieve both conservation and development objectives (van der Linde, 
2001; Bennett, 2003). Therefore, the KAZA is about conservation of biodiversity that ultimately 
ends up supporting socio-economic growth and development of the KAZA member states through 
enhanced tourism and other activities such as fisheries and agriculture as discussed in Chapter Two 
and Chapter Six.  
The concept of TFCAs is grounded in protection of biodiversity to generate socio-economic value 
for local populations and for governments. Thus, operationalization of the KAZA is hinged on 
initiatives to protect biodiversity while generating practical value for human beings.    Research 
participants recount that the Zambezi River Basin is home to about 40 million people who rely on 
the river for drinking water, fisheries, irrigation, hydropower production, mining and industry, 
ecosystem services and maintenance, and other uses (Government official 6, interview, 12 
December 2017; Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Similarly, data from 
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participants show that the natural resource base in the KAZA supports biophysical and socio-
cultural systems which in turn support humanity in their millions (Government official 5, 
interview, 22 January 2018).  
However, humans have a tendency of overexploiting resources, this has the potential to deplete 
the natural resources, cause suffering and threaten human existence. This is not different from the 
case of Simalaha where poaching as well as liberation wars led to the depletion of wildlife (Civil 
Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017). In relation to this, data reveals that 
the growing population in the member states means more pressure on the natural resources as 
scramble for land and natural resources is becoming more prominent leading to competition for 
land between human beings and wildlife (Government official 1, Interview, 3 November 2017). 
This scramble implies that failure to plan for wildlife management will result into perishing of 
wildlife.  
Consequently, the KAZA participating countries realized that the resources are owned jointly, and 
belong to no single member state, thus the need for joint management systems and strategies that 
transcend boundaries becomes very important (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 
2017). This is because nature is blind to political boundaries (Hanks, 2003; Zbicz, 1999). In 
relation to this, information shows that the KAZA Treaty is hinged on sustainability of the 
resources in the KAZA area. Thus, participants in the study summarize their interest in the KAZA 
“…we participate in the KAZA because we want to sustain the resource which transcend 
boundaries for current and future generation.” (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 
2018). Furthermore, the realization that animals are not restricted by colonial boundaries which 
has little regard for the ecological connectivity and integrity (PPF, 2013) means that authorities 
and stakeholders need to invest in guaranteeing protection of wildlife in the region.  This relates 
to views by government officials (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017) who’s 
argues that there is an immediate need to drop the colonial boundaries which abruptly disrupted 
both human and animal movement and ‘freedoms’ and jointly manage the resources which 
transcend political boundaries. This is confirmed by Hanks (2003)) who argues that traditional 
migratory routes have been disrupted by erection of colonial border fences in turn distorting the 
ecosystems.  
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In relation to this, proponents of TFCAs have condemned colonial boundaries for impeding 
conservation of migratory wildlife by preventing wildlife from roaming freely (Hanks, 2003; 
Ferreira, 2004; Munthali, 2007), therefore the immediate need to remove man-made constraints 
and allow for wildlife to  roam freely, restore wildlife ecosystems and unite people who have long 
been separated by  colonial boundaries (Murphy, 2010). Overall, the TFCAs proposes a holistic 
approach to ecological ills and economic challenges that affect most of the rural population 
(Murphy, 2010; De Villiers, 1999; Griffins at.al, 1999; Sandwith at.al, 2001; Hanks, 2003) by 
opening up the previously fenced animal routes which restrain animal movements. The focus has 
been on enlarging the conservation spaces as a way of conserving more species and changing the 
living standards of the local people living in the rural areas. 
The KAZA TFCA is important in conserving native species like the African Elephants, Lions, 
Hynas, Rhinoceroses, Sitatunga, Buffalo, Waterbuck, Lechwe and the endangered African Wild 
dog and other species which may not be native but of good benefits to the region (Civil Society 
Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017; Carlson et.al., 2004). Further, there is need 
to secure wildlife corridors for transboundary wildlife migration in order to improve biodiversity 
and wildlife population (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). In relation to this 
rationale a representative of the civil society interested in the KAZA (Civil Society organization 
official 2, interview, 19 December 2017) asserts that KAZA is all about creating connectivity for 
wildlife and animals in areas experiencing overpopulation are able to move to areas which are 
void.  In relation to this civil society organizations contend that when boundaries were being put 
in place the focus was mainly on geopolitical issues and little or no attention was put on ecological 
connectivity (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018).  Thus, in 
order to create migratory routes for wildlife some government officials call for recreation of animal 
corridors (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). This relates to other participants 
who assert that there was no consideration to the fact that the animals need to move in time of 
stress, it could be in search of water, food, procreation, or security among others (Government 
official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). 
 This necessitated the need for the recreation of corridors to allow for the movement of animals 
from one place to another in order to reach certain dispersal areas (Government official 2, 
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interview, 17 November 2017). This argument is in line with the vision of the early supporters of 
peace parks which was “to see the creation of protected areas across international borders to ensure 
preservation of Southern African biological diversity, reopen ancient wildlife migration routes and 
promote ecological systems…” (Peace Parks Foundation (PPF 2013:2). In relation to this, 
government officials argue that animals have natural routes, there are movements of different 
animals such as lions and elephants among others (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 
2017). With the KAZA in place, free movement of animals is slowly being realized as animals 
will be able to move from Chobe National Parks to Kafue National Park through the Simalaha 
conservancy. 
This does not mean there are no challenges, as human settlements or incompatible land use 
continue to hinder the creation and sustainability of seamless biodiversity corridors in the KAZA 
areas. For example, “a rice field next to the national park or game reserve can fragment the 
ecological systems therefore countries need to talk to each other in order to recreate these 
corridors” (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). It should be noted that these 
areas are also subject to historically developed land uses and traditional governance regimes which 
are not easy to change. Thus, while progress is being recorded, research participants were 
unequivocal that more still needs to be done to ensure that biodiversity corridors are recreated or 
created and become functional. While research participants and proponents of TFCAs support the 
creation of animal corridors, some studies show that “corridors can also act as biological bridges 
for vectors and pathogens they carry” (Cumming, 2011; Ferguson & Hanks, 2010) thus 
transferring disease to areas where disease did not previously exist. Therefore, before creating the 
corridors there is need for assessment of disease in the areas to be opened. 
The process of creating animal corridors is a complex one. It involves mapping, which is a 
participatory process (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). In line 
with this idea, data indicates that (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017) people 
with prior knowledge of the area were identified who revealed the routes which were previously 
used by the animals and these areas were mapped. This was confirmed by one local farmer who 
stated that “I was one of the local people who participated in mapping of our area” (Local 
community farmer 1, interview, 26 July 2018). Some research participants stated that when the 
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areas are mapped, the people whose fields were in the animal corridors were encouraged to move 
their fields to other places where their fields would not be destroyed by wildlife (Civil Society 
organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). Additionally, in order to encourage the local 
people whose fields were in the animal corridors to move their fields to other places, incentives in 
the form of crops and other inputs were given to those who agreed to move their fields (Civil 
Society organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). Although the government and PPF 
officials maintained that people had voluntarily moved to recreate animal corridors and recreate 
ecological integrity in the KAZA, the movement of people from their original areas seemed to 
have been induced by new restrictions introduced by the KAZA project, and destruction of crops 
by wild animals in the area. This observation in Simalaha is similar to the findings by Milgroom, 
and Spierenburg (2008), Sinthumule (2018; 2019) in their research on the GLTP and the Greater 
Mapungubwe respectively, where a combination of new regulations restricted local people’s 
access to natural resources. The increased presence of wildlife forced the local people to accept 
their resettlement along the borders of the park.  
The expansion of conservation areas through creation of animal corridors has resulted in the 
creation of wildlife sanctuary which has led to the erection of new fences in conservation areas. 
The Simalaha sanctuary is a unique conservancy, where double fencing is introduced to protect 
wildlife and ‘cage’ the people as seen in Figure 4.1. Double fencing here is observed where large 
fences have both wildlife and people in one space, but another layer of fencing is introduced to 
protect the fields from attacks by wildlife inside the larger fence. Thus, rather than live up to the 
TFCA proponent’s claims of ensuring co-existence in Simalaha, the conservation efforts in the 
area have led to the erection of special fences that separate wildlife from people’s livelihood 
sources (gardens). While PPF continues to claim that Simalaha is a case in point where wildlife 
and people have been made to co-exist through TFCA efforts, the reality is different. 
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                                  Figure 5.1:  Simalaha sanctuary, Source: Author, 2018 
This entails that the creation of the KAZA has also resulted in the erection of new fences where 
man and animals interact, this interaction has given birth to new problems including animal attacks 
on the crops of the local people living in the sanctuary (see Chapter Six). Further, there is also a 
promise that dropping of fences will reunite the previously separated population. This` may not be 
an easy task and poses threats to national security as the question of sovereignty comes to the fore. 
In relation to this Wolmer cautions that countries in Southern Africa have different laws and 
policies, as such they may not be willing to let their people or natural resources be governed by a 
foreign country (Wolme, 2003).  
Furthermore, dropping the fences is a significant undertaking which goes beyond mere 
pronouncements and calling for more tourists. It requires a substantial amount of both financial 
and social capital and factoring in the consequences of such actions (Murphy, 2010), a thing that 
is yet to be actualized in the KAZA TFCA. Although the findings and proponents of TFCAs show 
that the primary purpose for TFCAs and Zambia’s participation in KAZA TFCA is conservation 
of species which results in social economic development. The critiques of TFCAs have argued that 
the countries’ underlying purpose for participating in TFCAs goes far beyond conservation. 
Conservation narratives are only used to obtain financial assistance (Ramutsindela, 2004). This is 
evidenced by the considerable financial backing provided to KAZA member states by big 
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international conservation and financial organizations, such as WWF, World Bank, KFW among 
others on account of conservation and tourism development as seen in Chapter Five. The TFCA 
conservation and poverty alleviation narratives provide a compelling argument for international 
financiers to TFCA and conservation initiative is portrayed as government driven and owned by 
the local communities. 
However, the realities clearly show that this project is owned by outsiders. For example, the budget 
for Simalaha Community Conservancy is held in South Africa, and in most cases the funds are 
paid directly to service providers (Government official 1, interview, 16 August 2018). This implies 
that the local communities have no powers and cannot make decisions on how the funds can be 
utilized. Similarly, one local farmer in Simalaha Community Conservancy maintained that “the 
Simalaha Conservancy is a community project therefore the management of the project should be 
done by the community and not the royal family, this will enable local community have a sense of 
ownership.” (Local community farmer 2, interview, 27 July 2018). Further, the social development 
indicators in the affected areas remain static. For instance, there is no radical anti-poverty 
transformative agenda in the KAZA documents and reports. I argue here that it is highly likely that 
‘taking down of fences’ to expand the conservation areas is also supported by TFCAs proponents 
and big international organizations as a way of masking their real intentions in conservation when 
their motives are to expand their territories in order to control. 
In addition, the alarming notion of crisis or danger on which TFCAs are premised is a clear 
indication that TFCA’s main objective go beyond conservation. Countries were called to act 
immediately failure to which the world’s resources on which human beings are also dependent for 
their survival will go to extinct. The notions used “Environmental crisis” and “danger” are meant 
to alarm, render the States hopeless and instill fear in them, as such they will have little or no 
resistance but to participate so as rescue their resources. Therefore, the TFCAs initiatives are part 
of the global solutions to the framed crisis (Ramutsindela, 2014). Owing to this it can be argued 
that the creation of KAZA TFCAs is not necessarily meant to conserve the endangered species in 
SADC but as a way of recolonizing Africa by powerful groups, but this time dressing it up under 
the guise of conservation. This can be proved by checking the list of interested parties and investors 
and how local actors have minor roles. The key investors in the KAZA are not local people, they 
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do not source financing locally and their networks are global in nature. Despite the wide acceptance 
of TFCAs and the KAZA in particular due to the huge promises they offer, implementation of 
TFCAs is faced with numerous threats. Table 4.1 below shows some potential threats to TFCAs.  
Table 4.1: Potential threats to TFCAs in Zambia 
 
Source: Author, 2018 
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4.4 Social-economic development 
The findings show that the other major motive for government participation in the KAZA is to tap 
from the claimed socio-economic benefits offered by tourism. In relation to this a senior 
government official maintained that “Tourism sector is large and if well managed it can bring a lot 
of revenue. The aim of the five countries is to be the number one tourism destination in the 
world….” (Government Official 8, interview, 25 July 2018). It is widely argued by research 
participants from the government and TFCA proponents that participation in the KAZA will 
increase tourist arrivals, create job opportunities, boost business linkages and local tourism supply 
chain, and improve incomes for local households as well as improve balance of payment for 
government (Hanks, 2003).  Respondents argue that claims on socio-economic benefits from 
KAZA are also held by SADC. In relation to this some scholars argue that the TFCAs provides a 
larger conservation space as it connects the previously fragmented spaces, this offers a great 
opportunity for tourism improvement as it accords the tourists a greater area for a better, diverse 
attraction and quality experience (Singh, 1999; Van der Linde, et al., 2001). Similarly, one 
government official notes that one of the main focuses of the KAZA and TFCAs in general is to 
build a tourism-based economy (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). This relates 
to the Ministry of Tourism and Arts (2015) assertion that the SADC member states have identified 
tourism as an economic sector and a backbone for sustainable development in the KAZA TFCA 
area that will be used to transform lives of the local poor.  
This links to arguments by senior government officials that tourism is a vehicle for economic 
development, and therefore “…we hope that people’s welfare will be improved, and poverty will 
be eradicated as a result of revenue generation through creation of employment” in the local area 
and beyond (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). In relation to this a government 
official added that, the KAZA has the potential to attract a lot of tourists, boost tourism 
development and improve livelihoods for local populations and also improve balance of payments 
for government (Government official 2, interview, 12 December 2017).  On the contrary, Hanks 
(2003) warn against unrealistic assumption of benefits from tourism.  Countries should not 
unrealistically assume that by being part of the TFCAs then they are guaranteed of a boom in the 
tourism industry translating into increased tourist arrivals, more Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
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resulting into social-economic growth. There are also other factors to consider, including 
developing policies and infrastructure such as roads, lodges and bridges, among others and making 
the environment conducive and attractive to tourists (Suich et.al, 2005), otherwise the benefits 
from tourism remain untapped (Hanks, 2003). It is so idealistic and irresponsible for certain 
countries to want to reap the benefits of tourism without first investing much in the tourism 
industry.   
Thus, the benefits of tourism are mainly enjoyed by countries whose infrastructure is well 
established. For example, Zimbabwe attracts more tourists than Zambia, due to its investment in 
pricing mechanisms and better infrastructure such as roads and accommodation facilities. 
Similarly, Namibia also has a better road network and pricing mechanisms compared to Zambia 
(Civil Society Organization senior official 1, interview, 22 January 2018) whose infrastructure is 
so poor and the roads in the KAZA region on the Zambian component become impassable in the 
rain season. Thus, Zambia is not expected to reap more benefits from tourism because its 
investment is equally low. In relation to this, one senior government official maintains that the 
KAZA on the Zambian side has nothing much to offer, therefore the tourist number has not 
increased in the area (Government Official 8, interview, 25 July 2018). 
Other government officials noted that in Zambia wildlife is the main tourist attraction (Government 
official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). To confirm this, one government official maintains that 
the main base for tourism in Zambia is wildlife (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 
2017). Thus, even tourism arrivals are prominent in wildlife areas. This is why tourism is mostly 
linked to wildlife. In relation to this Ferreira (2004) argues that in Southern Africa tourism is 
synonymous with the wildlife safari. Below are tables of tourist arrivals in the main national parks 
of the KAZA on the Zambian component from 2002-2017. 
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Table 4.2: Tourists 
arrivals to Key 
KAZA National 
Parks in KAZA from 
2002– 2014 
 
MOSI-OA-TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
YEAR 
International 
Tourists 
Local 
Tourists 
International 
Tourists 
Local 
Tourists   
2002 8,405 10,387 1,038 1,456 21,286 
2003 9,689 6,594 1,123 1,496 18,902 
2004 12,635 5,127 1,853 1,930 21,545 
2005 13,311 6,661 2,316 3,886 26, 174 
2006 13,784 6,888 1,987 1,245 23,904 
2007 11,284 7,628 2,514 2,198 23,624 
2008 9,218 11,355 1,971 2,224 24,768 
2009 9,254 9,186 3,099 3,747 25,286 
2010 9,632 8,387 1,908 2,611 22,538 
2011 17,000 12,297 4,215 3,137 36,649 
2012 8,841 9,777 3,209 2,252 24,072 
2013 8,480 9,403 7,288 1,797 26,968 
2014 14,576 4,251 3,537 557 22,921 
Source: Department of wildlife and National Parks, 2017  
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January 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015            754       481      2,558         2,558        
Total 2016         1,086       476      4,673           4,673      
Total 2017         1,272       276      3,240           3,240      10,471  
  February 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015            824       251      2,158         2,158        
Total 2016         1,208       395      2,618           2,618      
Total 2017         1,042       110      2,125           2,125        6,901  
  March 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015         2,815       533      5,026         5,026        
Total 2016         1,885       190      4,259           4,259      
Total 2017         1,257       207      2,868           2,868      12,153  
  April 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015         3,048       672      6,867         6,867        
Total 2016         2,249       524      5,245           5,245      
Total 2017         3,153       650      7,792           7,792      19,904  
  May 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015         1,792       912      6,759         6,759        
Total 2016         2,547       870      7,404           7,404      
Total 2017         2,097       546      6,583           6,583      20,746  
  June 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015         1,732    1,287      7,972         7,972        
Total 2016         1,746       824      7,914           7,914      
Total 2017         1,724       707      8,318           8,318      24,204  
  July 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Table 4.2: Tourists arrivals to Key National Parks in KAZA from 2015-2017   
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Source: Department of wildlife and National Parks, 2017  
 
The figures above show tourists arrivals from 2002-2017. Data for Sioma Ngwezi National Park 
from 2002-2015 was missing. The officers only managed to find information on tourist arrivals 
from 2016-2017. Sioma Ngwezi National Park recorded 131 tourist arrivals in 2016 and 130 in 
2017. Scant information on Sioma Ngwezi National Park signaled poor data management, which 
makes it difficult to track records and development in the area. 
Total 2015         3,818    1,540    12,898       12,898        
Total 2016         2,056    1,544    11,554         11,554      
Total 2017         3,074    1,878      9,894           9,894      34,346  
  August 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015         2,691    1,848    15,879       15,879        
Total 2016         2,591    2,292    14,163         14,163      
Total 2017         2,585    1,668    12,085         12,085      42,127  
  September 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015            958    2,044      9,247         9,247        
Total 2016         1,215    1,248      9,418           9,418      
Total 2017         1,475       163      7,680           7,680      26,345  
  October 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015         1,133    1,657      9,489         9,489        
Total 2016         1,220    1,353      9,712           9,712      
Total 2017         1,255    1,348      9,072           9,072      28,273  
  November 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015         1,449    1,199      5,983         5,983        
Total 2016            875    1,056      5,507           5,507      
Total 2017         1,272       949      6,130           6,130      17,620  
  December 
TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS 
MOSI-OA TUNYA KAFUE TOTAL 
 
2015 2016 2017 Total 
Total 2015         3,037       598      4,901         4,901        
Total 2016         1,625       575      7,836           7,836      
Total  2017         1,739    1,325      5,666           5,666      18,403  
     89,737      90,303    81,453    261,493  
70 
   
There was a general consensus by research participants that the creation of the KAZA TFCA has 
resulted into an increase in tourist arrivals in the area. However, the figures above show that there 
has been a gradual increase in tourism arrivals from 2003-2012 and a major increase in 2013, 
which could be attributed to the WTO meeting in 2013. There is a slight decline in 2014, which 
was recorded after the signing of the KAZA treaty. The table indicates that the gradual increase 
was recorded before the introduction of the KAZA. Despite Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, 
Sioma Ngwezi national park remains undeveloped and less attractive to tourists, as seen from 
tourist numbers in the area shown above.  Therefore, there was no evidence to prove that the 
establishment of the KAZA has led to a significant increase in tourist numbers. In relation to this, 
one government official maintained that the creation of the KAZA has not resulted into increase 
in tourist arrivals. Some National Parks such as Mosi-oa-tunya and Sioma Ngwezi have little to 
offer, this is evidenced by the low number of tourists to Sioma Ngwezi National Park (Murphy, 
2014). Therefore, it can be argued that, the investment in the KAZA region on the Zambian 
component is too low to transform the tourism sector into a money-spinning industry as seen in 
Chapter Five (Government official 8, interview, 25 July 2018). 
As indicated above, tourism in Zambia mostly occurs in National Parks and game management 
areas. As in other Southern African countries, tourism in Zambia is synonymous with wildlife 
safaris (Ferreira, 2004). Game management areas are simply buffer zones for wildlife, as they 
border National Parks (Interview, Civil Society organization official 2, 23 January 2018). The 
game management areas are usually areas in which wildlife and human beings co-exist. Similarly, 
government official added that there are two types of tourism that take place in the natural and 
semi-natural areas. One is consumptive tourism, where a quota is issued for one to hunt animals r 
for trophies (Interviews: Government official 4, 22 January 2018) and the second  is  non-
consumptive tourism where lodges and hotels are developed and tourists come to view animals 
and then leave  without killing them (Civil Society organization official 1 Interview, 23 January 
2018).Representative from civil society organizations working on the KAZA indicated that 
Zambia benefits greatly from nature-based tourism and that mostly, it is in the National Parks 
(Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). However, traditionally, 
promotion of nature-based tourism in Zambia has tended to exclude local populations from nature 
(Civil Society Organization Official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). 
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In Zambia, natural resource management is based on two key approaches, namely, the community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) approach and the use of top down government 
institutions led by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife, formerly known as Zambia 
Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). The CBNRM seeks to generate dual benefits at community level. 
Firstly, CBNRM seeks to use community governance structures to act as agencies for protecting 
nature and supporting tourism. Secondly, protected wildlife generates revenue that directly 
benefits communities (Murphy, 2010). As such, in Zambia two fees are paid by hunters. These are 
trophy fees and concession fees. Trophy fees depend on the species to be hunted, while the 
concession fee is the annual fee paid by a hunting company (Civil Society Organization Official 
2, interview, 23 January 2018). A government official noted during a personal interview that for 
hunting in communal land, 50% of the trophy fees is given to the community as communal benefits 
and 20 percent of the concession fees go to the community (Government official 2, interview, 2 
March 2018). From the 50% that goes to the local community through the Community Resource 
Boards, 5% is given to the Chiefs (Civil Society organization official 2, Interview, 23 January 
2018; Government official 3, interview, 2 March 2018).  
This has resulted in Chiefs playing a key role in championing nature conservation and biodiversity 
as they have a direct vested economic interest. Furthermore, the local communities acting through 
community leadership structures like elders and village headmen, among others, decide on how to 
use their money for the public benefit. These approaches to resource management are incentives 
to enable local communities to actively participate in wildlife management activities. This has 
helped communities to develop a sense of ownership regarding wildlife and participate in the 
management of resources because they are able to see and manage the benefits from the wildlife 
that accrue to them. However, participants in the research indicate that these benefits are only 
available in areas with rich wildlife resources. In areas where the wildlife numbers are very low 
the benefits to the local communities are diluted and are insignificant (Civil Society organization 
official 2, interview, 23 January 2018).  
The funders of the KAZA have argued that the economic potential of TFCAs such as the KAZA 
are huge and what is needed is to get institutions to realize the potential (Funding Agency official 
1, interview, 24 November 2017). The KAZA’s rich landscape has the potential to increase wildlife 
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and bring in more revenue through tourism (Funding Agency official, Interview, 24 November 
2017).  However, some participants argue that the tourism sector in Zambia remains 
underdeveloped, and thus does not attract the desired number of tourists (Government official 1, 
interview, 23 January 2018; Government Official 8, interview, 25 July 2018). In addition to this 
some scholars have argued that the benefits of tourism have no significant impact on the locals 
because the profits from tourism accrue to private and corporate enterprises (Suich, 2005) and 
these are mostly owned by foreign investors or a few elites. 
Furthermore, the participating countries work in isolation, as evidenced by the individual 
packaging of tourism products by each member state.  In the case of Zambia, the Zambia Tourism 
Agency (ZTA) has not done enough to advertise the KAZA on the Zambian Component. In relation 
to this civil society organizations stated that to tap more from the benefits of tourism there is a 
need for collaboration among countries in the region, as well as a need to develop new initiatives 
which will attract more tourists, generate benefits and make movement easier for tourist in the 
region (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 19 December 2017). Thus, the Univisa was 
introduced in order to facilitate the easy movement of tourists and boost the tourism industry, 
which would potentially lead to economic development. Zimbabwe and Zambia were the first 
countries to pilot the KAZA Univisa, which was introduced in 2013 (Government official 4, 
interview, 22 January 2018). This shows the willingness by the countries to support each other and 
use tourism as a vehicle for regional economic development (Noe, 2010). 
Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the much-proclaimed benefits of tourism are not 
without their limitations. The tourism sector is fragile and directly affected by prevailing national 
and international conditions, which include but are not limited to weather, local politics, 
international politics, infrastructure, security related trends, public health concerns and changes in 
rates of economic growth, which in turn affect equity in benefit sharing, and tourism’s contribution 
to poverty alleviation (Scovronick and Turpie 2009; Suich 2008; Hanks 2003). Therefore, it is not 
enough to rely solely on TFCAs to expand the tourism sector and reap the benefits. There is also 
a need for countries to invest in infrastructure, pricing mechanisms, and marketing strategies and 
build local human capacity in order for the local people to contribute to building the tourism sector. 
In the case of KAZA Zambia, many threats such as perceived and actual political instability, 
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election cycles, and poor health care infrastructure systems serve as deterrents to international 
tourists. In a country where domestic tourism is poorly marketed and very underdeveloped, it is 
unrealistic to expect to reap maximum benefits from the KAZA’s tourism potential. Thus, the high 
stakes for Zambia, as noted in the KAZA documents, can be characterized as myths if the tourism 
sector remains underdeveloped. In the following sub section, I explain the background and 
conceptualization of the KAZA Univisa. 
4.5 Easing tourists’ movements through KAZA Univisa: The dynamics 
The claims for economic benefits to be gained through TFCAs in the KAZA are based on 
assumption of increased flow of tourism and generation of tourism related economic activities and 
transactions. This means the KAZA member countries needed to come up with initiatives to 
promote regional integration through nature and tourism. Some key informants likened the KAZA 
Univisa initiative to the European Schengen Visa, which calls for seamless borders in the member 
countries to facilitate the smooth movement of people, natural resources (animals) and capital 
(Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). The discussion that led to the implementation 
of the KAZA Univisa dates back to 2013 when Zambia and Zimbabwe co-hosted the United 
Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) summit.  (Government official 1, interview, 22 
January 2018). The partnering countries realized that cross boarder tourism in the KAZA region 
was hampered by requirement for a country specific Visa for tourists to cross from one country to 
the other (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015). Thus, the partnering countries were keen to develop 
a vibrant regional tourism industry through the facilitation of unrestrained passage of tourists 
across the international boarder in the KAZA region and eventually the entire SADC region 
(Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015). 
On the 13th March 2012 the question of how to enable the easy movement of tourists in the KAZA 
region came up at a committee of Ministers held in Kasane in Botswana (Government official 5, 
interview, 26 February 2018). At this meeting, the KAZA officials decided the easy movement of 
the participants at the WTO between Zambia and Zimbabwe could be achieved by establishing 
seamless movement across the borders (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015; Government official 
1, interview, 3 November 2017). This meeting coincided with the ongoing consultancy on 
harmonization of Tourism and Natural Resources Management Policy in the KAZA TFCA whose 
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output was the introduction of the KAZA Univisa (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015). This was 
in accordance with the objectives of the KAZA TFCA under Article 5 of the KAZA Treaty on 
facilitation of easy movement of tourist across international borders (KAZA Treaty). This idea 
was shared with the heads of state of Zambia and Zimbabwe, who agreed to the suggestion and 
made a joint pronouncement endorsing the seamless loop for a period of two months (Government 
official 4, interview, 22 January 2018).  
Following the successful co-hosting of the 20th session of the General Assembly of UNWTO by 
Zambia and Zimbabwe in Livingstone and Victoria towns respectively in August 2013, it was 
agreed by the KAZA officials that the initiative be continued (Government official 1, interview, 
22 January 2018). It was from this background that the two heads of State of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe directed that the KAZA partnering countries, Zambia and Zimbabwe in particular 
should replicate the principle that governed the movement of tourists across the border during the 
UNWTO. This was to become standard across the SADC region (Ministry of Arts and Tourism, 
2015). In relation to this a government official noted that the process of the KAZA Univisa pilot 
was kick started with the financial support from World Bank. This was the genesis of the KAZA 
Univisa (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018).  
The KAZA Univisa is a 50 US$ Visa, and the entire Visa process was funded by the KFW 
(Funding Agency official 1, interview, 22 January 2018) including the purchasing of the stickers 
used on the KAZA Univisa. Given the limited resources, the pilot of the Univisa could not be done 
by all five participating countries (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). As such 
Zambia and Zimbabwe were the first countries to pilot the KAZA Univisa. During a personal 
interview, a government official added that it was easier for Zambia and Zimbabwe to undertake 
the KAZA Univisa pilot exercise because the existing immigration systems in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe are similar (government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). Similar legal migration 
regimes exist, and the two countries have also cooperated for many years and share a colonial 
boundary. Furthermore, the two countries had gained experience when co-hosting the UNWTO. 
An informant added that the two countries had to pilot the Univisa, in order to provide lessons 
when rolling out the idea to the remaining three countries (Government official 1, interview, 22 
January 2018). Zambia and Zimbabwe have piloted the Univisa since 2015 and have now been 
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called upon to streamline the KAZA Univisa into the normal immigration system of the two 
countries (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017). The 
integration of the KAZA Univisa into the normal immigration system of the two countries will 
enable tourists to get a Univisa at any international entry point of Zambia or Zimbabwe. This will 
not only be cost effective but also time saving (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 
2017). In relation to this a funding agency official maintains that introducing the Univisa will 
attract more tourists to the area because it is convenient, less time consuming and cost effective 
(Funding agency official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). 
Once the Univisa has been issued to tourists, they can enter Zimbabwe or Zambia and visit any 
place of their choice, rather than being confined to the KAZA region. Tourists are allowed a 24-
hour trip to Botswana in Chobe National Park (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). 
The KAZA Univisa is valid for a period of 30 days in Zambia and Zimbabwe, with multiple entries 
between the two countries. During interviews, a government official (Government official 6, 
interview, 22 January 2018) stated that the introduction of the KAZA Univisa has led to an increase 
in tourist arrivals in the region. However, the revenue derived from tourism is not shared between 
the two countries, with the money received by each country remaining in that particular country. 
This makes it difficult in terms of the standardization of tourism products from both sides,  as they 
operate as  competitors, with each country seeking domination in order to attract more tourists. 
Generally, data on tourism in the KAZA remains unavailable or disaggregated (Government 
official 1, interview, 3 November 2017).  
Despite the KAZA Univisa being a sought-after destination by many tourists wishing to visit 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, the issuing of the KAZA Univisa came to a halt in August 2017 in Zambia 
and in September 2017 in Zimbabwe, without any notice. This was because the two countries had 
run out of the required stickers (Funding Agency official 1, interview, 24 November 2017). This 
state of affair inconvenienced tourists, and they had to arrange for alternative measures, while 
some had to cancel their trips. The halting of the issuing of visas signals some inefficiency and 
elements of dependency of the KAZA on international financing and the limited localization of 
the initiative.   
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There are plans afoot to roll out the KAZA Univisa to other participating countries, namely 
Botswana, Namibia and Angola (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015). This is expected to boost 
the tourism sector and bring in more revenue. With regards to KAZA funding agencies (Funding 
Agency official 1, interview 24 November 2017), KAZA is the biggest TFCA and if well protected 
can attract more tourists and increase the revenue base.  In addition to this, other research 
participants maintain that collaboration with other countries has the potential to boost the Tourism 
industry in the participating countries (Civil Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 
December 2017). However, some scholars have maintained that the size of the TFCA does not 
translate to a functioning tourism sector, economic growth or the wellbeing of the people (Suich, 
2008), Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park is the case in point (Scovronick and Turpie, 2009). 
Some government officials argued that the introduction of the Univisa between Zambia and 
Zimbabwe is helping to increase the movements of tourists between the two borders (Government 
official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). This is against the backdrop that no data is readily available 
to support the claims that KAZA has resulted in increased numbers of tourists to Zambia. 
Furthermore, some research participants emphasized that the Zambian and Zimbabwean 
components of the KAZA are not being advertised as one, but that each participating country  
advertises its own portion of the KAZA (Civil Society Organization senior official 1, interview, 
22 January 2018; Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). 
In addition, some countries stand a better chance of benefiting from the Univisa initiative than 
others because tourism in the participating countries remains at different levels in terms of 
infrastructure and service development, as well as in terms of service costs in the tourism sector. 
Some KAZA participating countries like Namibia and Botswana have more tourism infrastructure 
in terms of private sector investment, while other partnering countries like Zimbabwe have 
invested in pricing mechanisms. For this reason, the perception is that it is cheaper lodging on the 
Zimbabwean side than the Zambian side (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 
22 January 2018). Zambia’s tourism industry remains underdeveloped due to poor infrastructure 
such as a poor road network and limited options in accommodation facilities, among others (Civil 
Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017) as a result of less private and 
government investment in the tourism industry. In relation to this, a civil society representative 
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(Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018) added that the cost of 
doing business is said to be more expensive in Zambia than in other KAZA participating countries, 
hence the low private investment in the Zambian component. Additionally, the major tourist 
attraction and infrastructure development on the Zambian component of KAZA is mainly 
concentrated in Livingstone, and the intra-country movement of tourists is more expensive. For 
example, it is more expensive to travel from Lusaka to Livingstone than to land in Windhoek to 
go to Katima Mulilo. This has resulted in low tourist numbers and revenue earnings for Zambia 
(Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). Zambia has not invested 
much in national airlines, which would have made the cost of local and direct flights cheaper. 
Consequently, in Zambia even local flights are very expensive (Zambia Daily Mail, 6th December, 
2017 https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/kaza-visas-step-in-right-direction).  
Although Zambia is endowed with natural tourist attractions like the Victoria Falls, abundant 
wildlife and a rich cultural heritage, among others, its tourism sector remains relatively 
undeveloped and the cost of doing business in Zambia is very high due to cost obligations and this 
deters private investors from investing on the Zambian component. For this reason, the Zambian 
component lags behind in terms of infrastructure (Zambia Daily Mail 6 December 2017). Zambia 
has also not invested much in the marketing of its tourism products (Government official 4, 
interview, 22 January 2018). In relation to this some participants added that the KAZA 
participating countries made tourism an economic sector long before Zambia, and provided enough 
support in terms of infrastructure development for tourists within the country, as well as  pricing, 
among others (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22January 2018). They 
advertise in both electronic and print form on international media. However, Zambia rarely 
advertises on international media such as CNN, Algezira and the BBC, among others, which reach 
a large international audience, resulting in reduced tourist arrivals into the country. Poor marketing 
in Zambia’s tourism industry is due to low national budget allocations to the Zambia Tourism 
Agency (ZTA) which are not enough to support a meaningful marketing campaign, thus inhibiting 
Zambia from showcasing its tourism products to the outside world (Civil Society Organization 
Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). For example, in 2017 the allocation for both national 
and international marketing was U$D 600, 000. 
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This amount was too little to advertise internationally, compared to competitors in the region. 
While Zambia allocates such meager amounts, South Africa spent between US$80 million and 
US$200 million, while Botswana and Namibia spent US$8 million and US$12 million respectfully 
(Zambia Daily Mail, 6 December 2017). This entails that Zambia’s tourism sector remains a 
hidden treasure, which is largely unknown, and which will not attract great numbers of tourists 
and investors. While the KAZA Univisa is advertised internationally and mostly foreign tourists 
move between countries, free movement between countries does not apply to the local people. 
Despite the claim that local communities stand to benefits from the creation of TFCAs, benefits 
are not enjoyed by the local people (Sinthumule, 2018). In relation to this, Sinthumule (2019) notes 
that the border people are sidelined, thus the TFCA is not for the locals but rather a landscape 
devoted to nature conservation and commercial enterprises. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the main objectives of Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, which include:  
Regional integration, conservation of biodiversity and social-economic development. The chapter 
has also argued that the states’ participation in the KAZA goes beyond conservation objectives, as 
states view the TFCAs as a platform for lobbying financial support from donors.   Thus, TFCAs 
are seen as a forum by which states acquire political, social, economic and environmental gains. 
However, the benefits from TFCAs are not easily materialized (see Chapter Six). In addition, the 
chapter maintained that the Zambian tourism sector has remained underdeveloped despite 
Zambia’s participation in the KAZA. This is evidenced in the low numbers of tourist arrivals in 
the KAZA region on the Zambian component. Overall, the findings show that most of the key 
objectives for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA including regional integration and social, 
economic development among others remain unachieved and many of the KAZA’s promises to 
remain unfulfilled. Above all, the study establishes that the motivation for Zambia’s participation 
in the KAZA is not as ambitious as other participating countries as the measures taken by the 
Zambian government seem disjointed and somehow mere claims. Harnessing benefits from the 
TFCA calls for the formulation of robust and integrated conservation and tourism development 
strategies that represent an integrated trans-local caricature of nature-tourism nexus development. 
Participation alone cannot make Zambia harness the benefits promised by KAZA. 
79 
   
CHAPTER FIVE: INVESTMENTS IN THE KAZA TFCA ON THE ZAMBIAN SIDE 
5.1 Introduction 
The countries participating in the KAZA TFCA are not a homogenous group but, rather, are at 
different levels of economic development, with infrastructure differing from one country to 
another. Therefore, the KAZA TFCA is an unequal investment landscape. This naturally raises 
concerns relating to inter-state inequity in the distribution of benefits (Katere, Hill and Moyo, 
2001). This also implies that unification and consolidation of marketing and investment promotion 
of the TFCAs may not be an easy task. In this chapter investment refers to both monetary and non-
monetary inputs which necessitate the effective -functioning of the TFCA. States invest differently 
in TFCAs, depending on the capacity and importance they attach to conservation and the potential 
benefits derived from it. This chapter focuses on investments on the Zambian component. Two 
broad views were articulated by the key informants. While some were of the opinion that the 
government of Zambia has invested enormously in the KAZA, others were of the view that the 
government’s investment in the KAZA was somewhat insignificant.  These two conflicting views 
are analyzed below.  This chapter is organized into three sections: the first attempts to analyze the 
investments in the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component, the second presents data on the 
integrated development plan (IDP) as an investment and the third concludes the chapter.  
5.2 Zambian government’s investments in the KAZA 
Southern African countries backed by donor funding are increasingly embracing TFCAs based on 
their promise that they are capable of achieving high levels of both conservation and development 
through tourism (Thomson, 2013; Symons, 2017). In relation to this, there was consensus among 
the research participants that the government is supposed to be a major investor in the KAZA 
TFCA. In support of this, one government official stated that the Zambian government has 
contributed massive amounts of land, as evidenced by the fact that Zambia is home to the longest 
portion of the Zambezi River, and it is Zambia’s contribution to the KAZA which makes the 
KAZA the largest TFCA in the world (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In 
this regard, another official added that Zambia is one of the largest land contributors to the KAZA. 
Figure 5.1 below shows the participating countries’ land contribution to the KAZA.  
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Figure 5.1: Map of KAZA TFCA Treaty boundary, Source: KAZATFCA Master IDP, 2013 
Like the colonial administration that reserved huge pieces of land for conservation and tourism 
(Ramutsindela, 2004), the figure above shows a large piece of land set aside for conservation by 
states, with Zambia contributing 10, 189,640 hectares, making it the largest contributor. However, 
it should be noted that recently Botswana has extended its KAZA boundary and is now the largest 
contributor, with Zambia becoming the second largest contributor.  Other data sources from 
government show that government does not only provide the necessary vehicles, office space and 
accommodation to the employees but also the enabling environment and good will for the KAZA 
project to meet its objectives. (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). In this instance 
an enabling environment entails the legal frameworks, policies and all the practices of the 
government which enable the project to operate freely and achieve its objectives. Through the 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks of the Ministry of Tourism and Arts with the support 
of PPF the government participated in the construction of access and internal gravel roads and 
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additional buildings and boundary fences at Sioma Ngwezi National Park headquarters in Sioma 
District, Western Province, within the Zambia component of the KAZA TFCA (Government 
official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Despite these efforts Sioma Ngwezi National Park 
remains one of the least developed parks in Zambia and records a high level of poaching (Murphy, 
2008). The findings also show that the government donated a good number of animals to the 
Simalaha Community Conservancy (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July 2018).  
The findings reveal that the government of Zambia invests in policy formulation, which governs 
the management of the land, water, wildlife, the environment and biodiversity conservation. This 
kind of investment entails hiring consultants to conduct consultative meetings, training of staff and 
the drafting of policy, among others. These consultants are sometimes paid by external funders 
(Civil Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017). However, in Zambia, land 
laws are ill defined and do not provide real ownership to the local people (Jones, 2008). The land 
belongs to the chiefs, and the local community has no legal right to sell it (PPF official3, interview, 
27 July 2018). Furthermore, investors are also not allowed to buy land in the KAZA region on the 
Zambia component, and can only rent it from either the chiefs or the local people (PPF official 4. 
interview, 27 July 2018). In relation to this Spenceley (2008: 294) argues that the state should 
“invest in policies that allow clear and strong property rights for investors, developers and local 
communities.” The current policies may discourage investors from investing in the area due to 
lack of security. 
In relation to the above, Metcalfe (2006)’s policy study on the Zambian component of the KAZA 
reveals that the major weakness in terms of effective implementation of natural resources 
management on the ground is the sectoral and legal separation of Forestry, Fisheries, Water and 
Wildlife. This separation brings about differences in the access and control of fish, timber, water 
and wildlife resources. Metcalfe explains that: 
The protected local and national forests are surrounded by communal land and provide 
valuable wildlife habitat but no policy integrates land, forestry, water and wildlife tenure 
or management....Three separate legal, policy and institutional environments pertains and 
the common property design flaws in this arrangement mean high transaction costs, 
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overlapping jurisdiction and assure a ‘tragedy of the commons’ on the ground… (Metcalfe, 
2006:12). 
Despite such contributions as shown above, the government’s investment in the KAZA receives 
less attention  because government’s investments in projects such as infrastructure development 
to boost tourism is negligible, as such, infrastructure remains poor and the people living close to 
the parks continue to wallow in poverty, with the poverty level of Western province currently 
standing at 82.2 (CSO, 2016). This coincides with the views held by government officials who 
assert that “the government has been a silent investor in the KAZA project. This is because in most 
instances the efforts by the government are not recognized, and are mostly overshadowed by those 
of donors, thus leading people to think the KAZA project is donor driven (Government official 3, 
interview, 22 January 2018). In relation to this, a World Bank (2007) report shows that, although 
there is a gradual growth in the tourism sector in Zambia, the sector seems to be viewed by the 
government as one dominated by foreigners and hence does not translate to the economic growth 
of the country.  
It is important to note that all KAZA participating countries are mandated to contribute to an annual 
subscription fee. In this regard, the findings presented two contradicting views on the 
government’s finances to the KAZA secretariat. While some maintained that the government of 
Zambia’s financial contributions have continued to flow in line with all its KAZA related 
obligations; for instance, each member state participating in the KAZA contributes an annual 
subscription fee of 60, 000 US$ per annum. This money contributed by member states is used for 
operation costs of the KAZA secretariat (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 
22January 2018). This view was challenged by other key informants who allege that most of the 
member states do not pay the annual subscription fee and Zambia is not consistent in remitting the 
annual subscription fee to the KAZA secretariat (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, 
interview, 22 January 2018; Government official 3, 22 January 2018; senior government official 
7, 22 January 2018). It is also important to note that there are no penalties or punishments to compel 
the participating countries to comply with the set requirements or regulations (Government official 
3, interview, 12 December 2017). However, discussions to introduce such penalties against 
countries which do not comply are underway. There is a suggestion that countries which do not 
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remit the requisite subscription fee should not benefit from any grant provided to the KAZA 
participating countries (Government official 3, interview, 21 September 2018). 
The KAZA secretariat in Botswana is the body mandated to coordinate KAZA activities. In the 
first three years of the KAZA’s existence, no donor wanted to fund staff salaries (Civil Society 
Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). However, the German government 
offered to assist in the running of the secretariat in the interim, with member states taking over this 
role at a later stage. Money from donors should go into the running of projects. In support of this, 
information from key informants indicates that the contributions from member states do not only 
support the secretariat but also enable partner countries to develop a sense of ownership of the 
KAZA (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017).  
Although the views expressed by civil society organizations suggested that the government invests 
in the workforce and paying of salaries and allowances for hired staff (Civil Society Organization 
Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017), there was no significant evidence to support this 
claim. For example, there is only one officer who has been seconded by the government to the 
KAZA secretariat and one TFCA coordinator working on the KAZA TFCA, as well as other 
TFCAs of which Zambia is a member. It is also not clear if the KAZA project is the reason why 
the government hired about three hundred (300) wildlife police officers to safeguard wildlife in 
Kafue National Park which is part of the KAZA. This is because the government’s recruitment of 
wildlife police officers in the Kafue National Park had been practiced before the KAZA project 
commenced. This entails that the government has not invested much in human resources in the 
KAZA. In the Simalaha, the work force is hired and paid by PPF, and these staff members are 
mainly hired on a contract basis and work at different levels, some at policy level and others at 
implementation. 
 Just like other TFCAs, such as the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) where poaching is 
at a high rate, KAZA TFCA continues to record poaching cases (Ferreira, 2004). To support this, 
one civic leader noted that “there are complaints from Namibia and Botswana that animals are 
poached when they cross to the Zambian side” (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018). This is 
recorded despite claims that the government has employed Wildlife Police officers to ensure that 
management of wildlife is enhanced. This is the kind of investment that is not much talked about, 
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but it is very significant in sustaining and making the KAZA TFCA a reality.  However, these 
investments are not adequate enough to start yielding tangible benefits for the local people and 
other investment stakeholders. It is also known that the government of Zambia has not invested in 
marketing, infrastructure to support non consumptive tourism and claims on tourism benefits to be 
actualized. As such Zambia is seen as one of the least preferred tourism destinations as reflected 
in Chapter Four. I argue that investing in salaries and other indirect aspects of the tourism sector 
will not transform the tourism potential of the region as far as Zambia is concerned.  There is a 
need to invest in direct components of tourism like air and road transport infrastructure, lodges 
and hotels, tourism supply chain management and favorable policies for attracting private sector 
investment and developing local people and skills development, among others. Thus, significant 
investment in tourism is required if Zamia is to harness the benefits from the tourism sector. 
Findings also show that the government of Zambia contributes financial resources for marketing 
the KAZA. However, some participants maintained that the amount allocated to the marketing of 
KAZA is too little to reach the international audience (Civil Society Organization senior official 
1, interview, 22nd January 2018), (see Chapter Four). Informants also observed that in relation to 
other participating countries Zambia has not invested much in the KAZA, as evidenced in the 
tourism sector, which has remained relatively underdeveloped (Civil Society Organization Senior 
Official1, interview, 24 November 2017) (see Chapter Four). In relation to this, one civic leader 
stated that the Zambian government has “not invested much in the KAZA due to lack of vision by 
the policymakers” (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018). “The policymakers have decided to 
ignore the potential benefits which the KAZA can offer if the government invests in it” (Civic 
leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018). The KAZA is largely driven by funds from outside and this 
threatens the sustainability and real objective of the programme (Government official 2, interview, 
17 November 2017; Government Official 8, interview, 25 July 2018). If member states are keen 
to reap the perceived benefits from KAZA TFCA, government support needs to be streamlined in 
the operations of the KAZA.  
As mentioned above, the implementation of the TFCAs and KAZA on the Zambian component in 
particular is dependent on donor funding. In relation to this, Katerere, Hill and Moyo (2001) noted 
that large-scale conservation in Southern Africa has received generous funding from donors. This 
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raises the question of sustainability, should donor’s pullout of the project. The KAZA Univisa is 
a case in point. This KAZA Univisa was suspended due to non-availability of passport stickers. 
The research participants confirmed that this suspension was due to the transitioning of the 
financing for the printing of stickers from donor funding to national funding. The state did not 
budget for the KAZA Univisa, hence the abrupt suspension (Government official 3, interview, 12 
December 2017; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017), (see Chapter Four). TFCAs 
have been supported by politicians, big business men/women international actors: bilateral donors 
such as the German development agency (GTZ), KfW, the Swedish Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (SIDA), and USAID; multilateral agencies such as the European Union, 
the World Bank, and the World Conservation Union; and NGOs such as Conservation 
International and the Worldwide Fund for Nature. Most of these organizations work closely with 
the South African PPF (Swatuk, 2005; Hanks & Myburgh, 2015).  
Although some scholars see donor funding as an opportunity to attract private investors, the KAZA 
landscape on the Zambian component has not shown much/any evidence of private sector 
investment despite the flowing of donor funds into the area (Lunstrum, 2011). In relation to this, 
one government official stated that there are various projects on the Zambian component of the 
KAZA, and these are supported by various stakeholders, including KfW, WWF, Panthera, the 
World Bank and Peace Park Foundation, among others (Government official 6, interview, 12 
December 2017). By investing in the KAZA the stakeholders hope to see an increase in 
biodiversity in the region, as well as tourism development (Funding Agency official 1, interview, 
22 January 2018; Civil Society Organization official 3, interview, 5 December 2017). As such 
these funding organizations indirectly control the use and access of resources. It was further 
observed that, the emphasis is not so much on the improvement of the local people’s livelihood as 
seen from the little support channeled to livelihood activities as discussed below.  
Some informants noted that most of the funding received for implementation of the KAZA project 
by the Zambian component comes from KfW (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 
2017), KfW has been the main funder for the KAZA project with the funding amounting to 35.5-
million Euros since 2008(https://www.kavangozambezi.org). However, access to the financial 
documents was denied. Most of the funds raised go towards infrastructure projects and only a small 
percentage is allocated to community projects such as training of local farmers in conservation 
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farming, training of village scouts, provision of seeds to local farmers, provision of treadle pumps, 
energy saving stoves and enforcement of natural resource regulations (see Chapter Six). A 
government official also added that PPF has built three teachers’ houses and installed a solar pump 
at Mwandi Secondary School, the project has also installed solar to provide lighting at a 
community clinic (Government official 9, interview, 24 July 2018). Further, members of staff at 
Kasaya basic School confirmed that the school has received solar panel to supply electricity at the 
school (Government officials 10, interview, 24 July 2018) (see Chapter Six). However, access to 
documents on actual expenditure by the project was denied.  
In relation to the above some scholars have observed that the international organizations have put 
in huge sums of money, technical support, machinery and human resources in the implementation 
of the TFCAs and the KAZA in particular (Ferguson and Hanks, 2010; Cumming, 2011). 
Furthermore, PPF, which is a strong supporter and implementer of TFCAs, is seen to be driving 
the TFCA project, and governments are basically hosting rather than driving the implementation 
of TFCAs. As confirmation of this, one government official stated that the budgets for 
implementation of the KAZA projects are held in South Africa by PPF and other donors involved 
(Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Although this is done to ensure 
transparency and reduce the possible misapplication of funds, it erodes trust in member countries 
and reduces their decision-making powers due to lack of finances. Furthermore, the hiring of 
human resources is done by PPF. For instance, the TFCAs Director in Zambia who sits in the 
Ministry of Tourism and Arts is directly employed and paid (Salary) by PPF, the same applies to 
the officers working in the Simalaha conservancy (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 
2017). This threatens the continuity of the project should PPF withdraw its support. Similarly, 
Kokwe (1997) notes that the interest and motivation for supporting TFCAs by international 
institutions are different and may at times overlap as stated above.  
Consequently some scholars maintain that while non-state actors, international organizations and 
donor agencies such as the World Bank, IUCN, KfW and WWF, among others, influence the states 
to pursue certain goals and agendas which are said to be good by financing organizations such as 
achieving biodiversity conservation and clean air, among others, as this is deemed acceptable 
internationally and scientifically justified (Fin-nemore, 1996; Adams et.al, 2003), these may not 
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be priority areas for member states. Therefore, non-state actors, international institutions, donor 
agencies and NGOs play a key role in dictating the states’ pathways and interests by providing 
international legitimation of state policies, these acts as frameworks on which the states policies 
are based. By internationally financing and introducing the Univisa, financing the KAZA 
Secretariat, it is arguably certain that the KAZA TFCA development pathways are determined by 
actors beyond the SADC region and the KAZA region.  
Thus, the state does not necessarily control the use of its resources but act as a surrogate for non-
state actors such as the big international organizations and a few local elites. They are forced to 
compromise on their autonomy and be answerable to the funders. This has weakened some 
countries and facilitated the recreation of a colonial vision in African conservation (Rusinga, and 
Mapira, 2012) thus eroding the countries’ sovereignty. In relation to this some scholars argue that 
the discourse and linking of conservation to underdevelopment creates room for the reentry of 
former colonizers and external actors, thus bringing about ‘sovereignty bargains’ (Singh and 
Houtum, 2002).  Therefore, investment benefits rarely extend much beyond the actors who are 
directly involved. 
5.3 Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 
IDPs are central because they direct the investments to take place in the KAZA, by producing the 
land use plans and maps which guide investors and governments on the type of investments and 
areas to invest in.  For example, the Simalaha Community Conservancy being implemented in 
South-West Zambia, is one of the projects stipulated/planned in the Zambia IDP. Owing to this, 
countries have also invested in the formulation of implementation documents such as policies and 
IDPs, among others. In this regard Moboko (2017) maintains that it is the responsibility of the 
Governments and other key stakeholders to harmonize conservation legislation, institutional and 
management practices in order to promote cooperation at local and regional level. This relates to 
one government official’s observation that the Zambian government, through the Department of 
Wildlife and National Parks, which was previously the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), 
together with other government departments participated in IDP formulation.  
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The first IDP was developed by Zambia in 2008 (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 
2017). A civil society official confirmed this by stating that Zambia was the first country to develop 
the IDP, which came about because the funders were biased towards Zambia (Civil Society 
Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017). In relation to this, one official 
added that Zambia was the first country to develop the IDP because it had a weaker organization 
structure and there was a need for connectivity in order to allow for the movement of wildlife (PPF 
official 2, Interview, 25 July 2018).Thus, Zambia’s IDP, as well as staff provided insights and 
valuable lessons for other participating countries in the development of their IDPs (Government 
official 1, interview,  3 November, 2017; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). 
The country-specific IDPs became the basis for development of the Master Integrated 
Development Plan (MIDP). In relation to this KfW (2014:15) maintains that “harmonization of 
the five partner countries’ national IDPs and the major development needs of the KAZA TFCA as 
articulated in a number of planning documents and guiding frameworks was the foundation for the 
formulation of the MIDP. Below is a brief general background of IDPs. 
There has been shift from traditional planning approaches to IDPs. Internationally, the idea of IDPs 
started gaining popularity in the 1980s as a response to fragmented and ad hoc project-based 
approaches (Gibbens, 2009). The emergence of IDPs in Zambia is underpinned by the planning 
theory in South Africa and its formulation was led by South African consultants (Garnett, 2017). 
Thus, IDPs draw on well-established planning theory propagated by progressive planning 
departments of South Africa’s Universities (The Department of Provincial and Local Government, 
2000). 
IDPs have been widely used by local authorities as a planning tool in order to balance development 
(Allebiosu, 2005), correct planning disorder and strike a balance between rural and urban 
infrastructure development (Mogaladi, 2007) so as to address spatial inequalities. Clearly the local 
authorities use the IDP to regulate the rapid growth of cities (Smith et al, 1998) and address the 
challenges encountered in marginalized areas. Over the years, there has been a strong drive by 
environmentalists for a holistic perspective of development which would reconcile competing 
interests and promote compatibility while at the same time creates synergy between conservation 
and development objectives. As such IDPs were identified as crucial in providing a guiding 
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framework for both conservation and development (Murphy, 2008). IDPs in TFCAs take a spatial 
planning approach with emphasis on supporting sustainable development in multi-use areas 
surrounding protected areas (named “interstitial areas”), and in the buffer zones of the Parks.  
In TFCAs IDPs provide information on the approaches that governments intend to take in the 
management, use and conservation of natural and cultural resources in particular areas (Murphy, 
2008; PPF, 2008). IDPs in this case are simply guiding documents for countries’ implementation 
of conservation objectives in the KAZA landscape. Buscher (2009) summarizes this by stating that 
IDPs act as a basis for the course of action to be followed. The IDP, by definition, looks at all the 
resources in the KAZA landscape (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 
November 2017). The KAZA landscape has different land tenure systems comprised of private, 
communal and state land. The use of communal land in TFCAs is not new. Indeed, it has been 
used elsewhere for the repository of biodiversity purposes. The Simalaha Conservancy, whose 
purpose is to create the animal corridor and facilitate movement of animals from Chobe to Kafue 
National Park in Zambia is a communal area (see also Ramutsindela & Noe, 2012). In relation to 
this a government official maintains that the central idea of having IDPs is to harmonize the 
activities in order for development to be done in a coordinated manner (Government official 1, 
interview, 3 November 2017).This relates to another government official’s argument that the 
uncoordinated development and unplanned land use may affect the ecological system of the KAZA 
landscape (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). In this regard, some participants 
argued that the greatest threat to biodiversity conservation is that of habitat fragmentation 
(Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Therefore, not only do IDPs support 
ecosystem management, they also support a bioregional approach to biodiversity conservation. 
Additionally, IDPs also help in packaging activities for easy mobilization of funds (Government 
official 3, interview, 12 December 2017).  
Furthermore, IDPs stipulate how the various activities contribute to the overall goal of the KAZA 
(Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017). Therefore, IDPs are 
needed in order to spell out the vision, the goals and the intended purpose for managing the KAZA 
landscape. There are six IDPs on the KAZA landscape. KAZA has the master IDP and each 
member state was encouraged to develop the country-specific IDP (Government official 2, 
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interview, 17 November 2017). In these IDPs issues of wildlife dominate (Civil Society 
Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). The development of all the IDPs in 
the five countries was based on the principle of a stakeholder consultative process. The process of 
IDP preparation involved soliciting for inputs from government, traditional authorities, CBNRM 
structures and the private sector through a series of workshops (Murphy, 2008). In relation to this 
a government official added that development of IDP is a multi-sectoral process, and all the 
stakeholders are involved, rather than having been developed by one section (Government official 
2, interview, 17 November 2017). Interview data indicated that the Process of IDP formulation 
called for the establishment of the Core Planning Team which was assigned to compile a resource 
inventory either through literature or field visits. Stakeholders’ consultative meetings were also 
held in order to get stakeholders’ views on how they wanted their land to be used (Civil Society 
Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017). The output of the stakeholders’ 
workshop was a draft IDP which was sent back to the stakeholders for review and validation (IDP) 
before approval.  
In Zambia, there was a Core Planning Team that spearheaded the IDP formulation process. The 
Zambia Core Planning Team for IDP formulation comprised of PPF and Department of National 
Park and Wildlife; however, were they needed experts in heritage, natural resources and fisheries, 
among others, and specialists in these fields were called in (Civil Society Organization Senior 
Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). This relates to one government official’s assertion that the 
process of coming up with the IDPs is participatory (Government official 3, interview, 12 
December 2017). Views from government officials show that various stakeholders were involved, 
including the   NGOs, business people, government departments and, most importantly, the local 
communities. One government official further stated that, in Zambia, the process of formulating 
the IDP was participatory and Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) now called Department of 
National Park and Wildlife was the lead agency (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 
2017). In addition to this some government officials maintained that there was a lot of support 
from the local communities (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017; Government 
official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to this another government official added 
that the local people identified key issues and solutions (Government official 1, interview, 3 
November 2017). Chiefs were also consulted through their representatives, who they dispatched 
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to meetings. The consultative process received both financial and technical support from PPF 
(Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). PPF mobilized for 
resources from other development agencies.  
One government official noted that the local people came up with eighty-nine (89) projects, which 
were grouped into seven major projects and they include, the rehabilitation of Sioma Ngwezi 
National Park, the creation of Ngonye falls Community Partnership Park, creation of land use 
plans, and rehabilitation of Simalaha (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). A 
government official added that, ‘this clearly shows that the IDP is a people driven document’ 
(Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). On the contrary, some studies have shown 
that the processes involved in IDP development cannot be driven by the local people because these 
people lack the technical knowhow, have weak social and intellectual capital to understand the 
TFCA processes (Spenceley, 2008). In addition to this fish sellers outside the conservancy revealed 
that they were not involved in the consultation process despite being directly affected by the 
creation of the KAZA. This is because the KAZA covers the Zambezi River where they buy their 
fish for sale sell (Local trader1, interview, 28 July 2018). This is not different from Greater 
Mapungubwe Transfrontier Conservation Area (GMTFCA) on the Botswana-South Africa–
Zimbabwe where conservation and commercial enterprises are at the expense of the local 
communities (Sinthumule, 2019).  
Similarly, Chiutsi and Saarinen (2017) established that lack of community engagement in the 
Sengwe community in the GLTP hindered local people’s access to benefits. In relation to this 
Katerere, Hill and Moyo (2001) argue that despite TFCAs’ emphasis on local communities and 
stakeholder participation, in practice the TFCAs implementation is rushed and less time is left for 
meaningful consultation with both stakeholders and local communities. As such the local 
communities do not fully understand how the project will function. Therefore, there is need to 
rethink community participation in TFCAs. 
The master IDP acted as a pointer to the disparities in policy noted a government official 
(Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). This relates to (Civil Society Organization 
Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018)’s assertion that IDPs on their own could not 
harmonize policy because policy is a stand-alone document. However, to a certain extent the IDPs 
92 
   
can identify policy gaps and devise ways for policy harmonization (Civil Society Organization 
Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). It is argued that the implementation of the KAZA 
activities is based on the IDP approved by the governments (Government official 2, interview, 17 
November 2017). On the contrary, Cumming (2011) notes that IDPs are not a reflection of the 
conservation objectives, but that their emphasis is more on administrative and management 
activities which are not clear on how conservation will be executed. Although Zambia was the first 
to come up with the IDP implementation has been very slow and this has been attributed to 
succession disputes and inadequate funding (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). 
5.4 Conclusions                                                                                                                            
 The chapter has shown government’s investment in the KAZA TFCA. It has indicated that the 
government has not invested much in infrastructure development in the KAZA. The government’s 
major contribution to the KAZA is in form of land, but this kind of investment is not enough to 
yield the desired benefits from TFCA because the implementation of the KAZA requires huge 
financial capital. The chapter also established that although TFCAs are said to be driven by 
member states, in reality the KAZA TFCA is a donor driven project. The chapter further looked at 
IDPs as one of the investments by both government and donors. The following chapter presents 
the implications of the creation of the KAZA on the local people. 
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CHAPTER SIX: IMPLICATIONS OF THE KAZA TFCA ON THE LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES ON THE ZAMBIAN COMPONENT 
6.1 Introduction 
TFCAs have been accepted on the premise that they promise to benefit the local and mostly 
marginalized communities living close to the parks. However, TFCAs have been criticized for 
disadvantaging the local people by displacing them from their land using conservation narratives 
and using military tactics to deal with those labeled as poachers and militarizing protected areas 
(Duffy, 2015; Ramutsindela, 2016). TFCAs have been cited as responsible for causing 
accumulation by dispossessionand commodification of nature there by making it inaccessible to 
the public (Huges 2005; Buscher 2013). As such Local are treated as threats to conservation 
initiatives ((Buscher& Ramutsindela, 2016; Ramutsindela, 2016). This chapter provides an 
analysis of the impacts of the TFCAs on the local communities in the Simalaha Community 
Conservancy on the KAZA on the Zambia side. The chapter argues that despite the claimed 
benefits of the KAZA, the ordinary local population continues to live in abject poverty due to 
several factors including low government investment in the area.   This chapter is organized into 
three sections the first section presents background of Simalaha, while the second section provides 
a discussion of the introduction of the Simalaha Community Conservancy and the local people’s 
participation. In the third section the effects of the conservancy on the local people are outlined.  
6.2 Background: The case of Simalaha 
Simahala Community Conservancy is situated in the South-Western part of Zambia, in chief 
Sekute of Chundu Chiefdom and senior chief InyamboYeta of Sisheke (PPF, 2013). It covers an 
area of approximately one hundred and eighty-two thousand hectares (182, 000 ha) (PPF, 2016). 
The idea of creating the Simalaha Community Conservancy came through Senior Chief 
InyamboYeta. Senior Chief InyamboYeta has been the board member of PPF since 2011 
(Government official 1, interview, 16 August 2018). The idea of the conservancy was also shared 
with Chief Sekute and the two Kutas (Traditional leaders, 25 July 2018). The two chiefs have 
supported the creation of the Conservancy in their chiefdoms because they want to protect their 
cultural heritage as well as reap the benefits of wildlife conservation through tourism 2018. The 
Simalaha project has two elements, namely conservation of biodiversity and economic reasons 
through tourism (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July). Historically, Simalaha Floodplains used to be 
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characterized by an abundance of wildlife, particularly water and wetland species like red lechwe, 
sitatunga, hippos and crocodiles, among others (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 
2017; Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July, 2018; PPF, 2013).However, due to the liberation wars in 
neighboring countries, the wildlife has been drastically depleted (PPF, 2013; Civic leader 1, 
interview, 25 July 2018; Traditional leaders, interview, 25 July 2018). 
The process of registering the Simalaha Community Conservancy has already started and will be 
registered as ‘Simalaha Community conservancy Trust’. This is a compromise because the Trust 
is within the Zambia’s statute (Government official 1, interview, 16 August 2018).  in Zambia the 
law does not provide for the Community Conservancy concept, which gives full ownership to the 
community, so therefore the Simalaha Community Conservancy at present has no legal backing, 
as it is a new concept in Zambia. Currently an instrument is being established which will declare 
this the Community Conservancy concept. Below are facts and figures pertaining to the Simalaha 
Community Conservancy.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Geographical location of Simalaha Community Conservancy, Source: Department of National 
Parks and Wildlife, 2018 
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Figure 6.2: Simalaha Community Conservancy boundaries, Source: Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife,2018 
Simahala Community Conservancy is jointly owned by Senior Chief Sekute and InyamboYeta as 
shown in the figure above. Simalaha Community Conservancy is not an empty space, it is occupied 
by more than nine thousand people (9,000) and about one thousand five hundred (1500) people 
live in the Simalaha sanctuary (The people living in the sanctuary and the conservancy form 
different villages and are affected both positively and negatively by the activities in the 
conservancy and sanctuary). Below is figure 6.3 showing the villages of Simalaha on the Western 
Part. 
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Figure 6.3: Villages in Simalaha Community Conservancy, Source: Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife (2018) 
The sanctuary is part of the conservancy. It is fenced, and this is where the animals reintroduced 
are kept before their numbers grow. Currently, over one thousand two hundred (1200) have been 
reintroduced. (Government official 1, 22 January 2018). In relation to this a government official 
added that the animals reintroduced to Simalaha have been gotten from Kafue National Park, 
Lusaka National Park and some animals were taken from private game ranches within and outside 
the country (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). This is not different from back 
to the barriers form of conservation because it also reinforces the building of fences. In relation to 
this, one government official noted that, this is not the first time the local people are living together 
with animals, the local communities were there living with the animals before the colonial 
boundaries were put in place, and so, our efforts is to reconfigure the lives of these communities 
like before the creation of colonial boundaries (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 
2017).When animals increase in numbers, the fence will be removed and the animals will be able 
to room freely (PPF official 3, interview, 27 July 2018; Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018; 
Government officials 10, interview, 26 August 2018).  
In the KAZA region on the Zambian component the people living in the conservancy have been 
organized into Village Action Groups (VAGs). For instance, there are five VAGs in senior chief 
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InyamboYeta’s areain the Western Part of the Simalaha and the other five belongs to Chief Sekute 
in the Southern part of the Simalaha. The VAGs elect a Chairman (PPF official 1, interview, 27 
July 2018) who performs advisory role on conservation. They also represent the communities to 
the working group, Board of Trustee among other committees. However, the groups are dominated 
by traditional leaders. Thus, the voice of the locals is not well represented. Figure one below shows 
the composition of the Simalaha Community Conservancy Association. 
 
Figure 6.4: Composition of the Simalaha Community Conservancy Association, Source: Author, 2018 
As seen from the above figure, it can be deduced that this kind of participation will not enable full 
participation and meaningful empowerment of the local communities. Thus, the need to establish 
institutions which will prioritize the voice of local people and enable them to represent themselves 
in decision making positions (Murphree, 2000). This will enable the local people to effectively 
manage their resources. On the contrary, TFCA proponents argue that TFCAs are based on the 
community participatory models (Ramutsindela, 2004). Thus, before conservation programmes 
begin, the first priority is given to the local people. Like other TFCAs in Southern Africa whose 
establishment has been dominated by government officials (Munthali, 2007), reality on the ground 
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shows that the KAZA project on the Zambian component also takes a top-bottom approach, as 
seen from the KAZA entry point. To confirm this one senior official added that the Western part 
of Zambia is predominately occupied by Lozi speaking people. They have a strong traditional 
leadership which follows a top-down approach, therefore “we approached their King (Litunga) 
first who helped to link PPF with the Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta, the vision for the Simalaha was 
also shared with Chief Sekute, and later the indunas from both chiefdoms disseminated the 
information to the local communities as stated above (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July 2018).  
In relation to this, one community member maintained that the control and management of the 
conservancy is in the hands of the royal family (Local community farmer 2, 27 July 2018). This is 
in line with the view of one community member who maintained that the resistance from the local 
people was not significant because the chief had already agreed to implement the KAZA project. 
“Who are we to reject the chief’s decision?” (Local community farmer 6, interview, 27 July 2018). 
Thus, the local communities had no option but to welcome the project. This clearly shows that the 
local people are on the receiving end, while important decisions are made by the traditional leaders 
and funders. 
6.2.1 The Simalaha dream 
The Simalaha project feeds into the KAZA plan of joining fragmented wildlife habitats in order to 
form an interconnected mosaic of protected areas and transboundary wildlife corridors for 
facilitation and enhancement of free movement of wildlife across colonial borders (PPF, 2013). 
As such Simalaha project was given priority as it marks the first strategic step towards the creation 
of a wildlife corridor.  Simalaha is strategically positioned to provide a corridor which goes up to 
Kafue National Park from Chobe National Park. This corridor is going to link the Chobe National 
Park in Botswana and Conservancies in Namibia to Kafue National Park in Zambia, thus it forms 
part of the Zambezi Chobe dispersal area as stipulated in the Master Development Plan (PPF, 
2016) and shown in figure 6.5.  
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Figure 6.5: Animal corridor from Chobe to Kafue national park, Source: KAZA, 2012 
Thus, once fully functional the Simalaha conservancy will restore ecosystem health, conserve 
biodiversity thereby mitigating habitat fragmentation. This will also result into the revival of 
culture which was lost when the biodiversity in the area was depleted. PPF (2013:3) further adds 
that, “…the community trust will be formed and will be a legal entity that can enter into agreements 
with private sector investors. It will also be responsible for managing wildlife and concessions as 
well as charitable arm that will ensure benefits are ploughed back into the community…” in 
addition to this, government official mentioned that the Simalaha community conservancy will 
equip the local communities with conflict management skills through training and other forms of 
capacity building (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017).  
It is also hoped that the reintroduction of wildlife to the area will boast tourism, which will bring 
revenue to the area, resulting in economic growth and improved social services. This will translate 
to the overall improved welfare of the local people. Thus, not only is Simalaha strategically 
positioned to act as an animal corridor but it is culturally, economically and socially important to 
the local people, hence the need to understand the KAZA through the Simalaha case.  
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Simalaha sanctuary has been extended to create space for Buffalo restocking. Two hundred 
buffalos have been imported from Namibia for this purpose. On the 23 August the first ninety (90) 
buffalos were reintroduced to Simalaha sanctuary and the remaining one hundred and ten were 
delivered within a few weeks. This project is meant for the sustainability of the project because 
when the numbers of buffalos increase, they will be sold and the revenue generated will be used 
by the local community (Government official 1, interview, 16 August 2018).  
The views from civil society organizations indicate that wildlife numbers are still very low at the 
moment because the project is in its initial stages, therefore the benefits to the local communities 
are minimal (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 19 December 2017). This relates to 
views from government official that at the moment a wildlife based economy cannot be built 
because the benefits from wildlife take long to materialize, maybe in five or ten years’ time, more 
tourists will be attracted to the area and the local communities will begin benefiting through 
creation of more jobs, supply to tourism investments and domestic tourism (Government official 
3, interview, 12 December 2017). 
6.2.2 Introduction of the Simalaha Project to the local community 
As stated above, the idea of forming the Simalaha Community Conservancy by reintroducing the 
animals to the area was initiated by Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta. It was then shared with Chief 
Sekute. Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017) as such consultation meetings with 
the local communities through the Kutas (Council of traditional leaders) were held in 2007 and 
2008 on the Zambian component of the KAZA TFCA. During the consultation process and 
sensitization meetings some local people expressed mixed feelings about the project due to a 
number of reasons. Some key informants maintained that: 
I was skeptical because previously whites came under the pretext of helping the community 
but in the end, we realized that our land had been taken and the land tittles had been issued. 
We have lost a lot of our resources due to the investors who come in the name of developing 
the area (PPF official interview, 27 July 2018). 
When we first heard about the creation of the sanctuary our first reaction was negative 
because we did not know what type of animals were going to be introduced to the place 
101 
   
and how we were going to be living with the animals. Of course, they said the animals to 
be introduced were friendly, but we know that where there is prey there are also predators.... 
We have never stayed in such an environment before. As a school we feared for our 
children and the water which we needed to start sharing with the wildlife. (Government 
officials 10, interview, 26 August 2018). 
The local communities feared that the project was not for them, it was for the whites and 
when the whites bring the animals, they will chase them out. (Local community farmer 4, 
interview, 26 July 2018). 
Some people feared for their fields, as wildlife was going to attack their crops (Local 
community farmer 5, interview, 26 July 2018). 
According to interview data from a government official, after intensive sensitization, the local 
people agreed to the reintroduction of wildlife to Simalaha project (Government official 1, 
interview, 3 November 2017). As stated earlier the resistance by the local people was not high as 
the local Chiefs had already accepted the project. Therefore, the formation of the Simalaha is a 
people driven project and the local communities proposed to undertake the restocking of the 
Simalaha (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In 2010 PPF came on board to 
offer assistance to the local communities in sustainable natural resource management (PPF, 2013). 
With the support from PPF, and funding provided by WWF-Germany, Mava foundation, among 
others the Simalaha Nature Conservancy boundaries were determined, and kick started the fencing 
of the wildlife sanctuary (PPF, 2013). Additionally, the formulation of the Simalaha Community 
Wildlife Conservancy was cemented by signing of the Surveyor-General’s Maps by Senior Chief 
InyamboYeta and Chief Sekute was a milestone (PPF, 2013). On the 22 October 2012, Simalaha 
Community Conservancy was launched (KAZA, 2012). Another milestone was the establishment 
of a Project Steering Committee and a Working Group with representation from chiefdoms of 
Senior Chief Inyambo and Chief Sekute, DNPW, Forestry Department, the District 
Commissioners of the Sesheke and Kazungula Districts, as well as the Community Trusts from 
both chiefdoms (Ministry of Tourism and Arts, 2018).  
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On the other hand, some government officials argued that the local people are treated as equal 
partners in development in the KAZA TFCA and that no one should be termed as a beneficially. 
The argument holds that, the moment local people are considered as equal partners, they will be 
actively involved, but if termed as beneficiaries they will wait for handouts (Government official 
2, interview, 17 November 2017). As such the research participants argued that ‘The TFCA is a 
people-based concept’ (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Sources in 
government indicate that there is a need for buy in of the local community, right from the onset of 
the project. (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). One government official 
asserts that conservation can only be undertaken if it is beneficial to the local people. One cannot 
ask people to conserve when poverty is on the rise and people have no food (Government official 
1, interview, 22 January 2018). To support this, civil society actors contend that conservation in 
TFCAs takes on a human face (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 19 December 
2017).   
Similarly, state representatives in the study indicated that people are involved at every stage of the 
TFCA KAZA projects (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). For example, when 
coming up with the IDPs, the people were involved in identifying problems and finding solutions. 
In relation to this, one chief rightly pointed out at a meeting to discuss the initiation of the KAZA 
in the study area that ‘KAZA should go to the people because these people have lived with wildlife 
and other natural resource for many years’ (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). 
In this regard, one local community member confirmed that “I am one of the people who helped 
map the conservancy, I helped identify the permanent and temporal fish camps.” (Local 
community farmer 1, interview, 26 July 2018). The project officials maintained that at each stage 
of planning and implementation, the local people are involved. As such, a government official 
argues that local people on the Zambian component have been active participants and this is 
evidenced by the fact that there have been no forced removals on the Zambian component of 
KAZA; the local people co-exist with the wildlife and KAZA is managing to produce a new 
human-wildlife landscape in the KAZA areas (Government Official 1, interview, 3 November 
2017). On the contrary, research data indicate that some local people relocated due to wildlife 
attacks on their fields (see chapter 4). This does not support PPF claims of voluntary relocation as 
noted by Witter (2013) and shown in the research on GLTP by Sinthumule (2019). 
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Although there are claims by key informants that the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component 
takes a consultative process, the lack of consultation with the members of staff at Kasaya Primary 
School, as reported below, is a clear indication of the project’s failure to include the local 
communities to address the real needs of the school in the sanctuary. This practice continues to 
exclude marginalized people from accessing the benefits (Mbaiwa, 2015; Mogende & Kolawole, 
2016). In addition, it defeats KAZA’s key purpose of involving the local people when managing 
resources that transcend political boundaries. Like other TFCAs such as the GLTP, a TFCA 
flagship in Southern Africa where there was a lack of community consultation (Wolmer, 2003) the 
local communities (Local traders) living close to the conservancy revealed that they were not 
consulted on the establishment of the KAZA and the Simalaha conservancy but only saw fences 
being erected (Local trader1, interview, 28 July, 2018; Local trader2, interview, 28 July, 2018; 
Local trader3, interview, 28 July, 2018). In relation to this (Katerere, et al., 2001)argue that “In 
practice…TFCAs have been pushed forward at a rapid pace without much time for consultation 
with communities and other stakeholders.” 
6.3 Effects of the KAZA on the local people in Simalaha Community Conservancy 
It should be noted that the Simalaha local community is not a homogenous group. It comprises of 
different groups of people, including women, youths, fishermen and farmers, among others. All 
these groups are affected differently by the creation of the Simalaha sanctuary, as shown below. 
6.3.1 Effects of the KAZA on local farmers 
The main livelihood activity in Simalaha Community Conservancy is farming. As such the local 
communities are trained in conservation farming. Conservation farming is not a new practice in 
Zambia, it has been practiced since the 1980s in seven of the country’s provinces (Haggblade & 
Tembo, 2003). Conservation farming promotes minimum or zero tillage (see Chapter Two). Unlike 
conventional farming, which requires the clearing of trees on a large piece of land, conservation 
farming entails small scale cultivation with maximum yield (Haggblade & Tembo , 2003). Thus, 
conservation farming relates to the KAZA project because it gives quick benefits or quick wins to 
the local farmers and it is said to free space for wildlife conservation. In order to achieve the best 
results local people in Simalaha are trained in conservation farming and the first training was in 
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2013.   By 2018, about one thousand and eighty (1080) people had been trained (PPF official 4, 
interview, 27 July 2018). This relates to views by government officials that communities are 
expected to benefit through introduction of alternative livelihood opportunities (Government 
official 2, interview, 17 November 2017).  As such, conservation farming responds to both food 
security and social instability associated to it (PPF, 2013). In relation to this, one civil society 
organization official added that the project has not only introduced conservation farming and 
gardening programs to make local people food secure but to also keep them busy, so that they do 
not engage themselves in poaching (Civil Society organization official 4, interview, 27 July 2018). 
Despite the introduction of conservation agriculture in TFCAs, it was established that farmers 
continue to record low yields due to various reasons, including: declining investments in 
agriculture, unreliable rainfall, low and unattractive producer prices, poor extension support, 
poorly developed input supply markets, shortages and high prices of key inputs, declining soil 
fertility and insecure land tenure (Zimbabwe Conservation Agriculture Task Force, 2009).  
The local people living in Simalaha sanctuary and conservancy in Mwandi and Kazungula districts 
expressed two different views on the effects of the KAZA on local farmers. While some confirmed 
that the project had equipped them with knowledge and skills in conservation farming by training 
them in conservation farming, others viewed the project as one which has come to disfranchise the 
local communities. Thus, the local farmers noted that:  
I joined because the project was giving the farmers seeds such as maize and vegetable 
seeds. We were also given treadle pumps and training in conservation farming (Local 
community farmer 5, 27 July 2018). 
The project mobilizes resources for training the local people in conservation farming 
(Local community farmer 2, 27 July 2018). 
This project has provided us with treadle pumps and tanks, we are now able to cultivate 
bigger portions of land. I used to cultivate one lima, but now I have expanded my garden 
to almost two hectares as a result of the project (Local community farmer 5, 27 July 2018). 
As stated above some of the participants, mostly small-scale farmers, confirmed that their lives 
had been improved due to the support given to them by the project in the form of water tanks, 
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treadle pumps, seeds and training in conservation farming, which has resulted in higher yields 
(PPF, 2013). Due to the support received from the project, local communities are also able to 
engage in vegetable gardening, thus making the local communities’ food secure and able to sell 
their surplus crops. Figure 6.6below shows the gardens by the local communities.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Local farmers’ garden, Source: Author, 2018 
The vegetables shown in the figure above are not community owned but belong to individual 
farmers who can sell, and the proceeds used as desired by the farmers. In relation to the above, one 
government official maintained that parallel programs have made the local people become food 
secure and they can now sell their surplus food to buy other items that they need. The government 
official further noted that: 
We look at the welfare of the people, the livelihoods and their well-being…. (Government 
official 5, interview, 22 January 2018).  
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Similarly, another government official pointed out that it is important to note that the benefits from 
wildlife are not immediate, but long term, and therefore it is unreasonable to expect the local people 
to immediately begin reaping the rewards (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017), 
thus, the introduction of immediate benefits through conservation farming. Furthermore, some 
farmers have organized themselves in groups and are practicing fish farming by constructing dams 
using local material. Below is one of the fish dams constructed by community members.  
 
Figure 6.7: Source: Local community fish pond, Source: Author, 2018 
The above fish pond is owned by over five farmers, each with his/her family. The fish harvested 
from this pond is shared among the farmers who own it. As can be seen from the nature and size 
of the pond, it is too small to provide enough fish for the local farmers to meet their household 
needs and no surplus is available for sale. Furthermore, management of the pond appeared to be 
poor due to a lack of training and resultant low skills levels in fish farming. Currently the project 
is not supporting or training the local communities in fish farming, although such initiatives are 
promoted by the project. 
Despite the above benefits from KAZA TFCAs, some local farmers maintained that the project 
has made their lives more miserable than they were before. This is because, previously they used 
to farm on a large scale, thus producing more yield, whereas the current practice calls for small 
fields. In relation to this, one local farmer maintained that: 
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Previously we used to have a lot of produce because we could cultivate large pieces of 
land, and we were not fencing our fields but now the conservancy has reduced our 
cultivation area thus we cannot produce a lot and we are encouraged to fence our fields to 
prevent wildlife from attacking the field (Local community farmer 3, interview, 5 2018).   
Owing to the above, it can be argued that confining the local people to small pieces of land near 
their houses shows that the local people are slowly losing their land access rights. This relates to 
Dzingirai (2004:1) observation that although “TFCAs raise the hopes of the local people, in reality 
they disenfranchise the local people by reducing their access and control over resources’ on large 
geographical spaces on which they previously depended” (Brockington, 2002). Fencing of their 
gardens and fields comes at an extra cost of labour and money, which worsens the situation for the 
rural poor who have to bear the burden. As such, poor farmers have resorted to cutting down trees 
to fence their fields, a practice which is unsustainable and widely condemned in the light of climate 
change.  
Furthermore, the findings revealed that the introduction of wildlife to Simalaha sanctuary has led 
to the fields of the local people living in the sanctuary being destroyed. In relation to this Murphy 
(2008) argues that the increase in wildlife may negatively impact agriculture and human safety. 
One local farmer observed that people are fearful to go into the fields because of the risk of animal 
attacks. “My brother was killed by a hippopotamus and the project has not even compensated the 
family. My brother’s wife and children are now suffering because no one can help them.” (Local 
community farmer 3, interview, 5 January 2019). Figure 6.8 below shows a maize garden 
belonging to a local farmer that was destroyed by hippo. 
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Figure 6.8: A field attacked by the Hippo, Source: Author, 2018 
If sold, projected income from the maize was estimated at ten thousand Kwacha (K10, 000). Thus, 
this destruction is a huge loss for small scale farmers, who depend on gardening for survival. This 
case was reported to the project, but no compensation was given. The fields of the local people 
living in the sanctuary are frequently destroyed by Zebras and Hippos. When this happens, the 
local people are not compensated and in most cases are advised to fence their fields off so as to 
prevent wildlife from entering them. However, most of these locals have no financial capacity to 
buy wire to fence off their fields. Thus, they resort to cutting down trees in order to fence their 
gardens, a practice which is not sustainable. As such most participants complained about the lack 
compensation and inadequate support to enable them to fence their gardens. Some local 
community people maintained that: 
The animals attacked our fields and no compensation was made. My one hectare of maize 
was damaged by the Zebras, I reported to the project people, but no compensation was 
made. If only they compensated us we would have raised money to fence the fields (Local 
community farmer 6, interview, 27 July, 2018). 
In relation to this Metcalfe and Kepe (2008) argue that the local people living in sanctuaries or 
adjacent to parks are not given enough incentives to accommodate wildlife. Additionally, there is 
a tendency by conservation organizations using states as fronts to acquire large pieces of land on 
environmentally protected grounds (Ramutsindela 2007; Wolmer 2003). The vast land acquired is 
used for the creation or expansion of the TFCAs, thus resulting in the displacement of the local 
people. The land rights are normally transferred to private companies or the State (Dzingirai, 
2004). The GLTP is the case in point where at least two thousand five hundred (2500) residents of 
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Shangaan people were displaced using conservation narratives (Munthali, 2007; Andersson, et al., 
2013; Lunstrum, 2014). Local people are also threatened by wildlife which destroys their crops, 
livestock and human lives as the borders become more and more permeable thus pushing them 
into abject poverty. 
Although the key officials in this research claimed that the introduction of the conservancy had 
led to food security and the sale of surplus produce, some local people expressed their 
dissatisfaction. These were mainly linked to market and transport for ferrying their crops to the 
market. The increase in the yield of their crops necessitated the need for the market to sell the 
surplus crops and vegetables. However, the market in the area is small, and is normally flooded as 
most of the farmers in the area produce similar crops and vegetables. As such some farmers 
maintained that: 
Lack of market and poor road network are the major challenges we have. At times the 
tomatoes go to waste due to lack of transport. Previously 18 crates of my tomatoes went to 
waste due to lack of transport. We take our tomatoes to Sesheke which is 60km from here, 
however, the Sesheke market is also small, our tomatoes are at times not bought, therefore 
it tomatoes goes to waste (Local community farmer 6, interview, 27 July, 2018).  
We would like to have a market, at the moment lack of a proper market has resulted into 
low prices of commodities, it is also difficult to sell because everyone does the same crop 
(Local community farmer 7, interview, 27 July 2018). 
In relation to this PPF (2013:5) confirms that “Farmers are affected by market realities such as low 
market prices of some crops, especially when produced on a small scale, the implications being a 
persistent lack of food security, lack of income and very narrow livelihood options.” In response 
to the farmers’ grievances the project is looking into the market situation of the local farmers and 
has engaged a Dutch organization called Grounded. This organization will help farmers with inputs 
as well as buy crops from local farmers (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July 2018; PPF official 4, 
interview, 27 July, 2018). However, Grounded is only interested in five crops, these being 
groundnuts, maize, sorghum, cowpeas and cassava this implies that the local people will continue 
having market and transport challenges with their garden produce.  
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6.3.2 Effects of sanctuary on fishermen and women 
As mentioned above, fishing is also a source of livelihood in the sanctuary and, therefore, 
fishermen constitute another group of people found in Simalaha sanctuary. Thus, the creation of 
the sanctuary has an effect on them because the Zambezi River where they conduct their fishing 
activities flows right through the sanctuary. The creation of the sanctuary has come with 
restrictions on fishing activities, including the fact that methods of fishing are now strictly 
monitored by the project scouts. The fishermen can no longer fish freely as their methods of fishing 
are deemed unsustainable. Thus, the fishermen can no longer catch as many fish as they once were 
able to. The fish ban season is strictly enforced in the KAZA by the Fisheries Department, with 
the help of the scouts hired to safeguard the resources in the sanctuary by the KAZA project in 
order to create the right conditions for fish to reproduce (see Chapter Four). This means that during 
the ban, fishermen lose their only livelihoods. Thus, KAZA is failing by not introducing adequate 
alternative livelihood sources during fish ban periods in the area. Restriction on the usage of 
resources in TFCAs is not unique to the KAZA TFCA as it has been practiced in the Limpopo 
National Park, where hunting of small game for consumption was against the regulations of the 
park and stiff punishment given to those caught hunting (Milgroom and Spierenburg, 2008).  Thus, 
the study confirms that the claim that TFCAs ensure the co-existence of people and wildlife has 
not yet materialized. The findings in both Simalaha and GLTP show local people to be on the weak 
side and lose out on local livelihood sources.     
The fish ban also affects the local traders, who are mostly women. These women normally buy 
their fish from the fishermen and sell it at retail price at the market. The strict implementation of 
the fish ban and failure to provide alternative activities implies a loss of livelihood for these women 
and their children. Further, the women who mostly fetch water for their families struggle a lot to 
find drinking water in dry season. This is because during the dry season, the water in the shallow 
wells dry up and the only alternative is the Zambezi River. However, there are restrictions on 
access to the Zambezi River in the sanctuary. In relation to this one local farmer noted that, 
…prior to the commencement of the project, we were promised dams by the project, but up to 
now nothing has been done, in dry season we suffer a lot because we cannot access the Zambezi 
river anymore (Local community farmer, interview, 28 August 2018). 
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6.3.3Effects of the sanctuary on education in Simalaha 
The government representatives claimed that conservation in the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian 
component has contributed to better education facilities. In relation to this, one government official 
maintains that “….we link conservation to education, because an educated society is a developed 
society” (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). As such, through KAZA, PPF built 
three staff houses and installed water tanks (Government official 9, interview, 24 July 2018) as 
seen in the figure6.8 below. The project also promised to be implementing one project each year 
at Mwandi Secondary School. However, this has not been fulfilled. Figure 6.9below shows a water 
tank and one of the houses constructed by the KAZA project at Mwandi Secondary School. 
 
Figure 6.9: Staff Houses and a water tanks at Mwandi Secondary school Source: Author, 2018 
In addition, electrification of Kasaya primary school was done to enable the pupils in the 
surrounding community be able to study at night (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 
2018). Another senior government official added that “as a result of the installation of solar at 
Kasaya primary school pupils can study at night and for teachers, pupils as well as parents are able 
to attach such benefits to the sanctuary” (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July, 2018).There is 
emphasis on uplifting the living standard of people living near the parks, as doing this will enable 
the impact of KAZA to be felt by the local people and the failure to impact the local people is the 
failure of the KAZA project (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to 
this, officials at Kasaya primary school confirmed that the project installed solar panels which 
provide electricity for lights in classrooms and the teachers’ offices (Government officials 10, 
interview, 26 July 2018).  Below is figure 6.10 showing the solar installed at Kasaya School.  
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                                     Figure 6.10:  Solar panel installed at the class room block, Source: Author, 2018 
Despite the installation of solar panel at Kasaya Primary School, the officials at Kasaya 
revealed that the project’s assistance to the school was misplaced due to lack of 
consultation. The school officials maintained that: 
Electricity in classes does not serve its purpose because Kasaya is a primary School 
and children do not come to study in the night, therefore the lights in the classrooms 
are not very useful, they are not meeting our needs, if they consulted us we would 
have asked them to put the electricity in the school offices and staff house 
(Government officials 10, interview, 24 August 2018). 
The project keeps promising to the school, but they do not deliver, they promised 
to provide computers, accommodation, water and cement before commencing the 
project, but they never fulfill (Government officials 10, interview, 24 August 2018).  
What we needed the most were staff houses, we have seven teachers against three 
houses. The remaining four teachers either stay in offices or make clay houses 
(Government officials 10, interview, 24 August 2018).  
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In relation to the above, Kasaya Primary School has for a long time had inadequate 
accommodation. There are only three teachers’ houses at the school and, as stated above, 
those who cannot find space in the offices make their own homes out of clay. This means 
that the real benefits from the project do not reach the local communities. Figure 6.11 below 
is one of the teachers’ houses made out of clay. 
 
 
Figure 6.11: A primary school teacher building her house out of clay, Author 2018 
Like in the KAZA TFCA where most of the promises to the local communities have not been 
fulfilled, Wolmer (2003:13) notes that plans for electrification, rehabilitation of the road network, 
water supplies and staff accommodation, and ‘strengthening park management capacity in 
Gonarezhou National Park remain unfulfilled. The story is not different in the GMTFCA 
(Sinthumule 2017; Andersson et.al, 2017). 
6.3.4 Positive effects of the Simalaha sanctuary 
Findings also reveal that KAZA TFCA has resulted in a cross-border learning and knowledge 
exchange. This relates to arguments by government officials who report that transboundary forums 
have been created to enable local communities to exchange information as well as to raise 
awareness regarding conservation of biodiversity across borders (Government official 2, 
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interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to this, a government official added that Chiefs from 
participating countries now have an opportunity to implement exchange visits, learn from one 
another and support one another (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Through 
these visits, Chiefs are exposed to new knowledge and are able to learn better and more sustainable 
practices of wildlife conservation and management.  
In turn, the Chiefs begin to champion the idea of cross-boundary wildlife management to their 
subjects (Council of traditional leaders 1, interview, 25 July 2018). Accordingly, the government 
official argues that if the KAZA project is to be successful the local people have to be involved 
and the benefits should reach to the lowest level of society (Government official 2, interview, 17 
November 2017). In relation to this, the government official insists active community participation 
in wildlife management is cardinal because, as humans are part of the destruction of the 
environment, therefore they should also be part of conservation success stories (Government 
official 5, interview, 22 January 2018).  
There are also claims that the KAZA on the Zambian side have not conducted forced removals. 
Other government officials added that the people who have moved have done so voluntarily and 
it is normally after realizing that they are being attacked by wild animals. These people are also 
advised to move from the wildlife corridors, and they are assisted with inputs and crops as startup 
capital in their new area (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017; Government official 
5, interview, 22 January 2018).  However, these narratives reflect facilitated relocation and not by 
choice as claimed by state officials. In line with this, Witter (2013:406) indicates that “the 
resettlement processes in Mozambique’s Limpopo National Park place in a displacement context 
wrought by conflict with wildlife, elephants in particular.” In relation to this, Ramutsindela, (2009) 
argues that the forced removal of the local communities in other TFCAs such as GLTP resembles 
a practice in colonial and apartheid eras. 
The findings also show that KAZA TFCA has exposed conditions in these areas and placed on the 
world map the places like Simalaha, which were previously unknown to the outside world 
(Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Furthermore, a government official 
contends that the creation of Simahala has created employment opportunities for the local people, 
especially the youth (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Interview data from 
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civil society and government representatives indicate that not only are the local people employed 
in the Simahala area, but also the entire KAZA for different types of employment such as Village 
scouts, occasional workers casual workers to slash grasses, manage bush fires in various periods 
of the year in the KAZA and this has enabled the local people become financially stable and less 
reliant on natural resources and illegal activities such as poaching(Civil Society organization 
official 2, interview, 19 December 2017; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). In 
relation to this, Hanks (2003) argues that TFCAs contribute towards an increase in tourist arrivals, 
create jobs, improve the living standards of the local people and develop the economy. In this 
regard, research participants also confirmed that the project had provided jobs to the local 
communities (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018; Council of traditional leaders 1, interview, 
25 July 2018; Local community farmer 2, interview, 27 July 2018). At the moment the project has 
trained and recruited twenty-two (22) scouts, all of them are from local communities (PPF official 
3, interview, 27 July 2018). In 2011 eighty (80) people were hired to fence the sanctuary while in 
2018 fifty-two (52) have been hired to slash and fence the extension of the Simalaha sanctuary 
(PPF official 3, interview, 27 July 2018; PPF official 4, interview, 27 July 2018). 
6.3.5 Negative effects of the Simalaha sanctuary 
Although the Simalaha Conservancy has benefited the local community through conservation 
farming, gardening, employment, about one hundred and fifty-four (154) people (Scouts and 
casual workers) were employed (See section 4.4.3 of Chapter Six), construction of teachers’ 
accommodation, provision of energy serving stoves, electrification of schools and clinics among 
others as seen above. There are a number of negative effects as shown below. 
Like the Shangaan people whose land rights were taken away (Munthali, 2007; Lunstrum, 2014), 
the findings show that the reintroduction of wildlife poses a threat to children’s rights to education 
in the sanctuary. In relation to this research, participants from Kasaya Primary School, which is in 
the sanctuary, revealed that the wildlife come close to their school as the property is not fenced, 
“At the moment we have a challenge of the Hippo that has entered the dam and they are affecting 
pupils’ attendance. About 30-40% of pupils cannot report to school because they are scared.” 
(Government officials 10, interview, 26 August 2018). This is because the dam is very close to the 
school. Consequently, the pupils’ performance has been adversely impacted and some pupils may 
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drop out of school. The matter was reported to the conservancy manager and the District Education 
Board (DEBS) but nothing has been done. The research participants at the school noted that 
“whenever we report, the response we get is that your school is in the sanctuary” (Government 
officials 10, interview, 26 August 2018). The hippos come close to the teachers’ homes and this 
has brought a lot of fear and insecurity. The teachers have been robbed of their peace. It was further 
discovered that the dam in which the teachers depend on for their water is where the hippo is found 
thus this has brought security and safety concerns among the teachers.  
The findings also show that the scouts are trained in military skills (Civil Society organization 
official 2, 23 January 2018). During the operations people who are caught hunting are labeled as 
‘poachers,’ brutalized and treated as such because they are seen as threats to TFCAs (Anderson et 
al, 2013). Anti-poaching measures have become ‘bloody,’ as evidenced in the exchange of fire 
between rangers and poachers. Similarly, one village member revealed that fishermen caught 
fishing in the sanctuary using methods deemed ‘unsustainable,’ such as the arrow, mosquito nets 
and others are brutalized by scouts (Local community farmer 3, interview, 26 July 2018).The 
poachers now use sophisticated weapons and techniques. As such the States have also intensified 
in terms of using more sophisticated militarized and military actors, partnerships, techniques, and 
technologies (Lunstrum, 2014). Unlike Zambia, where  game rangers are armed on their patrols, 
but shooting of poachers is mainly done in self-defense and sentences for poachers can be as high 
as 20 years (Government official 2, interview, 23 January 2018) Botswana implements a “shoot to 
kill policy” which has provided a model on how to deal with poachers (Henks, 2007; 
Ramutsindela, 2016). Similarly, in order for KAZA initiatives to be successful there is a need to 
empower the state and implementing agencies involved so that they are enabled to counter the 
poachers’ techniques.  This entails acquiring more vigorous and violet forms of policing (Death, 
2016). However, this model has been criticized for abusing human rights and contradicting the 
essence of peace parks (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). It can be argued that militarization of 
conservation has pushed the local people from actively participating in conservation to being 
enemies of conservation. Conservation has created enmity between the implementing and 
enforcing agencies and the local people, for instance the Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife in Zambia is viewed by the local communities as unnecessary evil. 
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As seen from the forgoing arguments TFCAs are not very different from the previous forms of 
colonial practices which secluded the blacks from conservations areas using fences and military 
tactics. Like the former, TFCAs also use military tactics to prevent local people from trespassing. 
The state also criminalizes and brutalizes the local people and whoever is caught poaching, in some 
instances the people labeled as poachers are killed. This shows that the state is willing to go to 
extreme violet acts to protect biodiversity and push human beings away (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 
2016). In relation to this some scholars argue that conservation is a form of social relationship in 
which the powerful strive to prevent the weak from accessing resources which are vital for a 
sustained livelihood (Durand, 2019).  
Although there are claims that TFCAs create employment for the local people, as indicated above, 
the views of civil society organizations question the quality of jobs the local people get and there 
is no possibility that these jobs will lift people from poverty. In relation to this, field data indicate 
that the scouts employed to provide animal security get a salary of about $100 per month (Local 
community farmer 3, interview, 26 July 2018). This is too little for employees to cater for their 
basic needs given the high cost of living. The local people are rarely in executive positions thus 
they cannot make decisions and control what happens in the areas (Civil Society Organization 
Senior Official1, interview, 22 January2018). The decisions on what to do in the areas are outside 
the mandate and capacity of the local people. Sometime, the local people are also not well and 
fully represented by the local leadership.  
These jobs do not benefit many people, as seen from the quality of jobs and number of people 
employed. The jobs are too few compared to the demand and promise of the KAZA TFCA. In 
relation to this Munthali (2007) argues that States rarely employ adequate human resource to 
protect the resources.   Further, some authors have criticized these kinds of employment for not 
making the local people financially independent as the remunerations are too low and render them 
more dependent on their employers. This is evidenced by poor conditions exhibited by the local 
people living in the conservancy, sanctuary and adjacent to the TFCAs (Chiutsi & Saarinen, 2017; 
Ramutsindela, 2004) as seen in figure 6.12. The figure below shows a house of one of the local 
community members.  
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Figure 6.12: Example of a house of the local community farmer, Source: Author, 2018 
In relation to the above, the study revealed that the local people take up jobs which have no 
decision-making powers, as well as low class jobs as mentioned above (Civil Society Organization 
senior official 1, interview, 24 November 2017) thus perpetuating poverty. Therefore, the idea of 
local people benefiting fully from the KAZA needs very careful scrutiny and consideration. 
Therefore, the establishment and management of the KAZA TFCA does not escape the critique of 
TFCAs who have condemned the TFCAs on the basis of their failure to involve the local 
communities in decision making processes, creating low wage jobs, grabbing land from local 
communities - thereby pushing them into absolute poverty -and giving more power to their 
financiers (Ramutsindela, 2004; Munthali , 2007; Dzingirai, 2004; Lunstrum, 2015; Duffy, 2016). 
In line with this, Simunthule (2019) contends that TFCAs are not for local people’s wellbeing, 
they are mainly for biodiversity conservation and enriching commercial stakeholders while the 
cost is imposed on the local poor. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The chapter has shown that the introduction of KAZA TFCA and the Simalaha restocking project 
in particular has benefited the local communities by providing them with training in conservation 
farming, creating long term opportunities in eco-tourism and supplying seeds and treadle pumps, 
among others. However, the training as well as the seeds and pumps are only given to less than 
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50% of the total population in the conservancy while the remaining population continues to 
struggle. On the other hand, the reintroduction of wildlife has created new problems such as 
destruction of fields, thus pushing the local poor into absolute and abject poverty. Further, although 
the participation of the local community is integral to the success of the KAZA, the local people 
are not involved in meaningful participation as seen from the quality of the jobs given to them, 
which are mostly low paying with no decision-making powers. The Village Action Groups 
(VAGs) meant to represent the local communities are also dominated by the traditional leaders 
who may not represent the needs of the local people. As such the local people continue to live in 
poverty. Thus, the huge promise of TFCAs to the local community is yet to be seen in Simalaha. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: REFLECTIONS ON THE KAZA TFCA 
7.1 Introduction 
Over the past 20years, Southern Africa has seen the establishment of about eighteen TFCAs, 
among them the KAZA TFCA. However, KAZA’s recent existence does not reflect major 
improvements in the tourism sector in Zambia and the local people living close to the parks remain 
marginalised. Local people are even more disadvantaged as they cannot farm on large areas away 
from their homes, due to the fear of wildlife destroying their crops and being attacked by wildlife. 
Thus, the local people are encouraged to engage in conservation farming on small land on their 
backyard or near their homes. This is not only done in order to prevent their crops from being 
destroyed but also create more space for wildlife conservation. 
This chapter provides the final reflections of the thesis, whose aim was to investigate the 
motivation behind Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, types of investment and the implication 
the impaction of the KAZA on local communities. The study used the Simalaha Community 
Conservancy as a case study to understand the role of TFCAs as a development mechanism that 
balances imperatives between nature conservancy and socio-economic development in Southern 
Africa. The chapter reflects back on the research objectives by linking literature reviewed to the 
findings and further highlights conceptual insights. The thesis used the lens of political ecology to 
understand the power relations among the actors involved. It dwelt much on the role of the state 
in resource management in the KAZA TFCAs.  Political ecology was used in this study of TFCAs 
because it provided an understanding of the changing roles of the state in the face of global actors 
such as the international financing organizations and international conservation organizations 
among others. Political ecology was also used because it is cardinal in assessing control and access 
of the resources in TFCAs by various stakeholders, including states, local communities and 
international players among others. This chapter is divided into five sections including the 
introduction. Section two reflects on the rationale for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, before 
highlighting the investments of the Zambian government in KAZA in section three, in accordance 
with the research objectives. Section four highlights the implications of the creation of the KAZA 
TFCAs on the local people. In section five the conclusion of the chapter is presented. Finally, the 
recommendations are given in the sixth section. In the following section I reflect on Zambia’s 
interests in participating in the KAZA. 
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7.2 Rationale for participation in the KAZA 
TFCAs in Southern Africa are relatively new and are viewed as a way of balancing environmental 
conservation, socio-economic development and poverty reduction objectives. Countries around 
the world, and Southern Africa in particular, have different reasons for their participation in 
TFCAs. Proponents have pointed out conservation, tourism, peace, regional integration and 
economic development as key reasons for countries’ participation in the TFCAs (Bennett, 2003; 
Hanks, 2003; PPF, 2008). Thus, Zambia’s motivation for participation in the KAZA is not 
dissimilar to the regional objectives for joining TFCAs and includes conservation of biodiversity, 
regional integration, and social-economic growth through tourism development, which is cardinal 
for poverty alleviation, among others. Contrary to conservation narratives, some authors have 
argued that the participation of countries in TFCAs goes beyond conservation narratives. States 
participate because of the incentives which go hand in hand with TFCAs, such as donor funding, 
economic gains, environmental and political gains (Ramutsindela, 2004).  Thus, the participation 
of states in TFCAs comprises a combination of both individual needs and potential gains 
(Ramutsindela, 2004, 2007). Given the motivation for participation in the KAZA, the government 
of Zambia sees the need, often ‘political’-to also participate and contribute towards the 
establishment /implementation of the KAZA TFCA like any other state actor in SADC.  
As stated above, conservation of wildlife is one of Zambia’s motivations for participation and it is 
in line with the KAZA TFCA objectives. This is reinforced through the creation of KAZA and 
reinforces conservation through the creation of conservancies such as the Simalaha Conservancy. 
There has also been an introduction of ‘wires’ to ‘fence off’ certain areas and deprive local 
population of free movement and accessibility. The people can no longer move freely in the fenced 
areas for fear of being accused of poaching and they cannot easily access land-based resources 
such as water, fish, forestry and wildlife due to the restrictions associated with the establishment 
of the KAZA and enforcement by the scouts. This is not unique to the KAZA, other TFCAs 
including GTLP have also evicted local people from their land. While States are preoccupied by 
the above motivations when participating in the TFCAs, the creation of KAZA TFCA goes beyond 
that. It brings together different actors into play. Therefore, the creation of the KAZA TFCA 
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creates unique complex relationships and international cooperation among the state and non-state 
actors on sensitive issues which relate to taking down of colonial boundaries.  
The actors involved exert different forms of power at various levels. The power of the states is 
embedded in legislation, financing and the professional discretion of state bureaucrats, while the 
non-state actors such as NGOs and conservation organizations’ power take the form of technical 
expertise and the financial capacity to fund the TFCAs. In this context the powerful NGOs are said 
to influence public policy in public interest, (Adams at.el, 2003). Similarly, the powerful states, 
and those with better infrastructure such as Zimbabwe tend to benefit more from tourism gains as 
a result of the creation of the KAZA than those with poor infrastructure like Zambia. It is important 
to note that the formation of the KAZA has resulted in the restoration of wildlife which was lost 
during the liberation wars. Over one thousand two hundred (1200) animals have been reintroduced 
to Simalaha Conservancy. However, the participation of Zambia in the KAZA has not resulted in 
social-economic development and the tourism sector remains underdeveloped, with low tourist 
arrivals on the Zambia component of KAZA. 
7.3 Investments in the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component 
The second objective of this research was to understand Zambia’s investment in the KAZA. 
Accordingly, the government of Zambia has invested huge portions of land (see Chapter Five). 
This land comprises both communal and private land on which the KAZA TFCA is being 
implemented (Munthali at.el, 2018). Furthermore, the government also hires some of the human 
resources and builds the human capacity of workers to implement the KAZA on the Zambian 
component and provides some of them with salaries. It is also the responsibility of the government 
to pay for allowances such as travel for officers on official duties such as KAZA meetings. 
However, this kind of investment is not enough for the implementation of the KAZA, and, thus, 
PPF also hires staff to work in the KAZA and Simalaha Community Conservancy, in particular. 
The research established that despite Zambia being endowed with vast natural resources, 
conservation in Zambia remains least prioritized as evidenced from low investment levels by the 
government. Hence, it relies on funding from international organizations such as the KfW, WWF 
and World Bank, among others, with KfW being the major donor. These organizations have 
invested financial and technical support in the establishment and running of the KAZA TFCA. 
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Most of the support from donors goes through PPF or SADC. These organizations do not only 
fund but also regulates the usage of the funds and ensure that their interests of ensuring control 
through the use of direct or implied measures of power in the establishment and management of 
TFCAs is maintained (Duffield, 2007). Therefore, the KAZA TFCA is mainly a donor funded 
project with low prospects for project sustainability after donors pull out. This study established 
that fund allocation for KAZA TFCA, like any other TFCA to which Zambia participates in, does 
not reflect in national budgets. This means that, should the funders `withdraw their funding the 
project may come to an end. This then draws into question and begs microscopic interrogation of 
the efficacy of the objectives in the KAZA TFCA.   
Further, the presence of big international organizations in TFCAs poses a threat to national 
sovereignty. This is because the financiers of TFCAs may provide the frameworks which may be 
the basis for the policies of resource management in poor countries. The absence of total 
sovereignty by the member states implies that states cannot make independent decisions but are 
influenced by strong external financial forces which may not have the local community at heart 
(Anderson et al., 2013). As such the countries are reduced to fronts and surrogates for the powerful 
and a few elites, thus the resources are not controlled by the member states but the financiers. 
Therefore, the states are in the pockets of the financiers (Wolmer, 2003). 
7.4 What is in TFCAs for local communities? 
Scholars have invested their time and resources in researching the effects of TFCAs on the local 
communities (Anderson et al. 2013). Accordingly, the third research objective for this study was 
to explore the implications of the KAZA on the local population. TFCAs are said to be the tourism 
driving forces, leading to social-economic development through the creation of jobs for the locals. 
However, this research revealed that TFCAs do not automatically translate into tourism growth 
and economic prosperity. Therefore, being a part of TFCAs does not guarantee tourism growth 
and local beneficiation. For poor countries like Zambia, in order for the tourism industry to flourish 
and create value for both the participating countries and local populations, there is a need to address 
other drivers of the competitive tourism sector such as good infrastructure, including provision of 
adequate transport infrastructure, water, ICT and energy,, ensure novel marketing strategies, 
pricing strategies and put in place integrated tourism development policies, among others. These 
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factors are not well addressed in the KAZA TFCA, hence, the initiative does not create a 
competitive Zambia and local beneficiation remains very low. Thus, it can be argued that tourism 
mainly benefits those countries with a well-established tourism sector, while the less developed 
countries hardly see the benefits of tourism at all. As such the local communities see little or no 
benefits from the TFCAs proclaimed tourism benefits (Mogende, 2016).  
There was a general consensus among all the government officials in this study that the TFCAs 
are people driven and take on a human face. On the contrary, this research established that TFCAs 
on the Zambian component take an undemocratic top-down approach, which does not include the 
local communities in decision making portfolios. Although the local chiefs are said to represent 
local communities, their participation does not guarantee full representation of the local people’s 
needs (see Chapter Six). In relation to this, one research participant insisted that, the location of 
the Simalaha project offices at the palace creates a barrier between the project and the local 
communities because local people find it difficult to get to the palace (Local community farmer 3, 
interview, 26 July 2018). In this regard, critics of TFCAs argue that TFCAs take a Top-down, 
market-oriented approach imposed on Africa by international bureaucracies as a solution to 
environmental problems (Wolmer, 2003; Anderson et al. 2013; Ramutsindela, 2014). The fact that 
TFCA formation is driven by foreign donors with the support of a few local elites (both state 
bureaucrats, traditional leadership structures and civil society), it can never be an independent and 
local people driven initiative. The funders provide guidelines on how their funds should be used 
and local elites champion the local agenda, usually without due consideration of vulnerable rural 
local populations. Thus, the elites create a form of elite control (Ramutsindela et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, most decisions are made at regional level where there is no local community 
representation, thus the local people become invisible (Duffy, 2006; Anderson et al. 2013). 
Accordingly, there is no room for the local communities to engage with the donors or make 
adjustments to suit their local needs. It can be argued that TFCAs have not given ample attention 
to strengthen the weak voices of the local rural communities and their ability to favorably 
participate in decision making positions and processes, thus most decisions made are less sensitive 
to the local needs. In relation to this Mark (1994) maintains that in conservation of resources, the 
less powerful are sidelined from accessing the resources by the powerful actors who control the 
management of resources by enacting laws which enable or disable access to resources.  
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Although there are claims that TFCAs bring hope to the local communities living adjacent to 
national parks by facilitating job creation as tourism begins to boom, this study shows no 
significant improvement in the livelihood of the local communities because the local people 
continue to be marginalized and some experience hasher conditions due to human-animal conflicts. 
In Simalaha, a place of social deprivation, the competition for natural resources such as water 
between newly introduced animals and local populations is rife and wildlife continue to destroy 
the fields of the local communities (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008) thus making them food insecure. 
Other critics have argued that TFCAs do not empower the local communities but, rather, 
disenfranchise them by restricting both their access and control over the resources which they 
previously had (Dzingirai, 2004). In relation to this by introducing conservation farming training 
in 2013 and encouraging people to restrict themselves to back yard farming. More than one 
thousand people in Simalaha Community Conservancy have been trained and are participating in 
conservation farming. It can therefore be argued that the local people in Simalaha Conservancy 
have been ‘swiftly and quietly evicted’ from their farming land to backyard farming. This is done 
to pave the way for conservation, to the detriment of food security for local populations. This 
makes these populations more vulnerable because the resources from which they derived their 
living are no longer accessible.  
In addition, it has also been argued that linking poverty to conservation brings to the fore the idea 
of the donors using conservation to help in the alleviation of poverty. This donor figure does not 
necessarily result in reduction of poverty but, instead, conjures up images of colonial-masters 
trying to recolonize Africa in the name of conservation (Singh and Houtum, 2002). Further, there 
is more emphasis on enlarging conservation spaces through the creation of TFCAs than on finding 
ways of enabling local communities to benefit more from TFCAs. This shows that the donors are 
more interested in pushing forward their agenda of increasing their control over resources than 
improving the lives of the local communities. This is evidenced in the high poverty levels of the 
people living adjacent to the parks (Ramutsindela, 2004), including those who live in the KAZA 
TFCA in Western province of Zambia. The findings clearly dispute the claims by proponents of 
the alleged magical performance of TFCAs. 
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The study shows that community empowerment is inadequate in terms of enabling local people to 
live independently. Not only do local people lack both financial capital and the requisite skills to 
get involved in the tourism business, they also do not have ownership rights to natural resources 
and therefore depend on the often-low wage employment offered by the private companies who 
own the means of production (Ramutsindela & Noe, 2012). These jobs expose the local people to 
exploitation and render them dependent on the people providing them with wages. Where the 
locals do strive towards participating in tourism, the returns are very low. In relation to this, a study 
on tourism conducted by Suich (2008), in the KAZA region shows that locals own 50% of tourism 
related enterprises. However, the return rates, as well as local capacity building, remain low. This 
indicates that tourism does not necessarily translate to improved living standards of the local 
people (Scovronick & Turple, 2009). This is vividly true for the people of Simalaha. Therefore, 
for the local people to reap meaningful benefits from the KAZA, there is a need for true 
empowerment whose control should be locally based.  The local people need both financial capital 
and capacity building in order for them to properly participate in the tourism business and receive 
true financial and social gains. Other benefits includeemployment opportunities, provision of 
agricultural inputs, provision of a good road network and energy, among others. However, even 
empowerment may not translate  into immediate results for the local communities as the benefits 
derived from wildlife take a longer period to manifest.  
This study revealed the gap between the promises of TFCAs to local people and the realities on 
the ground in the KAZA.  There is no mention of how the local communities will radically connect 
with KAZA investment benefits, besides the mention of a trickledown effect to the poor in 
communities. The study shows that in Simalaha, any hopes based on the trickledown effect will 
remain over ambitious. In relation to this, Ramutsindela maintains that it remains unclear ‘how 
TFCA gains will ensue and be used to solve domestic problems’ (Ramutsindela, 2004:125). 
Furthermore, the KAZA has led to the creation of the ‘new state,’ which I refer to as the ‘KAZA 
State’. In this state the new approaches, regulations and policies to manage the common resources 
have been formulated. The ‘KAZA State’ has also adopted extreme measures to protect and defend 
wildlife, through the use of military tactics and shoot to kill (Ramutsindela, 2016). Furthermore, 
people caught hunting are labeled as poachers and punished as such, while in some instances such 
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people are even killed. It is important to note that despite the creation of the KAZA and efforts to 
harmonize policies, poaching in the KAZA region continues to be on the rise. 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
The research used a case study method to understand the motivation behind the government of 
Zambia’s participation and investments in the KAZA, as well as its implication on the local people. 
Political ecology provided a framework for understanding the research objectives, the complex 
relationships of actors involved in the KAZA TFCAs and power struggles over access to natural 
resources, including land and water. Over the past two decades, the countries have been 
increasingly embracing the TFCA’s style of conservation as this is seen to be reconciling both 
ecological and economic needs. The study showed that TFCAs are highly political projects and 
their successful implementation requires the political will of all involved. The KAZA TFCA is 
also a complex project as it involves five states with differing legislation, policies and 
implementing agencies. The establishment of the KAZA has largely been motivated by ecological 
reasons. Against this backdrop, KAZA region is said to be home to the largest number of the 
remaining African elephants (approximately 120,000). The study has indicated that countries 
participate in the KAZA for various reasons, including conservation, regional integration, peace 
and security, among others. It can be said that countries have different needs and expectations from 
the KAZA, due to their diverse levels of development. Accordingly, Zambia participates in the 
KAZA because its conservation plans are in line with the KAZA’s objectives. Other reasons for 
participation include regional integration, regional blocs and TFCAs: KAZA-SADC relations and 
social-economic development. 
The study further established that the KAZA region represents an unequal investment project by 
member states. This is because the member states are at different levels of development, as 
mentioned above. Thus, they invest differently in the KAZA. Furthermore, the KAZA project is 
donor-driven and some countries, particularly Zambia, do not invest much in terms of 
infrastructure, including roads, in the KAZA, despite the potential benefits the KAZA promises. 
Therefore, the claim that KAZA TFCA is a member states owned, does not imply real ownership 
by states as the KAZA operations are driven by outside actors who finance the KAZA operations. 
These financiers of the KAZA TFCA have the decision-making powers. Thus, the creation of 
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TFCAs has shifted the role of the state to that of hosts rather than as equal partners in the 
implementation of the TFCAs.  
KAZA’s implementation tends to marginalize the local communities. This is because the local 
people are not given decision making positions. Instead, the decision-making processes tend to 
involve technical bureaucrats, local elites and international NGOs and donor agencies, among 
others. Therefore, KAZA TFCA can be viewed as undemocratic global environmental governance 
which takes a top-down approach in its implementation agenda and excludes the local communities 
who are directly affected by the creation of the KAZA. Thus, real ownership is not in the hands of 
the local communities. Although some key informants and scholars claim that the creation of the 
KAZA TFCAs has led to alternative livelihoods such as conservation farming and gardening 
resulting into food security (Hanks, 2003; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017), 
this study revealed that the introduction of KAZA TFCAs has resulted in human-animal conflicts. 
It also found that the wildlife introduced to Simalaha conservancy destroy the fields of the people 
living in the conservancy, resulting in loss of crops, food insecurity and, in some instances, the 
local people are killed by wildlife. Thus, the KAZA TFCA produces new sets of problems and 
struggles. Furthermore, the KAZA does not offer a market for the few people who produce excess 
crops for selling. This means that the conservation programmes introduced by the KAZA project 
have so far not transformed the lives of the local people and most people living close to the 
conservancy continue to live in poverty. It can therefore be argued that TFCAs are a new form of 
the colonization of Africa, as opposed to improving the living standards of the local communities. 
 
7.6 Recommendations 
Based on the findings, the study has presented the following recommendations:  
1. The KAZA TFCA should be owned and run by the member states and give meaningful 
participation to local communities. This requires capacity building of the local people as 
well as instilling intellectual skills and building financial capacity. 
2. There is need for TFCAs to take a bottom-up rather than and a top-down approach in its 
management and operation. Thus, the Simalaha offices on the Zambian component should 
be shifted from the palace to the village to allow for free local level participation. 
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3. There is a need for the project to fulfill its promises, such as provision of water, paying the 
contract farmers and providing a market to the local farmers, among others, in order to win 
the trust of the local community. 
4. Member states should invest more (funds and support) in the TFCAs so as to prevent the 
collapse of TFCAs should donors withdraw their funding.  
5. There is need to invest more in the social sector. Education, health and environmental 
management need to anchor the success of the KAZA.   
6. KAZA needs to expand its operational scope beyond wildlife to include other equally 
important resources such as water and forestry, among others. 
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LIST OF APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
QUESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND NGOs 
Section A: Interview participant profile  
1. Name…………………………………………………………………………………… (Optional) 
2. Name of organisation/Department……………………………………………….…..  
3. Designation………………………………………………………………………………………..… 
4. Number of years or months in the position……………………………………..……. 
5. Briefly describe ways in which your organisation engages with the KAZA 
………..………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Section B: Knowledge and information on KAZA 
 
6. Why and how is Zambia participating in the KAZA TFCA? 
 
1. What is the motivation for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA?  
2. How and when was the decision to participate in the KAZA made?  
3. What is the lead institution in Zambia’s participation in the KAZA?  
4. How is Zambia participating in the KAZA? 
5. Why did Zambia come up with the IDP for the KAZA? 
6. What is the strategic focus of the IDP for the KAZA? 
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7. Who funded the formulation of the IDP? 
8. Did the formulation of the IDP involve government officials or consultants or both? 
9. What do you expect to achieve from the IDP? 
10.  What has been achieved from the IDP  
11. To what extent are the objectives of the IDP been achieved? 
12. Which other stakeholders are collaborating with the government of Zambia in the KAZA project? 
13. Explain how the collaboration is structured and implemented.  
14. What are the underlying motives for Zambia’s investment in the KAZA TFCA? 
1. What is the government of Zambia investing in the KAZA? 
2. Which other institutions are investing in the KAZA? 
3. How did the land become part of the KAZA? 
4. Were there any conflicts in the formation of the KAZA? What were the drivers of these conflicts? 
Give examples.  
5. In cases where local people refused to have their land become part of the KAZA, what measures 
were taken/or are being taken? Have these dynamics reduced or increased? 
6. How have the local populations benefited from the KAZA?  
7. What infrastructure has been built as a result of the KAZA  
8. What is the motive for the investment? 
9. How is the Zambian government benefiting from the investment in the KAZA?  
10. Who does the government/private sectors/NGOs’ investment benefit? 
11. What are the implications of the KAZA TFCA on the local communities on the Zambian side? 
1. How does the investment in the KAZA affect the local people? 
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2. Where their resettlement of the local people when KAZA was being created? 
3. How was it done? Any special actors?  
4. What are the benefits of the investments to the local people? 
5. What are the negative effects of the creation of the KAZA on the local people? 
6. How are the local people involved in the operation of the KAZA? 
7. What challenges do you face when dealing with local communities?  
Questions for Land Owners 
8. Are you aware that your land is part of the TFCA? 
9. Given that your land is part of the TFCA, how would you like it to be used? 
10. What are you benefiting from the TFCA investment? 
11. What are the negative impacts of the formation of the TFCA? 
12. Has your income increased or reduced, or livelihood become more secure or insecure due to the 
establishment of the KAZA?  
13. Was this land grabbed from you or you gave or sold it to KAZA without any coercion? 
14. If you were compensated, was the compensation satisfactory to you? 
CAN I USE OR NOT USE YOUR NAME IN THE RESEARCH REPORT? 
Thank you for the time 
 
 
 
